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o
bscured by the current economic moment and the nation’s rightful preoccupation with recov-
ery, the united States stands poised at a moment of significant societal change.
over the last decade, America has passed a number of major demographic milestones. The 
State of Metropolitan America shows how these “new realities” are redefining who we are, 
where and with whom we live, and how we provide for our own welfare, as well as that of our 
families and communities. And these new realities, most pronounced in the leading edge of the nation’s met-
ropolitan areas, are fundamental: the continued growth and outward expansion of our population; its ongoing 
racial and ethnic diversification; the rapid aging on the horizon; our increasing but selective higher educational 
attainment; and the intensified income polarization experienced by our workers and families. 
These underlying realities are too large to ignore any longer. Specific policy responses designed to make the 
most of America’s potential in the face of the nation’s relentless pace of change must be priorities for national, 
metropolitan, and local actors alike in the coming decade. failure to recognize and address these challenges 
will only further thwart the timeless American struggle to form a more perfect union.
by understanding the context and landscape of America’s metropolitan areas, we can begin to develop 
smarter policies to increase more equitable opportunities for our nation.
The rockefeller foundation is proud to support this seminal report and the ongoing State of Metropolitan 
America series at brookings, which will continue to chronicle the demographic shifts transforming America, 
from the ground up. Support for this and other urban initiatives in the united States and around the world 
affirms the foundation’s commitment to building more resilient cities and metropolitan regions.
We hope you find this report a useful lens on America’s future.
Judith Rodin 
president 
The rockefeller foundation 
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he 2000s were a tumultuous decade for Americans. The oscillating state of the economy, which 
careened from a mild recession to booming house prices and, finally, to the worst downturn since 
the great Depression, complicates the task of summarizing what the decade meant for the future 
of American society. nonetheless, the boom-bust economics of the 2000s did not repeal the structural forces 
that continue to transform our population. 
This report shows that our nation now faces five 
“new realities” that are redefining who we are, where 
and with whom we live, and how we provide for 
our own welfare, as well as that of our families and 
communities. in each of these five areas, the nation 
reached critical milestones in the 2000s that make 
those underlying realities too large to ignore any lon-
ger. And large metropolitan areas—the collections of 
cities, suburbs, and rural areas that house two-thirds 
of America’s population—lay squarely on the front 
lines of those trends.
THE FIVE NEW REALITIES
Growth and Outward Expansion
The nation’s population passed 300 million, and over 
the course of the decade, the nation will have added 
roughly 28 million people. our nation’s large metro 
areas remain at the cutting edge of the nation’s 
continued growth. between 2000 and 2009, they 
grew by a combined 10.5 percent, versus 5.8 percent 
growth in the rest of the country. but they continued 
to spread out, too, as their less developed, outer 
areas grew at more than three times the rate of their 
cities and inner suburbs.
Population Diversification
The united States population is today one-third non-
white, and those groups accounted for 83 percent 
of national population growth from 2000 to 2008. 
immigration continues to fuel our growth, too, and 
now nearly one-quarter of u.S. children have at least 
one immigrant parent. This coming-of-age genera-
tion, a little over 30 years from now, will stand on the 
precipice of our transition to a majority non-white 
nation. large metropolitan areas will get there first, 
as their under-18 population had already reached 
majority non-white status by 2008.
Aging of the Population
Together, u.S. baby boomers and seniors now number 
more than 100 million. large metro areas are in some 
ways aging faster than the rest of the nation, experi-
encing a 45 percent increase in their 55-to-64 year-
old population from 2000 to 2008. As a result, their 
single-person households are growing more rapidly 
as well, especially in suburban communities that were 
not designed with these populations in mind.
7
Uneven Higher Educational Attainment
More than one-third of u.S. adults held a post-
secondary degree in 2008, up from one-quarter in 
1990, helping to propel our economic growth. but 
younger adults, especially in large metro areas, are 
not registering the same high levels of degree attain-
ment as their predecessors. Moreover, the African 
American and hispanic groups projected to make 
up a growing share of our future workforce now lag 
their white and Asian counterparts in large metro 
areas on bachelor’s degree attainment by more than 
20 percentage points. 
 
Income Polarization
The typical American household saw its inflation-
adjusted income decline by more than $2,000 
between 1999 and 2008—and probably even further 
by 2009 when the economy hit bottom. low-wage 
and middle-wage workers lost considerable ground, 
but high-wage workers saw earnings rise. The num-
ber of people living below the poverty line increased 
as well. large metro areas stood at the vanguard of 
these troubling trends. by 2008 high-wage workers 
in large metro areas out-earned their low-wage coun-
terparts by a ratio of more than five to one, and the 
number of their residents living in poverty had risen 
15 percent since 2000.
THE VARIABLE METRO MAP
large metropolitan areas as a group are “ahead of 
the curve” on the five new demographic and social 
realities that America confronts. however, in some 
ways, large metropolitan areas actually became 
more different from one another in the 2000s, mak-
ing it even more important to understand American 
society from the individualized perspectives of these 
places. no longer easily grouped along traditional 
regional lines, such as Sun belt versus Snow belt, 
or east versus West, this “pulling apart” reinforces 
a new seven-category typology of metropolitan 
America:
•  Next Frontier metro areas exceed national aver-
ages on population growth, diversity, and educa-
tional attainment. of these nine metro areas, eight 
lie west of the Mississippi river (Washington, D.c. is 
the exception)
•  New Heartland metro areas are also fast growing, 
highly educated locales, but have lower shares of 
hispanic and Asian populations than the national 
average. These 19 metro areas include many in the 
“new South” where blacks are the dominant minor-
ity group, such as Atlanta and charlotte, as well as 
largely white metro areas throughout the Midwest 
and West, such as indianapolis and portland (or)
•  Diverse Giant metro areas feature some of the 
largest in the country, including the three most 
populous (new york, los Angeles, and chicago), 
as well as coastal anchors such as Miami and San 
francisco. These nine regions post above-average 
educational attainment and diversity, but below-
average population growth, owing in part to their 
large sizes
•  Border Growth metro areas are mostly located in 
southern border states, and as such are marked by 
a significant and growing presence of Mexican and 
other latin American immigrants. only orlando 
lies outside the main orbit of this group of 11 metro 
areas, which stretches from east Texas, through 
Arizona and nevada, and up california’s central 
Valley
•  Mid-Sized Magnet metro areas have experienced 
high growth, but exhibit lower shares of hispanic 
and Asian minorities, and lower levels of edu-
cational attainment. like many border growth ST
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centers, many of these 15 mid-sized, mostly 
Southeastern locations got caught in the growth 
spiral of the 2000s that ended abruptly with the 
housing crash
•  Skilled Anchors are slow-growing, less diverse 
metro areas that boast higher-than-average levels 
of educational attainment. of the 19 nationwide, 
17 lie in the northeast and Midwest, including 
large regions such as boston and philadelphia, 
and smaller regions such as Akron and Worcester. 
Many boast significant medical and educational 
institutions
•  Industrial Cores are in some ways the most 
demographically disadvantaged of the metropoli-
tan types. These 18 metro areas are largely older 
industrial centers of the northeast, Midwest, and 
Southeast. Their populations are slower-growing, 
less diverse, and less educated than national aver-
ages, and significantly older than the large metro-
politan average. These metro areas lost population 
in the aggregate in the 2000s
Viewing metropolitan America through this lens 
offers a more nuanced view of the country and its 
variable challenges than conventional regional gen-
eralizations. yet, even as large metro areas “pulled 
apart” demographically from one another in some 
ways in the 2000s, they also “came together” at the 
individual metropolitan scale so that suburbs and 
cities grew more alike in many ways. cities gained 
population at suburbs’ expense in the wake of the 
housing crash; a majority of members all major 
racial/ethnic groups now live in suburbs; and the sub-
urban poor population grew at roughly five times the 
rate of the city poor population over the decade.
A NEW DECADE OF RECKONING, 
FROM THE MACRO TO  
THE METRO
Some commentators have begun to refer to the 
2000s as “the lost decade,” largely on the basis 
of the lack of job and economic growth nationally 
during that time. but the decade was lost in another 
sense, too; the nation lost time and opportunity to 
respond to the challenges and prospects of its new 
demographic realities. 
We now stand on the precipice of a “decade of 
reckoning.” Questions around how to support com-
munities with rapidly aging populations, how to meet 
family and labor market needs through immigra-
tion, and how to help lower-paid workers support 
themselves and their families simply cannot go 
unaddressed for another decade without risking our 
collective standard of living and the quality of our 
democracy. Tackling these and other challenges will 
require coherent, purposeful leadership in the com-
ing years. 
national conversations tend to overlook the fact 
that these new realities affect not only “macro” con-
ditions such as the federal budget and the u.S. labor 
market. They are also experienced in places—mostly 
in our nation’s largest metropolitan areas. Therefore, 
a federal policy agenda must confront aspects of 
particular concern for the metropolitan communities 
on the front lines of these trends, including:
•  Accommodating more efficient growth, by putting 
a price on carbon to account for the external costs 
of fossil fuel combustion, encouraging greater 
coordination between housing and transportation 
planning, and reducing the deductibility of mort-
gage interest to discourage over-consumption  
of housing
9
•  Integrating and incorporating diverse popula-
tions, through comprehensive immigration reform 
that protects our borders and provides a fair path-
way to legal status, federal support for programs 
and practices that facilitate immigrant incorpora-
tion, and a national office of new Americans to 
elevate and coordinate makeshift local integration 
efforts
•  Enhancing community affordability and vital-
ity for seniors, including meeting rising demands 
for affordable housing integrated with services, 
protecting seniors’ home equity through enhanced 
oversight of mortgage products, and requiring the 
expenditure of federal transportation and housing 
funds to take into account the specific needs of 
older populations
•  Accelerating higher educational attainment, by 
continuing to focus on enhancing teacher quality 
for students in need and promoting effective inter-
ventions in low-performing schools, and rewarding 
and supporting institutions and students not just 
for enrollment in higher education, but also persis-
tence toward and completion of degrees
•  Reducing income inequality, by restoring and 
growing the productive capacity of the nation’s 
auto communities, pursuing enhanced labor  
standards enforcement, and renewing/expanding 
tax credits that support lower-income working 
families like the earned income Tax credit and 
child Tax credit
national policy makers have the unique obliga-
tion to address aspects of the five new realities that 
affect all metropolitan areas, or are simply beyond 
metropolitan areas’ own capacity to tackle. As this 
report demonstrates, however, different challenges 
assume varying levels of prominence in different 
types of metropolitan areas. leaders at the state, 
regional, and local levels must now more than ever 
understand and respond purposefully to the demo-
graphic, social, and economic changes most affect-
ing their places. 
•  Border Growth and Mid-Sized Magnet metro 
areas must seek greater economic balance in the 
wake of the housing crash. Smart infrastructure 
investments in these metro areas could promote 
growth of alternative energy production and ST
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distribution, international travel and tourism, and 
linkages with larger nearby centers of global com-
merce. Their leaders must also be fierce champions 
for the continued viability of 2- and 4-year higher 
education institutions, which offer the best hope 
for ensuring that their large and growing young, 
minority populations can share in the fruits of 
future economic growth
•  Diverse Giant and Next Frontier metro areas 
should adopt the most innovative practices  
for accelerating the civic and labor market inte-
gration of their larger immigrant and “second 
generation” populations. They should also set 
out “roadmaps” for addressing future local and 
regional population needs in an environmentally 
sustainable, fiscally efficient manner that  
create and preserve affordable options for low-  
and middle-income families
•  New Heartland metro areas, with migration  
rates likely to remain somewhat lower in the  
near term, should focus on growing a more  
educated pipeline of workers from within their  
own borders. Attracting younger middle-class 
families back to urban and inner-suburban public 
school systems, and forging closer partnerships 
between regional economic development and  
university officials, could help build the next  
middle class in these regions
•  Skilled Anchor and Industrial Core metro areas, 
while economically distinct, share certain demo-
graphic attributes and associated challenges. 
Slowing the tide of decentralization by building 
outward from anchor institutions and overhauling 
urban land use, keeping older skilled workers con-
nected to labor market opportunities, and inte-
grating housing and social services for urban and 
suburban senior populations should be priorities 
for their leaders
finally, new demographic realities must be met 
with new governance arrangements. especially 
in light of the deep fiscal crisis facing states and 
local governments, the lines between cities and 
suburbs—and the long, fruitless history of battles 
and mistrust between them—must be transcended, in 
all types of metropolitan areas. local leaders must 
forge regional solutions to newly shared regional 
challenges, such as linking the supply and demand 
sides of the labor market to benefit disadvantaged 
workers. They must undertake greater collabora-
tion in the delivery of services, or outright combine 
outdated, inefficient local government units such as 
school districts. And they must act like metropolitan 
areas in dealing with their states, consolidating their 
influence on common issues that affect the well-
being of their populations. 
CONCLUSION
The pace of change and complexity of u.S. society 
only seems to multiply with each passing decade. 
now, as the nation and its major metropolitan areas 
reach a series of critical demographic junctures, 
forging a constructive path forward to the “next  
society” is as much about helping communities  
manage the velocity of that transformation as it  
is about responding to its specific character. failure 
to maximize shared responses to the inevitable  
challenges of change, and common ownership of  
the solutions, will only serve to sow the seeds of 
intergenerational, interracial, and inter-ethnic 
conflict. understanding—from the ground up—who 
Americans are, and who they are becoming, is a  
critical step toward building constructive bridges 
before they become impassable divides. n
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ABOUT THE STATE oF METRoPolITAN AMERICA
T
he State of Metropolitan America is a signature effort of the brookings Metropolitan policy 
program that portrays the demographic and social trends shaping the nation’s essential economic 
and societal units—its large metropolitan areas—and discusses what they imply for public policies 
to secure prosperity for these places and their populations.
This report marks the inaugural edition of a 
regular summary report in brookings’ State of 
Metropolitan America series. it focuses on the major 
demographic forces transforming the nation and 
large metropolitan areas in the 2000s. in this sense, 
it previews what we will learn from the results of the 
2010 census, as well as supplements those results 
in important ways. future editions of the annual 
report will examine those results, probe more deeply 
specific types of populations and geographies pro-
filed in this report, and update the analysis herein 
as the country emerges from its deepest economic 
recession in decades. brookings’ ongoing State of 
Metropolitan America series will also feature regular 
reports on key demographic topics, and their rel-
evance to the changing populations of our metropoli-
tan areas, cities, and suburbs.
THE TOPICS
This report is arranged topically, with nine chap-
ters that correspond to nine of the most important 
subjects tracked by the census bureau in its annual 
American community Survey (AcS; see below):
n  Population and Migration follows the popula-
tion growth and decline of u.S. places over the 
decade, and how the movement of people—from 
next-door communities, from other parts of the 
country, and from abroad—contributed to these 
trends
n  Race and Ethnicity analyzes the changing 
racial (e.g., white, black, Asian) and ethnic (e.g., 
hispanic) composition of our population, includ-
ing the patterns of growth and decline in these 
groups in different corners of the nation1
n  Immigration focuses on America’s foreign-born 
population, both citizens and non-citizens: their 
growth, where they live, their characteristics, 
and the growing demographic influence of their 
children
n  Age looks at the shifting balance between older 
and younger Americans across the country, 
especially as the baby boom generation—Ameri-
ca’s largest—approaches seniorhood
n  Households and Families examines who makes 
up the fundamental units of our society, how 
their structures are changing over time, and 
how they relate to the different racial/ethnic 
and age profiles of America’s communities
n  Educational Attainment profiles the educa-
tional status of adults (how much schooling 
they have completed, their enrollment in higher 
education), identifies differences by age and ST
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race/ethnicity, and relates these to the underly-
ing economic features of regions
n  Work analyzes two sets of indicators on the sta-
tus of America’s labor force: the wages earned 
by differently compensated workers; and rates 
of unemployment, which reflect the varying 
degrees of economic pain experienced by dif-
ferent parts of the country
n  Income and Poverty portrays trends in the 
economic well-being of typical households, the 
size of the “middle class,” and the location and 
characteristics of America’s sizeable and grow-
ing poor population
n  Commuting details how we get to work, how 
those patterns have changed over time, and the 
factors contributing to the sizeable differences 
among communities in how workers undertake 
those daily trips
each chapter is authored by one or more 
brookings experts, each of whom has written widely 
on the topic at hand (see “About the Authors”). 
The chapters include the authors’ own analysis of 
the most important and compelling trends over the 
2000s at multiple levels of American geography 
(described further below), accompanied by their 
thoughts on what these trends mean for the future 
of people, places, and public policy.2
THE DATA
The data on which the bulk of this and many other 
reports in the State of Metropolitan America series 
are based come from the u.S. census bureau’s 
American community Survey (AcS) data. The AcS is 
a nationwide survey that provides an ongoing demo-
graphic, social, and economic portrait of the country 
and its communities, and the largest survey that the 
census bureau administers other than the decen-
nial census. About 3 million households each year 
receive and respond to the AcS, allowing the census 
bureau to construct a detailed profile of states, met-
ropolitan areas, and larger cities on an annual basis.3 
The latest AcS from which data are publicly available 
is from 2008 (see inset “The State of Metropolitan 
America and the great recession).
previously, many of the data now collected 
through the AcS were collected via the decennial 
census’ “long form.” The long form asked a sample 
of census respondents more detailed questions than 
the more common “short form,” on topics such as 
their marital status, where they were born, their level 
of education, and how much money they earned. 
The 2010 census only features the short form, which 
asks 10 basic questions regarding population, age, 
race and ethnicity, relationships among members 
of households, and homeownership. in essence, the 
AcS has replaced the long form, and in doing so has 
created a valuable opportunity to understand the 
in-depth population dynamics affecting our coun-
try’s communities more than once every 10 years. 
A further implication of this shift is that the 2010 
census, while providing essential information for 
research and policymaking, will not offer the same 
sort of treasure trove of socio-economic data as its 
predecessors.
A couple of further distinctions between the 
AcS and the decennial census long form are worth 
noting, in light of the fact that this report makes 
many comparisons between AcS data from 2008 
and decennial census data from 2000. first, the 
sample of American households that receive the AcS 
on an annual basis is considerably smaller than the 
sample that received the census 2000 long form. 
As a result, there is a greater degree of uncertainty 
that the results from the AcS represent the true 
14
characteristics of the underlying population than 
is the case with census 2000 results. The smaller 
the population of the geography in question (see 
below), the greater that degree of uncertainty, or 
“sampling error.” Where this report makes compari-
sons between results from census 2000 and the 
2008 AcS, we only report the value of the change 
over time if the margin of error for the reported AcS 
estimate indicates that the change is statistically 
significant.4 
Second, the AcS surveys households on a 
monthly basis, while census 2000 collected informa-
tion as of April 1 that year. one implication is that the 
“reference period” for certain questions differs from 
that in the decennial census. in particular, 2008 AcS 
respondents reported income they received in the 
previous 12 months, and the census bureau adjusted 
those data for inflation to reflect an estimate for 
their income in calendar year 2008. nevertheless, 
those data capture the economic condition of house-
holds stretching from January of 2007 (12 months 
prior to responses from January 2008 respondents) 
to December of 2008 (the final month of data 
collection for the 2008 AcS).5 in census 2000, by 
contrast, all long-form respondents reported their 
income for calendar year 1999. 
THE STATE OF METROPOLITAN 
AMERICA AND THE GREAT  
RECESSION
The bulk of analysis in this report covers popula-
tion characteristics in 2008, as well as trends 
during the “2000s,” used to refer to the period 
from 2000 to 2008.6 The 2008 American 
community Survey (AcS), like the AcS in other 
years, represents an aggregation of responses to 
the survey from a sample of households in each 
month of the year. The census bureau tabulates 
and reports the results to reflect the average 
profile of community populations across the 
entire calendar year. 
This is particularly relevant in the case of 
2008, which marked the first year of the “great 
recession,” by several measures the most 
severe that the united States experienced in the 
postwar period. The impact of the recession was 
significant but relatively mild in the first half of 
the year, but grew especially severe in the sec-
ond half of the year, particularly in September 
through December.7 The data presented here 
thus reflect national and metropolitan condi-
tions that span a portion of the great recession, 
but do not capture its full impact, which was felt 
most severely in 2009.
it seems likely that the more cyclical indica-
tors examined in this report through 2008, such 
as income and poverty, wages, and even migra-
tion and commuting patterns, may look some-
what different in 2009. however, most topics 
examined here, such as race and ethnicity, age, 
household structure, and educational attainment 
are more structural in nature, and will not look 
significantly different during or after the great 
recession than they did at its onset.
Most of the AcS data, and all of the decennial 
census data, analyzed in this report and presented 
at the State of Metropolitan America website (see 
below) come from the tables and data files hosted 
on the census bureau’s website, particularly its 
American factfinder tool.8 for certain more compli-
cated topics and indicators, however, the State of 
Metropolitan America benefited from special access 
to the full 2008 AcS data file hosted at the census 
bureau (stripped of individual identifiers). These sub-
jects, such as detailed educational attainment of the 
population for different age groups, characteristics ST
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Most topics 
examined here 
are more  
structural than 
cyclical and  
will not look  
significantly  
different due 
to the Great 
Recession.
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of the population in poverty, and commuting mode 
for workers of different incomes, could only be exam-
ined for the places profiled in this report via this 
special access.9
This report uses data from a couple of sources 
in addition to the AcS and decennial census. The 
most important of these is the census bureau’s 
population estimates program.10 using data from the 
last decennial census, more recent national surveys, 
and administrative records at all levels of govern-
ment, the program produces annual estimates of 
population, and its “components of change” (natural 
increase, domestic migration, and immigration), for 
all incorporated municipalities, counties, and states 
nationwide. The program also estimates state and 
county populations by age and race/ethnicity annual-
ly.11 These data provide the basis for much of our 
analysis in the population and Migration, race and 
ethnicity, and Age chapters. 
THE GEOGRAPHy
Metropolitan Areas
As its name indicates, this report focuses primar-
ily on metropolitan areas, the geographic building 
blocks of America’s economy and society. Why met-
ropolitan areas? unlike individual cities and towns, or 
large political units like states, these are the places 
within which most people—both here and abroad—live 
their daily lives. Most Americans (84 percent) live 
in metropolitan areas.12 Most of their workers (58 
percent) commute to jobs within their metropolitan 
area, but in a city or town different from the one in 
which they live.13 Most metropolitan residents who 
move (79 percent) choose another location in the 
same metro area.14 We do our shopping in different 
parts of metropolitan areas, get our media from met-
ro-wide newspapers and television stations, and root 
for sports teams and visit cultural institutions that 
service whole regions. We share natural resources 
and infrastructure—air, water, roads, airports—at the 
metropolitan scale. related businesses cluster and 
share innovations and labor force expertise within 
metro areas.15 in short, metropolitan areas represent 
the critical geographic lens through which to under-
stand a changing American society.
Metropolitan areas as a statistical concept join cit-
ies and their suburbs together to represent local and 
regional markets. in the united States, Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas are defined by the u.S. office of 
Management and budget (oMb) based on data gath-
ered by the census bureau. oMb locates these areas 
around a densely populated core, typically a city, of 
at least 50,000 people. counties that have strong 
commuting ties to the core are then included in the 
definition of the metropolitan area. oMb currently 
identifies 366 metropolitan areas nationwide, with 
populations ranging from 55,000 (carson city, nV) 
to 19 million (new york-northern new Jersey-long 
island, ny-nJ-pA).16
Within this group of metropolitan areas, the State 
of Metropolitan America series concentrates the bulk 
of its attention on the 100 largest, which in 2008 
coincided almost exactly with those metro areas 
having populations of at least 500,000.17 While there 
is nothing especially magical about the half million-
person threshold, these metropolitan areas are fairly 
recognizable places to most Americans. Moreover, 
nearly all of their largest cities have populations of 
at least 100,000. even more remarkably, these large 
metro areas continue to slowly but steadily increase 
their share of the nation’s population. At the turn 
of the 20th century, 44 percent of Americans lived 
in the counties that today make up the 100 largest 
16
metro areas.18 by 2000 that share had risen to 65 
percent, and by 2009 reached 66 percent.
 
Primary Cities and Suburbs
in addition to tracking trends for large metropolitan 
areas—individually and in the aggregate—the State 
of Metropolitan America also looks inside these 
places to differentiate their large cities and suburban 
areas. oMb defines “principal cities” for metropoli-
tan areas, which include the largest city in each, 
plus additional cities that meet specific population 
size and employment requirements.19 Many principal 
cities, while important destinations or residences 
for local populations, do not accord with what most 
Americans would regard to be a “city.” for instance, 
the los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA metro 
area—which is composed of los Angeles and  
orange counties—contains 25 oMb-designated  
principal cities.
The cities examined in this report—termed 
“primary cities” to distinguish them from oMb’s 
concept—include the first named city in each met-
ropolitan area (the largest), plus other incorporated 
places in the metro area name with populations of 
at least 100,000. because metro area names may 
feature a maximum of three principal cities, no more 
than 3 primary cities are designated for each metro 
area. Across the 100 largest metro areas, then, a 
total of 137 primary cities are identified.20 in refer-
encing some metro areas in tables and figures, the 
report modifies oMb’s official titles to reflect only 
those cities designated primary cities. for example, ST
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The Share of U.S. Population Living in the 100 Largest Metro Areas Continues to Grow
Share of U.S. Residents Living in 100 Largest Metro Areas, 1900–2009
Note: Geographical definition of 100 largest metro areas held constant to 2007 boundaries over time
Source: Brookings analysis of "Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990" (U.S. Census Bureau) and Population Estimates Program data
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the boston-cambridge-Quincy, MA-nh metro area is 
referred to as the boston-cambridge, MA-nh metro 
area, as Quincy has too small a population to be clas-
sified a primary city.21 
for each metro area, “suburbs” or “suburban 
areas” are designated as the remainder of the metro 
area outside of primary cities. This is an admit-
tedly crude approach, though one consistent with 
brookings’ longstanding demographic research 
methodology. in several chapters, however, the State 
of Metropolitan America goes a step further to ana-
lyze data for different types of suburbs. counties are 
The Twin Cities Area Contains a Range of Older and Newer Communities
Metropolitan County Types in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Area
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and Population Estimates data
18
 
MINNESOTA
WISCONSIN
Isanti
Chisago
Sherburne
Wright
Hennepin
Anoka
Ramsey
Washington
Minne-
apolis St. Paul
DakotaScott
Carver
St. Croix
Pierce
City/Suburban Type
Primary Cities
High Density
Mature
Emerging
Exurb
classified based on their degree of “urbanization”—
that is, what share of its people live in more densely 
populated areas—net of any primary cities they might 
contain. beyond the cities themselves, metropolitan 
counties are classified into four types of suburbs: 
high-density, mature, emerging, and exurban.
how does this look in a typical metropolitan area? 
in the Minneapolis-St. paul-bloomington, Mn-Wi 
metro area, Minneapolis (population 383,000) and 
St. paul (population 280,000) are designated pri-
mary cities, while bloomington (population 81,000) 
is not. The remainder of the counties in which the 
cities of Minneapolis and St. paul sit—hennepin and 
ramsey—are labeled “high-density” suburbs, owing 
to the large shares of their populations (over 95 
percent in 2000) that live in densely populated com-
munities. high-density suburbs tend to be among 
the first settled suburban areas outside of cities, 
and elsewhere are often termed “older” or “inner” 
suburbs. Two more Minnesota counties, Anoka and 
Dakota, are labeled “mature suburbs,” with between 
75 and 95 percent of their populations in urbanized 
areas. Many such suburbs were developed largely 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Three more Minnesota 
counties—carver, Scott, and Washington—are termed 
“emerging suburbs,” with between 25 percent and 
75 percent of their populations in urbanized areas. 
These tend to be among the fastest-growing commu-
nities in metropolitan areas, with significant develop-
ment in the 1980s and thereafter. finally, six more 
sparsely settled counties (four in Minnesota, two in 
Wisconsin) are labeled “exurbs,” areas that tend to 
lie at the rural fringe of metropolitan areas.22
THE WEBSITE
The State of Metropolitan America also introduces 
a dynamic, interactive website that allows users to 
display, map, and download data for the nation’s 50 
states (plus the District of columbia), 100 largest 
metropolitan areas, and their cities and suburbs 
on over 300 social, demographic, and economic 
indicators. The website goes beyond the report by 
providing more data, for more geographies, and for 
more years (2000, 2006, 2007, and 2008, as well as 
change since 2000), allowing users to make com-
parisons not presented in the report.
The website’s geographic profiles also provide a 
detailed “snapshot” of key indicators from across 
all nine of the report’s major subject areas, for each 
of the 100 largest metro areas (including their cities 
and suburbs) and the 50 states (plus the District 
of columbia), which users can view dynamically or 
download. in addition, subject profiles provide sum-
maries of each major subject area (e.g., population ST
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www.brookings.edu/metroamerica
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and migration, race and ethnicity, etc.) that users can 
display or download.
This interactive website, accessible at www. 
brookings.edu/metroamerica, facilitates readers’ 
continued exploration of the nation’s metropolitan 
areas and the particular trends highlighted in  
the report. n
ENDNOTES
1.  Many chapters include analysis for different race and 
ethnic groups. in general, the terms “white,” “black” or 
“African American,” “Asian,” and “other race” are used 
to refer to non-hispanic members of these groups, 
while “hispanics” or “latinos” (used interchangeably) 
can be of any race. The term "non-white" refers to 
groups other than non-hispanic whites. exceptions to 
this approach are noted in the text.
2.  The most notable AcS topic not addressed in this edi-
tion of the State of Metropolitan America is housing. 
The AcS collects information from households on 
subjects such as the age and layout of their homes, 
ownership status, housing costs, and home values. 
given the dramatic state of flux in the housing market 
in 2008 and thereafter, results from the survey on 
many of these topics may significantly lag current reali-
ties, especially in parts of the nation most affected by 
foreclosures and declines in house prices. Although this 
report does not include analysis on these housing sub-
jects, brookings does intend to return to the topic in a 
future edition of the annual report, as well as examine 
selected housing indicators as part of other forthcom-
ing reports in the State of Metropolitan America series.
3.  The results of the annual AcS are tabulated as “one-
year estimates” and provide a statistically valid sample 
for census-recognized geographies with populations 
of at least 65,000. The census bureau also combines 
multiple years of AcS results to yield statistically valid 
samples for smaller geographies. The obama adminis-
tration’s fy 2011 budget contains a $44 million request 
to increase the AcS sample to 2.5 percent of the popu-
lation, or 3.5 million households. FY 2011 Budget of the 
U.S. Government Appendix, Department of commerce.
4.  unless otherwise noted, comparisons between census 
2000 and 2008 AcS results are tested for statistical 
significance at the 90 percent confidence level. 
5.  This methodology has implications for the interpre-
tation of income data as reflecting the onset of the 
great recession in late 2007 and early 2008. See inset 
“The State of Metropolitan America and the great 
recession” for further details.
6.  The population and Migration chapter includes some 
data from 2009 on metropolitan populations and 
components of change, and the Work chapter includes 
unemployment rate data from 2009.
7.  nationwide, payroll employment declined 666,000  
(0.5 percent) in the first 6 months of 2008, then  
fell by 2,957,000 (2.2 percent) in the last 6 months of 
the year.
8. http://factfinder.census.gov 
9.  brookings and the u.S. census bureau entered into a 
Joint project Agreement in 2009 (Agreement number 
75-2009-JpA-01) that permitted brookings to analyze 
data from the 2008 American community Survey 
(AcS).  A brookings consultant with census bureau 
Special Sworn Status analyzed microdata housed on 
site at the census bureau in Suitland, MD, producing 
special tabulations for topics and geographies that 
could not be constructed using publicly-available data.  
The bureau’s AcS office provided brookings with 
access to the files and support in using them, and the 
bureau’s Disclosure review board provided review and 
approval of the tabulations that brookings produced.
10.  in addition, the Work chapter uses data on metropoli-
tan unemployment rates from the bureau of labor 
20
Statistics’ local Area unemployment Survey.
11.  Although many of these same topics are tracked in the 
AcS, the census bureau actually uses the population 
estimates program data to establish the sampling 
frame for the AcS, so that they represent a more 
primary source of information about population and its 
characteristics (and in the case of population counts, 
more recent) than the AcS. That noted, data on race 
and ethnicity and age for sub-county geographies (i.e., 
cities and suburbs) in this report come from the AcS, 
as they are not available from the estimates program.
12.  brookings analysis of census bureau population 
estimates program data for 2009.
13.  brookings analysis of American community Survey 
data for 2008. reflects people living in places (e.g., cit-
ies and towns).
14.  u.S. census bureau current population Survey, 2008 
Annual Social and economic Supplement.
15.  karen g. Mills, elisabeth b. reynolds, and Andrew 
reamer, “clusters and competitiveness: A new federal 
role for Stimulating regional economies” (Washington: 
brookings institution, 2008).
16.  Some of this description originally appeared in Alan 
berube, MetroNation: How U.S. Metropolitan Areas 
Fuel American Prosperity (Washington: brookings 
institution, 2007).
17.  in 2008, 101 metro areas had populations exceeding 
500,000 (lancaster, pA had 504,000 residents).
18.  All data for metropolitan areas in this report refer to 
the metro areas as they were defined by oMb in 2007; 
that is, we hold the county boundaries of metro areas 
consistent across time.
19.  for more on oMb/census methodologies for defining 
metro areas and principal cities, see William h. frey 
and others, “Tracking Metropolitan America into the 
21st century: A field guide to the new Metropolitan 
and Micropolitan Definitions” (Washington: brookings 
institution, 2004).
 20.  five primary cities—bradenton, fl; greenville, Sc; 
harrisburg, pA; portland, Me; and poughkeepsie, 
ny—are the largest cities in their respective metro 
areas but have populations under 65,000. As a result, 
the census bureau does not report results from the 
AcS for these cities in its one-year estimates due to 
insufficient sample size. Topics for which this report 
uses the 2008 AcS to analyze results for cities and 
suburbs typically exclude these five metro areas 
because of this data limitation.
 21.  The new york-northern new Jersey-long island, 
ny-nJ-pA metro area is re-named “new york-newark, 
ny-nJ-pA” to recognize newark’s role as a primary city 
in northern new Jersey. Metro areas listed by their full 
names, with brookings-designated primary cities identi-
fied, can be found on the website www.brookings.edu/
metroamerica.
22.  While the Minneapolis-St. paul metro area has suburbs 
of all different types based on this classification system, 
many metropolitan areas have fewer, especially those 
with a smaller number of large counties (such as in 
new england and the West). Therefore, indicators and 
trends by suburban type in this report are presented 
for all large metro areas in the aggregate, rather than 
for individual metro areas. for further description 
of a similar typology, see robert e. lang, Thomas W. 
Sanchez, and Alan berube, “The new Suburban politics: 
A county-based Analysis of Metropolitan Voting 
Trends Since 2000.” in ruy Teixeira, ed., Red, Blue, and 
Purple America: The Future of Election Demographics 
(Washington: brookings institution press, 2008).
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T
he 2000s were a tumultuous decade for Americans. The oscillating state of the economy, 
which careened from a mild recession, to a historic boom in house prices, to the worst 
downturn since the great Depression, complicates the task of summarizing what the decade 
meant for the future of American society. The 2000s were less a coherent era than a series 
of dramatically different economic epochs. Moreover, it is difficult to know whether, or how long, several of the 
recession-induced trends we identify in this report—slowed migration, increased enrollment in higher educa-
tion, declining median wages and incomes, rising levels of poverty—might persist into the coming decade. 
but even as the economy spun through a remark-
able series of astronomical highs and abysmal lows, 
demographic and social trends that continue to 
transform our population proceeded apace. if any-
thing, the decade accelerated America’s longer-term 
approach toward a number of critical demographic 
and social junctures. This report shows that our 
nation now faces a series of “new realities” about 
who we are, where and with whom we live, and how 
we provide for our own welfare, as well as that of our 
families and communities. These new realities relate 
to: the continued growth and outward expansion of 
our population; its ongoing racial and ethnic diversi-
fication; the “rapid” aging we are about to undergo; 
our increasing but selective higher educational 
attainment; and the intensified income polarization 
experienced by our workers and families. in each 
of these five areas, the nation reached important 
milestones in the 2000s that make those underlying 
realities too large to ignore any longer.
if these trends position the united States as a 
whole at a demographic crossroads, then our large 
metropolitan areas have already forged ahead.1 
because of their size, and their historical and con-
temporary role in America’s economy and society, 
our major cities and suburbs stand on the very 
front lines of these dynamics. They are thus the 
places where the nation is feeling the challenges 
that accompany these new realities first, and where 
the responses that will shape our next society must 
ultimately be co-produced.
THE FIVE NEW REALITIES
Growth and Outward Expansion
unlike many of its peers in the industrialized world, 
the united States retained a robust rate of popula-
tion growth in the 2000s. The nation’s population 
passed 300 million, and over the course of the 
decade, the nation will have added roughly 28 million 
people, about a 10 percent growth rate. The healthy 
levels of fertility and immigration present in the 
united States confirm that, despite economic tumult, 
our population—and those around the globe—remains ST
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hopeful about the opportunities our society pro-
vides. indeed, our growth will ultimately provide a 
demographic cushion that may help us cope better 
with another new reality—supporting an increasingly 
aging population (see below).
our nation’s large metro areas remain at the 
cutting edge of the nation’s continued growth. As 
Population and Migration shows, between 2000 and 
2009, the 100 largest metropolitan areas grew by a 
combined 10.5 percent, versus 5.8 percent growth in 
the rest of the country, and by the end of the decade 
housed two-thirds of all Americans. While, on net, 
people move from large metro areas to other parts 
of the country in the aggregate, these places gain 
from births to their relatively younger populations, 
and from the migrants they attract from abroad in 
large numbers.
yet the 2000s, particularly the go-go years of the 
housing bubble, fueled growth patterns in which the 
outermost reaches of metropolitan areas expanded 
at several times the rate of cities and core urban 
communities. in the 100 largest metro areas, cities 
and high-density suburban counties grew by a little 
under 5 percent from 2000 to 2008, while less 
developed, generally smaller counties grew at more 
usage.3 indeed, while Commuting confirms that the 
share of Americans getting to work via public transit 
grew marginally for the first time in decades, it did so 
against the backdrop of a society in which three out 
of four commutes occurred alone, in a car.
The bursting of the housing bubble ushered in at 
least a temporary retreat from the longer-run march 
toward outer suburbia and lower-density metropoli-
tan areas in general, a pattern also chronicled in 
Population and Migration. Whether a move toward 
more environmentally sustainable modes of liv-
ing and transportation, in both cities and suburbs, 
will persist into the 2010s will depend on a range 
of factors. if recent history is any guide, public 
policy tools—both national and local in scope—will be 
needed to ensure that future development reflects 
the full range of its economic and environmental 
impacts on communities and society.
Population Diversification
in a country that recently elected its first African 
American president, it can be easy to forget that not 
so long ago, we were a considerably more racially 
and ethnically homogeneous society than we are 
today. in 1970, non-hispanic whites accounted for 
roughly five in six Americans, a share that has 
dropped to less than four in six today. immigrants 
that year were less than 5 percent of u.S. population; 
their share topped 12 percent in 2008. Today, our 
nation’s population is one-third non-white (including 
hispanics), and those groups are projected to reach 
majority status by 2042. 
immigration helps explain this transition toward 
a more racially and ethnically diverse society. in the 
2000s, immigration accounted for roughly one-
third of u.S. population growth. The majority of the 
remainder came from a natural increase of native-
born racial and ethnic minorities. nearly a quarter of 
than three times that rate. 
by 2008, 40 percent of the 
metropolitan population lived 
in these spread-out areas.2 
This pattern of growth poses 
stark challenges for efforts 
to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. homes and cars 
account for a significant por-
tion of u.S. carbon emissions, 
and lower-density develop-
ment is associated with 
higher energy and vehicle 
24
309 million
U.S. population
40%
Share of large metropolitan popula-
tion living in lower-density counties
Growth and outward Expansion
all u.S. children in 2008 were the sons and daugh-
ters of at least one immigrant parent. This coming-
of-age generation, a little over 30 years from now, is 
projected to stand on the precipice of our transition 
to a non-white majority nation.
large metropolitan areas will get there first.  
As Race and Ethnicity reveals, in 2008 these  
areas contained 68 percent of the nation’s multi-
racial population, 74 percent of its blacks, 80 percent 
of its hispanics, and 88 percent of its Asians. 
roughly one in six of their residents was foreign-
born, a share exceeding that of the united States as 
a whole during the last great wave of immigration 
at the turn of the twentieth century. notably, the 
under-18 population across the 100 largest metro-
politan areas reached majority non-white status  
by 2008. 
America’s largely successful history at integrat-
ing immigrants into its social fabric remains one of 
its greatest economic and societal strengths. That 
strength is being tested anew, however, both by 
the large volume of immigration the country has 
recently experienced, and by the socioeconomic 
challenges that many of those immigrants and 
their children face. This is especially pronounced in 
the metropolitan communities that most of these 
new Americans call home. Immigration shows that 
some of these communities, especially suburbs, 
experienced rapid immigrant growth over both the 
1990s and 2000s. Meanwhile, the nation’s track 
record with respect to helping African Americans 
climb the socioeconomic ladder is mixed at best. yet 
that group will remain a large and growing part of 
an increasingly diverse workforce as well. it shares 
some challenges with other minority groups, as well 
as disadvantaged portions of the white population, 
that metro areas on the front lines of this transition 
will be unable to fully address on their own.
Aging of the Population
given the baby boomers’ outsized influence on 
(among other things) our economy, our popular cul-
ture, and our politics, the move of the first members 
of this cohort into seniorhood—scheduled to begin 
in 2011—has not gone unnoticed. The demographic 
impact will be monumental, a veritable “age tsu-
nami” compared to the smaller World War ii genera-
tion immediately preceding them. foreshadowing 
this, the number of 55-to-64 year-olds nationwide 
grew by nearly 50 percent from 2000 to 2010, as 
detailed in Age, with an even larger number of 
younger boomers (44 to 54 years old) looming in 
their wake. Together, u.S. boomers and seniors now 
number more than 100 million. Their impending 
retirements have provoked much analysis on the 
future of health care, our entitlement systems, the 
labor market, and the stock market.
Attracting somewhat less attention have been 
the questions of how and where aging will transform 
America’s communities. once again, large metro 
areas find themselves at the forefront of the trend. 
They are in one sense aging faster than the nation as 
a whole, experiencing a 45 percent increase in their 
55-to-64 year-old population 
from 2000 to 2008, versus 
40 percent nationally. More 
than one-third of their popu-
lations are now over the age 
of 45. And Households and 
Families reveals that metro 
areas’ single-person house-
holds are growing more rap-
idly than the national average 
as well. As noted below, these 
increases are registering 
largely in the suburban com-
munities that much of this ST
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generation has always called home, but which were 
not designed with the boomers of 2020 in mind.
Moreover, because they are the locus of both 
America’s diversifying and aging populations, large 
metro areas register a larger “cultural generation 
gap.” Although more than 50 percent of their com-
bined child population is non-white, their over-65 
population remains 75 percent white. Metropolitan 
communities thus face particular challenges not 
only in how to preserve a high quality of life for the 
growing cadre of elderly who will age in place there, 
but also in how to reconcile the distinct needs of that 
population with very different next generations of 
workers, homeowners, and voters.
Uneven Higher Educational Attainment
The 2000s continued a trend that has made the 
united States one of the most highly educated 
nations in the world. More than one-third of u.S. 
adults held a post-secondary degree in 2008, up 
from one-quarter in 1990. These higher levels of edu-
cation have helped propel our economic growth, and 
the quality of our higher educational institutions has 
make up a growing share of our future workforce lag 
their white and Asian counterparts dramatically on 
post-secondary attainment.
large metro areas at once lead the nation in this 
regard, while exemplifying even more strongly the 
disparities that lie beneath. Their residents earn 
four-year degrees at a much higher rate (31 per-
cent) than those living elsewhere (21 percent). but 
35-to-44 year-olds in large metro areas post higher 
degree attainment rates than their 25-to-34 year-
old counterparts. And the attainment disparities 
between whites and Asians on the one hand, and 
blacks and hispanics on the other are more pro-
nounced in large metro areas. by 2008, that racial/
ethnic gap in bachelor’s degree attainment had 
passed 20 percentage points.
The issues that lay behind these trends are 
numerous, and extend well beyond the purview of 
the higher education sector alone. but with decent-
paying jobs in the u.S. labor market poised to 
demand ever-greater levels of education and skills 
from their workers, the economic and social future of 
metropolitan areas may hinge on the ability of their 
economic and social institutions to propel a younger, 
more diverse population toward post-secondary 
success.
Income Polarization
The economically tumultuous 2000s were not kind 
to the typical American household, which saw its 
inflation-adjusted income decline by more than 
$2,000 between 1999 and 2008—and probably 
even further by 2009 when the economy hit bot-
tom. This will likely mark the first census decade in 
recent u.S. history in which real median household 
income declined. nor was the decade a good one 
for Americans living at the economic margins; the 
number of people living below the poverty line rose 
attracted talented individuals 
from all over the globe.
yet as Educational 
Attainment demonstrates, 
the trend that has recently 
propelled growth in u.S. 
educational attainment—each 
generation “out-attaining” 
the one before it—may be 
faltering. enrollments are 
rising, but rates of completion 
appear to be stalling among 
young adults. Moreover, 
the African American and 
hispanic groups projected to 
26
117 million
Population of U.S. boomers and 
seniors (age 45 and over)
38%
Share of large metropolitan  
population age 45 and over
Aging of the Population 
15 percent, and the u.S. poverty rate increased from 
12.4 percent to 13.2 percent.
one could chalk these trends up to purely cyclical 
forces, but this would overlook what appear to be 
longer-run, structural changes that led to continued 
polarization of wages and incomes over the decade. 
Work details how low-wage workers lost considerable 
ground in the 2000s, with hourly earnings declining 
by 8 percent. Middle-wage workers suffered a wage 
decline of more than 4 percent. At the top of the 
distribution, however, high-wage workers saw hourly 
earnings rise by more than 3 percent. not surpris-
ingly, these wage trends accompanied a further rela-
tive decline in the size of the middle class, building 
on a trend from past decades.4
large metro areas stood at the vanguard of this 
troubling trend, too. Their low-wage workers suffered 
greater losses, and their high-wage workers made 
greater gains, than the national average during the 
2000s. by 2008 high-wage workers in large metro 
areas out-earned their low-wage counterparts by a 
ratio of more than five to one, reflecting an espe-
cially stark divide between the haves and have-nots 
in metropolitan America. This holds by race/ethnicity, 
too, with non-hispanic whites in large metro areas 
out-earning their black and hispanic counterparts 
by larger margins than in smaller communities. 
And as explored below and in Income and Poverty, 
large metro areas demonstrated household income 
polarization of a different, equally important kind in 
the 2000s—a regional “pulling apart” that pummeled 
some corners of the nation even as it left others 
relatively unscathed. 
These trends called into question the sufficiency 
of overall macroeconomic growth—and metropolitan 
economic growth, too—for improving living standards 
for most Americans. broadly shared prosperity is 
important at both levels for the future of our society 
and our democracy, and much more purposeful 
public policies may be needed in the decade ahead 
to ensure that the next round of economic growth 
delivers on that goal.
 
NEW REALITIES VARy IN  
THEIR INTENSITy ACROSS  
METROPOLITAN AMERICA
large metropolitan areas as a group are notewor-
thy for exhibiting a forward-leaning position across 
the five new demographic and social realities that 
America confronts. like any group with 100 distinct 
members, however, variation abounds. in some ways, 
large metropolitan areas actually became more dif-
ferent from one another in the 2000s. Still, much 
can be gleaned about the present and future of large 
metro areas from a basic demographic typology of 
these areas, the results of which confound simple 
35%
Share of U.S. population  
age 25 and over with a  
post-secondary degree
21%
Difference in bachelor’s degree 
attainment rate, whites/Asians 
versus blacks/Hispanics in large 
metro areas
Uneven Higher Educational 
Attainment 
regional ways of viewing the 
country and its population.
Metropolitan  
Distinctiveness
The 100 largest metro areas 
span a wide range of social, 
demographic, and economic 
experience. Across the nine 
subject areas of this report, 
enormous differences sepa-
rate the metropolitan areas 
with the highest and lowest 
rankings in 2008. The new 
york metro area, for instance, 
has nearly 40 times the 
population of the Modesto 
metro area. The non-white ST
A
T
e
 o
f
 M
e
T
r
o
p
o
l
iT
A
n
 A
M
e
r
ic
A
 |
 O
V
E
R
V
IE
W
27
S
TA
T
e
 o
f
 M
e
T
r
o
p
o
l
iT
A
n
 A
M
e
r
ic
A
 |
 O
V
E
R
V
IE
W
share of population in McAllen is roughly 16 times 
that in portland (Me), and immigrants make up 
nearly 20 times the share of population in Miami as 
in youngstown. boomers and seniors are a majority 
of the population in bradenton, but just one-fifth in 
provo. And adults in the Washington, D.c. area are 
more than three times as likely to hold a college 
degree as those in the bakersfield area.
over the past decade, these major metropolitan 
areas diverged on many aspects of the emerging 
realities defining and challenging our society:
• on growth and outward expansion, the 2000s 
brought hyper-growth in some parts of the Sun belt, 
along with population decline in struggling parts of 
the great lakes region. provo, raleigh, las Vegas, 
and cape coral each had at least one-third more 
people in 2008 than in 2000. Meanwhile, something 
of a “lake effect” produced population losses in 
Syracuse, rochester, buffalo, youngstown, cleveland, 
and Toledo, along with the nearby metro areas of 
Detroit, pittsburgh, and Scranton. even as many 
declined in population, Midwestern metro areas 
sprawled outwards, experiencing more than half of 
of metro areas, they remained highly concentrated in 
a handful of very large places. A majority of Asians, 
and a near-majority of hispanics, lived in just 10 met-
ropolitan areas in 2008 (versus 25 percent of total 
u.S. population), producing wide variation across 
metro areas in the share of children who are “second 
generation” Americans (from 4 percent in Jackson to 
60 percent in los Angeles). Meanwhile, the number 
of blacks shrank in Midwestern and coastal california 
metro areas, and nearly one-fifth of black population 
gains in the 100 largest metro areas occurred in the 
Atlanta region
• on aging, already youthful metro areas such 
as Austin and boise augmented that profile in the 
2000s by adding large numbers of younger fami-
lies with children, both white and minority, and now 
have relatively low shares of their populations 
aged 45 and over. At the same time, rapidly aging 
metro areas in the northeast and Midwest such as 
youngstown and pittsburgh saw their numbers of 
married-with-children households drop at alarm-
ing rates, and now the boomer/senior share of their 
populations approaches half
• on higher educational attainment, the metro 
areas with the most highly educated populations 
essentially pulled farther away from the pack in the 
2000s. boston, new york, and San francisco ranked 
among the top gainers of college graduates over the 
decade, while progress largely stalled in lower-attain-
ing metro areas such as chattanooga, el paso, and 
Modesto. The degree attainment difference between 
Washington, D.c. and bakersfield (#1 and #100, 
respectively) grew from 26 percentage points in 1990 
to 34 in 2008. This clustering of the highly educated 
generally added to racial gaps in attainment within 
metro areas; the white/black college degree gap, for 
instance, grew considerably in “talent magnet” loca-
tions such as San Jose, Seattle, and Minneapolis
-$2,241
Change in U.S. real median  
household income, 1999 to 2008
5.25
Ratio of high-wage worker to  
low-wage worker hourly earnings, 
large metro areas 
Income Polarization
their population gains in low-
density counties. by compari-
son, only 20 percent of popu-
lation gains in northeastern 
metro areas, and 16 percent 
in Western metro areas, 
occurred in these farther-
flung locations
• on population diversifi-
cation, while America’s racial 
and ethnic minorities and 
immigrants continued to dis-
perse in the 2000s, reaching 
significant thresholds of pop-
ulation in a growing number 
28
• on income polarization, the recession that 
began in 2001 never really ended throughout much 
of the Midwest as its manufacturing base shed 
jobs throughout the decade. All 19 of the region’s 
large metro areas experienced an inflation-adjusted 
decline in median household income in the 2000s, 
averaging more than 8 percent across those 
households. by contrast, incomes held steady in 
northeastern metro areas, even rising modestly 
in areas such as Albany, Allentown, and Worcester. 
Meanwhile, metropolitan areas with among the 
lowest wages and incomes at the beginning of the 
decade, such as bakersfield, el paso, and Scranton, 
suffered losses in the 2000s
The great recession that took hold during the last 
two years of the decade may have, at least temporar-
ily, moderated some aspects of this growing regional 
inequality. This is because migration fell significantly 
due to crippled housing and labor markets. growth in 
much of the Sun belt and the outer suburbs cooled 
off, immigration slowed, and Americans everywhere 
went back to college in higher numbers. yet these 
shifts neither reversed the full extent of the “pulling 
apart” that occurred across the 2000s, nor did  
they necessarily “lock in” new patterns of regional 
growth and change that will persist once economic 
growth resumes.
A Demographic Typology of  
Metropolitan America
While each metropolitan area possesses a unique 
social, demographic, and economic profile, the dis-
tinctions among these places on many of the “new 
realities” are also apparent among different groups 
of metro areas. These groups do not break neatly 
along traditional regional lines, such as Sun belt 
The Seven Types of Large Metropolitan Areas Are Distinct Along Several Demographic Dimensions
 
   % Growth in  %  %    %  
  Total Core Areas,   Population Population Educational Wage Commuters 
 Number of Population 2000 Age 45 Foreign- inequality inequality Driving 
Metro Type Metro Areas (millions) to 2008* and Over Born Ratio**  Ratio*** Alone
Diverse giant 9	 58	 50	 38	 28	 2.8	 5.7	 65
Skilled Anchor 19	 31	 n/a	 41	 9	 2.1	 4.6	 77
next frontier 9	 29	 41	 35	 18	 2.6	 5.4	 74
new heartland 19	 28	 44	 36	 9	 2.0	 4.7	 79
industrial core 18	 22	 n/a	 40	 6	 2.1	 4.5	 82
border growth 11	 19	 30	 33	 19	 2.7	 4.9	 77
Mid-Sized Magnet 15	 13	 29	 41	 8	 2.0	 4.5	 81
100-metro average 100	 199	 33	 38	 16	 2.4	 5.2	 74
        
 Low Medium High   
Note: all metro type averages weighted by 2008 population; statistics are for 2008 unless otherwise noted       
* Share of metropolitan growth in primary cities and high-density suburbs ("n/a" indicates population loss in these areas)
** Ratio of college degree attainment rate, whites/Asians versus blacks/Hispanics
*** Ratio of hourly earnings, high-wage (90th percentile) workers versus low-wage (10th percentile) workersr
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versus Snow belt, east and west of the Mississippi, or 
even the four census regions (northeast, Midwest, 
South, and West). What differentiates them are 
simple metrics of population growth, population 
diversity, and educational attainment, as compared 
to national averages.5 grouped into seven categories, 
the particular issues facing the nation’s 100 larg-
est metro areas become clearer, as do the places to 
which individual metro areas might look for common 
solutions.
• Next Frontier metro areas exceed national aver-
ages on population growth, diversity, and educational 
attainment.6 of these nine metro areas, eight lie 
west of the Mississippi river (Washington, D.c. is the 
exception). They attracted immigrants, families, and 
educated workers during the 2000s thanks to their 
diversified economies (including government employ-
ment in several) and relatively mild climates. in some 
ways the demographic success stories of the 2000s, 
next frontier areas are generally younger, growing 
more densely, and more transit-oriented than other 
metro areas. one price of their success is their higher 
levels of both educational and wage inequality
• New Heartland metro areas are also fast grow-
ing, highly educated locales, but have lower shares 
of hispanic and Asian populations than the national 
average.7 These 19 metro areas include many in the 
“new South” where blacks are the dominant minor-
ity group, such as Atlanta, charlotte, and richmond, 
as well as largely white metro areas throughout 
the Midwest and West, such as indianapolis, kansas 
city, and portland (or). The service-based econo-
mies of these metro areas attracted many middle-
class migrants, both white and black, during the 
2000s. That diverse in-migration has given the new 
heartland areas a more racially equitable educa-
tional profile than other metropolitan types
• Diverse Giants feature some of the largest 
metro areas in the country, including the three larg-
est (new york, los Angeles, and chicago), as well as 
coastal anchors such as Miami, San francisco, and 
San Diego.8 These nine regions post above-average 
educational attainment and diversity, but below-
average population growth, owing in part to their 
large sizes. like the new frontier areas, they are 
growing more densely, but exhibit wide educational 
30
NEXT FRONTIER
High growth
High diversity
High educational attainment
NEW HEARTLAND
High growth
Low diversity
High educational attainment
and wage disparities. With more than one-quarter of 
their residents born abroad, these areas are home to 
sizeable populations of “second-generation” children 
of immigrant parents9
• Border Growth metro areas are mostly located 
in southwestern border states, and as such are 
marked by a significant and growing presence of 
Mexican and other latin American immigrants.10 only 
orlando lies outside the main orbit of this group of 11, 
which stretches from central Texas, through Arizona 
and nevada, and up california’s central Valley. 
Many of these metro areas are suffering “migration 
whiplash,” as they built large swaths of single-family 
housing for tens of thousands of newcomers through 
mid-decade, only to see growth largely halt with the 
bursting of the housing bubble. for those work-
ers and families that stayed, especially less-skilled 
hispanics, the challenge now before these areas is 
to diversify the local economy in ways that provide 
sustainable growth opportunities well beyond the 
housing sector
• Mid-Sized Magnet metro areas are similar  
in their recent growth and educational profile to  
border growth centers, but are distinguished by 
lower shares of hispanic and Asian minorities.11 
These 15 mostly mid-sized locations, largely in the 
Southeast but with a couple of Western representa-
tives, lack some of the high-value industries that 
characterize the new heartland. Similar to the 
border growth centers, some got caught in the 
growth spiral of the 2000s that ended abruptly with 
MID-SIzED MAGNET
High growth
Low diversity
Low educational attainment
BORDER GROWTH
High growth
High diversity
Low educational attainment
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These new demo-
graphic realities 
do not break 
neatly along  
traditional 
regional lines, 
such as Sun Belt 
versus Snow 
Belt. 
DIVERSE GIANT
Low growth
High diversity
High educational attainment
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the housing crash—particularly boise and the six 
florida metro areas. having attracted many boomers 
and seniors over time, Mid-Sized Magnets contain 
the oldest populations among the metropolitan 
types, but have grown in a distended fashion that 
has left them among the most car-dependent of the 
seven groups
• Skilled Anchors are slow-growing, less diverse 
metro areas that boast higher-than-average levels 
of educational attainment.12 Seventeen (17) of the 19 
lie in the northeast and Midwest, and include large 
regions such as boston and philadelphia, as well 
as smaller regions such as Akron and Worcester. 
Many are former manufacturing and port centers 
that some time ago made the difficult transition to 
service-based economies, with significant represen-
tation of medical and higher educational institutions. 
others like pittsburgh and St. louis still specialize 
in non-auto-related manufacturing sectors that 
remained relatively steady over the 2000s. These 
characteristics have kept Skilled Anchors demo-
graphically more vibrant than other parts of the 
north (see below), even as they post lower levels 
of inequality than faster-growing locales. Still, all of 
the modest recent growth across these areas has 
occurred in lower-density suburbs
• Industrial Cores are in some ways the most 
demographically disadvantaged of the metropoli-
tan types.13 These 18 metro areas are largely older 
industrial centers of the northeast, Midwest, and 
Southeast. Their populations are slower-growing, 
less diverse, and less educated than national  
averages, and significantly older than the large 
metropolitan average. A remaining industrial base 
combined with lack of diverse in-migration to these 
metro areas has kept educational and wage inequali-
ties in check. but these metropolitan areas lost  
population in the aggregate during the 2000s,  
yet still saw growth in their outer suburbs, even as 
their cities and high-density suburbs declined  
in size.
Viewing metropolitan America through this lens 
offers a more nuanced view of the country and 
its variable challenges than conventional regional 
generalizations. The South, for instance, counts at 
least one member in each of the seven metropolitan 
INDUSTRIAL CORE
Low growth
Low diversity
Low educational attainment
SKILLED ANCHOR
Low growth
Low diversity
High educational attainment
32
categories, as very different demographic desti-
nies confront Atlanta versus Augusta, or Miami 
versus palm bay. Similarly, the notion of a unified 
“rust belt” stretching across large portions of the 
northeast and Midwest overlooks the important 
factors that distinguish populations in rochester, 
cleveland, indianapolis, and chicago from one 
another. As explored further in Policy Implications, 
these population distinctions dictate different pri-
orities for metropolitan leaders seeking to forge a 
prosperous future for their communities.
CITIES AND SUBURBS SHARE 
MORE THAN EVER IN THE  
NEW REALITIES
even as large metro areas “pulled apart” demograph-
ically from one another in some ways in the 2000s, 
they also “came together” at the individual metro-
politan scale. Several trends in the 2000s further 
put to rest the old perceptions of cities as declining, 
poor, minority places set amid young, white, wealthy 
suburbs. As this report outlines, the decade brought 
many cities and suburbs still closer together along a 
series of social, demographic, and economic dimen-
sions. in this way, the five new realities are, more 
than ever, metropolitan—rather than purely urban or 
suburban—in scope. examples include:
Growth—notwithstanding the general outward 
expansion of metropolitan areas over the full decade, 
the period from 2006 to 2008 saw a retrenchment 
of population toward cities and high-density subur-
ban counties as outer suburban housing markets 
crashed. indeed, high-density suburbs are increas-
ingly similar to cities in their overall growth trajec-
tory and commuting patterns than mature and  
outer suburbs
Population diversification—by 2008, a majority 
of members of all major racial and ethnic groups in 
metropolitan areas lived in suburbs, as did more than 
half of all immigrants nationwide. At the same time, 
the white population grew in many older cities where 
it had previously declined, such as Atlanta, boston, 
and Washington, D.c.
Aging —a growing share of elderly and smaller 
households are found in suburbia, a trend that  
will only accelerate as the boomers—more than  
70 percent of whom live in suburbs—enter senior-
hood. Meanwhile, many Sun belt cities added 
younger populations during the 2000s, slightly  
narrowing the “married-with-children” household 
gap between cities and suburbs
Educational attainment—the distinction between 
city and suburban educational attainment remained 
almost negligible, given the regional nature of labor 
markets and the concentration of high-value jobs in 
denser urban areas that lure highly educated work-
ers. Thirty-one (31) and 32 percent of city and subur-
ban adults, respectively, held bachelor’s degrees in 
2008. The most highly educated communities were 
in fact high-density suburbs that surround many cit-
ies, where 36 percent of adults held a college degree
Income—the income and poverty gaps between 
cities and suburbs, while still wide, narrowed in the 
2000s. As overall metropolitan median income fell, 
the difference between city and suburban median 
incomes declined by about $800. Meanwhile, the 
poverty rate in cities rose marginally, but jumped a 
full percentage point for suburbs, as their poor popu-
lation grew five times faster. A majority of metropoli-
tan poor now live in suburbs, and their income, labor 
market, and educational profiles largely mirror those 
of their city counterparts 
The urban/suburban boundary, it should be noted, 
blurs more easily in some types of metropolitan ST
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areas than others. for instance, in next frontier, new 
heartland, Diverse giant, and border growth metro 
areas, racial and ethnic minorities represent a 10 to 
20 percent larger share of population in cities than 
suburbs. but that gap ranges from 20 to 40 percent 
in Mid-Sized Magnet, industrial core, and Skilled 
Anchor metro areas. Similarly, the city/suburban 
median household income difference is relatively 
muted in border growth and Mid-Sized Magnet cen-
ters ($6,000 to $7,000), but a substantial $27,000 in 
the Skilled Anchors. 
nonetheless, most of these gaps, regardless of 
metropolitan type, narrowed during the 2000s. And 
where sizeable differences in population shares and 
median characteristics prevail, the locus of the new 
reality (e.g., immigrants, older population, the poor) 
continues to shift in new, mostly suburban, direc-
tions. in an era of severe fiscal restraint and increas-
ingly shared demography, governance must begin to 
transcend the parochial 18th-century administrative 
borders that frustrate shared approaches to increas-
ingly shared challenges. 
CONCLUSION
The 2000s found large metropolitan areas on the 
front lines of America’s demographic transformation. 
Together, they confront a series of new realities more 
intense than those buffeting the rest of the nation, 
on measures of growth and diversification, aging, 
and increasingly uneven outcomes in educational 
attainment and income. Those realities—and the chal-
lenges they imply—are shared more than ever across 
city and suburban lines. nevertheless, the diverse 
economic and social histories of metropolitan areas 
persist in their contemporary demographic profiles. 
for each of seven types of large metro areas, a 
distinct set of issues comes to the fore, some within 
metro areas’ own capacities to tackle, but oth-
ers fundamentally beyond their reach. chronicling 
the unprecedented demographic changes afoot in 
America generally, and their specific metropolitan 
manifestations, the State of Metropolitan America 
brings these new realities into sharp focus as the 
nation enters a new and undoubtedly challenging 
decade. n
ENDNOTES
1.  See “About the State of Metropolitan America” for more 
on the definition and importance of metropolitan areas.
2.  These areas (counties and county remainders) were 
defined as “lower-density” based on their having less 
than 95 percent of their population living in urban-
ized areas in 2000. it is likely that based on population 
growth patterns from 2000 to 2008, that some of these 
areas would no longer qualify as “lower-density” based 
on their contemporary settlement patterns. Still, their 
share of metropolitan population rose from 39 percent 
in 2000 to 42 percent in 2008. The results of the 2010 
census will reveal changes over the decade in the rate of 
population urbanization in u.S. counties.
3.  Marilyn A. brown, frank Southworth, and Andrea 
Sarzynski, “Shrinking the carbon footprint of 
Metropolitan America” (Washington: brookings 
institution, 2008).
4.  Jason booza, Jackie cutsinger, and george galster, 
“Where Did They go? The Decline of Middle-class 
neighborhoods in Metropolitan America, 1970–2000” 
(Washington: brookings institution, 2006). 
5.  Specifically, statistics for each metropolitan area were 
compared to approximate national averages on three 
indicators: (a) population growth from 2000 to 2008 
(above or below 8 percent); (b) share of population  
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other than black and non-hispanic white (above or 
below 22.5 percent); and (c) share of adults 25 years 
and over with a bachelor’s degree (above or below 28 
percent). This produced the seven groups of metro areas 
described in the text.
6.  next frontier metro areas include: Albuquerque, nM; 
Austin, Tx; Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx; Denver-
Aurora, co; houston, Tx; Sacramento-roseville, 
cA; Seattle-Tacoma-bellevue, WA; Tucson, AZ; and 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV.
7.  new heartland metro areas include: Atlanta, gA; 
charleston, Sc; charlotte, nc-Sc; colorado Springs, 
co; columbia, Sc; columbus, oh; Des Moines, iA; 
indianapolis, in; kansas city, Mo-kS; knoxville, Tn; 
Madison, Wi; Minneapolis-St. paul, Mn-Wi; nashville, Tn; 
omaha, ne-iA; portland-Vancouver, or-WA; provo, uT; 
raleigh-cary, nc; richmond, VA; and Salt lake city, uT.
8.  Diverse giant metro areas include: chicago-naperville-
Joliet, il-in-Wi; honolulu, hi; los Angeles-long beach-
Santa Ana, cA; Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, 
fl; new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA; oxnard-Thousand  
oaks-Ventura, cA; San Diego, cA; San francisco-
oakland-fremont, cA; and San Jose-Sunnyvale- 
Santa clara, cA.
9.  “Second generation” is used here to refer to children  
of one or more foreign-born parents living in the  
united States, and includes both foreign-born and  
u.S.-born individuals under age 18. See immigration  
for further details.
10.  border growth metro areas include: bakersfield, cA; 
el paso, Tx; fresno, cA; las Vegas, nV; McAllen, Tx; 
Modesto, cA; orlando, fl; phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, 
AZ; riverside-San bernardino, cA; San Antonio, Tx; and 
Stockton, cA.
11.  Mid-Sized Magnet metro areas include: Allentown, 
pA-nJ; baton rouge, lA; boise, iD; bradenton, fl; cape 
coral, fl; chattanooga, Tn; greensboro-high point, nc; 
greenville, Sc; Jacksonville, fl; lakeland, fl; little rock, 
Ar; ogden, uT; oklahoma city, ok; palm bay, fl; and 
Tampa-St. petersburg-clearwater, fl.
12.  Skilled Anchor metro areas include: Akron, oh; 
Albany, ny; baltimore, MD; boston-cambridge, MA; 
bridgeport-Stamford, cT; cincinnati, oh-ky-in; hartford, 
cT; Jackson, MS; Milwaukee, Wi; new haven, cT; 
philadelphia, pA-nJ-De-MD; pittsburgh, pA; portland, 
Me; poughkeepsie, ny; rochester, ny; St. louis, Mo-il; 
Springfield, MA; Syracuse, ny; and Worcester, MA.
13.  industrial core metro areas include: Augusta-richmond 
county, gA-Sc; birmingham, Al; buffalo, ny; cleveland, 
oh; Dayton, oh; Detroit-Warren, Mi; grand rapids, Mi; 
harrisburg, pA; louisville, ky-in; Memphis, Tn-MS-Ar; 
new orleans, lA; providence, ri; Scranton, pA; Toledo, 
oh; Tulsa, ok; Virginia beach-norfolk-newport news, 
VA-nc; Wichita, kS; and youngstown, oh-pA.
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I. populATion & MigrATion
B y  T H E  N U M B E R S
25
million
Increase in population, 
United States,  
2000 to 2009
11.9%
Share of population chang-
ing residence, United States, 
2007 to 2008 (postwar low)
+95,000 / 
-7,000
Net domestic migration, 
Riverside-San Bernardino 
metro area, 2003 to 2004 / 
2007 to 2008
67
Number of primary cities 
(out of 100) with population 
increases, 2000 to 2008
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OVERVIEW
n  Population growth in the United States and its large metro areas was robust in the 2000s. The 
housing crisis and ensuing deep recession, however, slowed migration considerably, so that the share of 
Americans changing residence in 2007–2009 was lower than at any point in postwar history.
n  The decade continued the broad shift of U.S. population toward the Sun Belt. Metropolitan areas gaining 
the most population from 2000 to 2009 included several of the fastest growers from the 1990s, as well as 
regions that boomed during the early part of the decade due to real estate development before the housing 
market crashed.
n  The 2000–2006 and 2006–2009 periods represent two distinct migration epochs for metropolitan 
America. Migration magnets in florida, the intermountain West, and inland california during the first half of 
the decade saw inflows plummet post-crash, while metro areas in Texas and the Southeast with more diversi-
fied economies held steady. large metro areas that had previously “exported” large numbers of residents to 
other parts of the country saw out-migration slow considerably toward the end of the decade.
n  Strong immigration throughout most of the 2000s cushioned populations in large metropolitan areas 
experiencing domestic out-migration. Metropolitan new york, los Angeles, chicago, and San francisco lost 
hundreds of thousands of domestic migrants across the decade, but experienced substantial counterbalanc-
ing inflows of international migrants.
n  Two-thirds of primary cities in large metropolitan areas grew from 2000 to 2008. city growth spread 
and accelerated between 2006 and 2008, as many core urban areas realized a “windfall” of residents due to 
the impact of the housing slump on movement to the suburbs. 
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
TRENDS
population growth remains an important barometer 
of economic and societal well-being in America. 
Though ours is an aging population—due to increas-
ing life expectancy and the outsized baby boom 
generation about to reach seniorhood—healthy levels 
of fertility and immigration in the united States have 
combined to make it a fast-growing country among 
its industrialized peers over the last few decades.
This story remained true in the 2000s. between 
2000 and 2009, the country added roughly 25 mil-
lion people, an 8.8 percent increase (figure 1). This 
was not quite as high as the growth rate in canada 
over the same time period (10.4 percent), though the 
united States added more than seven times the num-
ber of people as our northern neighbor. u.S. growth, 
meanwhile, far outpaced that in the european union 
(3.5 percent).1 
Though ours is 
an aging popu-
lation, healthy 
levels of fertility 
and immigration 
in the United 
States have com-
bined to make it 
a fast-growing 
country among 
its industrialized 
peers over the 
last few decades.
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The 2000s also saw faster growth in large u.S. 
metropolitan areas than elsewhere in the country. 
The combined population of the 100 largest metro 
areas rose 10.5 percent through 2009, compared to 
8.7 percent in smaller metro areas, and 2.7 percent 
outside of metro areas. large metro areas together 
accounted for over three-fourths of the nation’s 
population increase during that period. Metro areas 
with populations over 1 million grew at nearly exactly 
the same overall rate as those with populations 
between 500,000 and 1 million.
continuing the trend from past decades, u.S. pop-
ulation in the 2000s shifted from the northeast and 
Midwest, toward the South and West. large metro 
areas in the latter regions experienced much higher 
growth rates than those in the former regions. The 
particular metropolitan areas at either end of the 
growth spectrum are detailed further below.
The 2000s, however, were a highly uneven decade. 
beyond the population trends, the end of the decade 
Figure 2. The U.S. Annual Migration Rate Reached 
a Postwar Low in the Late 2000s
Share of Persons Changing Residence,  
1991-1992 to 2008-2009
Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey dataSource: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data
brought about a historic decline in migration, driven 
by a sequence of factors. first, the housing “bubble” 
that arose during the middle part of the decade 
popped, bringing an end to the rapid homebuilding 
and easy mortgage credit that propped up migration 
in previous years. Second, this precipitated a seri-
ous financial market crisis in September 2008 that 
produced sharp reductions in credit availability. As a 
result, potential buyers had difficulty obtaining mort-
gages, and potential sellers saw reductions in the val-
ues of their homes. Third, the financial crisis greatly 
exacerbated the national recession that had begun 
in December 2007, reducing job availability in most 
regions of the country. This triple whammy made it 
riskier for would-be homebuyers to find financing,  
would-be sellers to receive good value for their home, 
and potential long-distance movers to find employ-
ment in areas where jobs were previously plentiful. 
These factors meant that by the end of the 
2000s, America had reached a new low point in 
Figure 1. Growth in Large Metro Areas, Especially Those  
in the South and West, Outpaced the National Growth 
Rate in the 2000s
Population Change by Geography Type, 2000 to 2009
Large Metro Areas by Region
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domestic migration.2 in 2007–2008, only 11.9 percent 
of Americans changed residence, and this rose to 
just 12.5 percent in 2008–2009. Together, these are 
the lowest rates of annual mobility since the census 
bureau began collecting migration statistics in 
1947–1948 (figure 2). 
long-distance, between-state migration declined 
even more dramatically than within-county residen-
tial mobility. in fact, the 1.6 percent interstate migra-
tion rate in both 2007–2008 and 2008–2009 was 
half the value exhibited in 1999–2000, and far lower 
than the rate in the 1950s, when between 3 and 4 
percent of the population moved across state lines 
annually. Although short-distance moves are more 
frequent, long-distance migration acts as an engine 
of growth in many metropolitan areas as people seek 
new job opportunities. 
 
METROPOLITAN TRENDS
Population Trends Across the 2000s
Metropolitan growth patterns across the 2000–2009 
period, particularly the movement toward the 
Sun belt, continued patterns evident in the 1990s. 
During the earlier decade, the familiar postwar 
population shifts from large northeastern and 
Midwestern metro areas like new york, chicago, 
and philadelphia, to growing Southern and Western 
metro areas like Miami, Atlanta, los Angeles, Dallas, 
and houston began to spread to a larger number of 
areas in the interior West and the Southeast.3 While 
the 10 fastest growing metro areas in the 1990s were 
all located in the Sun belt (i.e., the South and West 
regions), seven lay outside the traditional postwar 
magnet states of florida, Texas and california. one 
impetus for growth during this period was a high-
tech boom that manifested itself in several of these 
new Sun belt growth magnets (raleigh, phoenix,  
and boise) as well as in some traditional magnet 
states (Austin).
The big gainers in the post-2000 decade do not 
differ sharply from those in the 1990s (Table 1, right 
panel). eight make the list for both decades, and 
four of the top five gainers in the 2000s are located 
outside the traditional magnet states. climbing 
the list in the 2000s, however, were metro areas, 
such as cape coral in florida, where booming real 
estate development contributed more to recent 
growth. The las Vegas and phoenix metro areas in 
the intermountain West continued to occupy top 
growth spots due to similar housing-led migration. of 
course, the growth dynamics of these regions shifted 
sharply in the latter part of the decade (see below).
Just as there were no dramatic shifts in the list 
of fastest gainers between the 1990s and 2000s, the 
list of slowest growing and declining metro areas 
did not change significantly. in both periods, metro 
areas in the nation’s manufacturing belt populate 
the list. youngstown, buffalo, pittsburgh, Syracuse, 
and Scranton registered population declines in both 
periods. An additional five metro areas showed 
population declines from 2000 to 2009, all of which 
lay in the industrial northeast and Midwest, with the 
exception of new orleans (resulting from out-migra-
tion due to hurricane katrina in 2005). 
The division between growth in the Sun belt and 
Snow belt continued to characterize the 30 most 
populous metro areas during the 2000s (Map 1). The 
two largest metropolitan areas, new york and los 
Angeles, registered growth levels below 5 percent. 
Among the seven additional metro areas with 
populations exceeding 5 million, Atlanta, Dallas, and 
houston increased their populations by more than 
one-fifth. Among all 30 metro areas, las Vegas and 
Metropolitan 
growth pat-
terns across 
the 2000–2009 
period, particu-
larly the move-
ment toward  
the Sun Belt, 
continued  
patterns evident 
in the 1990s. 
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Table 1. The Fastest and Slowest Growing Metro Areas in the 2000s Resemble Those From the 1990s
Highest and Lowest Ranked Large Metro Areas by Population Growth, 1990 to 2000 and 2000 to 2009
   1990 to 2000    2000 to 2009
  Change to   Population  Change from  Population 
 Rank 2000–2008 Metro Area Change (%) Rank 1990–2000 Metro Area Change (%)
   Highest Growth    Highest Growth
	 	1	 -2 las Vegas, nV 84.3	 1	 6	 provo, uT 46.2
	 2	 -2 Austin, Tx 48.6	 2	 2	 raleigh-cary, nc 40.0
	 3	 -6 McAllen, Tx 48.1	 3	 -2 las Vegas, nV 36.6
	 4	 2 raleigh-cary, nc 46.6	 4	 -2	 Austin, Tx 34.7
	 5	 0 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 45.8	 5	 0 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 33.1
	 6	 -2 boise city, iD 45.5	 6	 6 cape coral, fl 32.2
	 7	 6 provo, uT 40.3	 7	 6 charlotte, nc-Sc 30.2
	 8	 -2 Atlanta, gA 38.5	 8	 -2	 boise city, iD 29.3
	 9	 -3 orlando, fl 33.5	 9	 -6	 McAllen, Tx 29.3
	 10	 -17 Denver-Aurora, co 32.3	 10	 -2 Atlanta, gA 27.9
   lowest Growth/Decline    lowest Growth/Decline 
	 91	 -5 cleveland, oh 2.1	 91	 6 Syracuse, ny -0.6
	 92	 8 Albany, ny 2.0	 92	 -4 rochester, ny -0.6
	 93	 7 Springfield, MA 0.9	 93	 -11 Detroit-Warren, Mi -1.2
	 94	 7 Toledo, oh 0.7	 94	 1	 Dayton, oh -1.5
	 95	 1 Dayton, oh 0.4	 95	 5 Scranton, pA -1.8
	 96	 -1 pittsburgh, pA -1.6	 96	 -5 cleveland, oh -2.6
	 97	 6 Syracuse, ny -1.8	 97	 -1 pittsburgh, pA -3.0
	 98	 0 buffalo, ny -1.8	 98	 0 buffalo, ny -3.9
	 99	 0 youngstown, oh-pA -1.9	 99	 0 youngstown, oh-pA -6.5
	 100	 5 Scranton, pA -2.9	 100	 -13 new orleans, lA -9.5
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates data
phoenix registered the fastest growth rates, each 
exceeding 30 percent despite slowdowns post-2006. 
Meanwhile, pittsburgh, cleveland, and Detroit all lost 
population over the eight-year period.
Metropolitan Population Booms  
and Busts
in light of the sharp downturn in migration toward 
the end of the 2000s, the broad patterns of 
metropolitan growth from 2000 to 2009 described 
above clearly camouflage what will be defined as 
a tumultuous decade for population shifts among 
metro areas. To get an overview of these boom-to-
bust impacts on metro areas, Table 2 contrasts the 
fastest growing large metros from 2000 to 2006 
with those from 2006 to 2009. 
for several metro areas in california and florida 
and the intermountain West the housing market 
S
TA
T
e
 o
f
 M
e
T
r
o
p
o
l
iT
A
n
 A
M
e
r
ic
A
 |
 P
O
P
U
L
A
T
IO
N
 &
 M
IG
R
A
T
IO
N
41
Map 1. The Fastest-Growing Large Metro Areas in the 2000s Lay in the Sun Belt
2000–2009 Growth Rate and 2009 Population Size, 30 Largest Metro Areas
crash also precipitated a migration crash. population 
growth in cape coral, riverside, and orlando, along 
with several other metro areas in california’s central 
Valley (not shown), fell dramatically between 2000–
2006 and 2006–2009. las Vegas dropped out of 
the top ten. other florida metro areas not near the 
top of the list also experienced a substantial growth 
slowdown as well between 2000–2006 and 2006–
2009, including bradenton (falling in growth rank 
from 19th to 59th) and Tampa (from 28th to 60th). 
The metro areas that either survived or moved up 
in growth rank as the housing bubble popped and 
the recession took root had less overheated housing 
markets and more diversified economies. between 
2006 and 2009, metro areas in Texas (Austin, Dallas, 
San Antonio), the Southeast (raleigh, charlotte, 
charleston, greenville), and parts of the interior West 
(ogden, Denver) did as well or better in the rankings 
than earlier in the decade.4 
The list of metro areas experiencing the slowest 
growth or population decline changed less dramati-
cally between these two periods. The fall of Detroit 
reflects the impact of an accelerated decline in 
the area’s important auto manufacturing industry. 
upstate new york and ohio metro areas clearly felt 
the impacts of industrial decline in both periods.
Size of circle is proportional to total 
population in 2009.
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data
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Reversal of Metropolitan Migration 
Fortunes
The broad shift of American population from the 
Snow belt toward the Sun belt was largely driven by 
domestic migration. The sharp migration slowdown 
toward the end of the 2000s began to turn this long-
standing dynamic on its head.
examining different regional groups of metro 
areas puts this departure from the historical norm 
in sharp relief (figure 3). florida, an epicenter of the 
housing crash and ensuing foreclosure crisis, repre-
sents one side of the coin. orlando and Tampa each 
added more than 50,000 residents from domestic 
migration as recently as 2004–2005, but saw those 
inflows plummet in recent years, turning negative 
in orlando’s case by 2008–2009. cape coral also 
Table 2. The Housing Market Collapse Shifted the Locus of U.S. Metropolitan Growth
Highest and Lowest Ranked Large Metro Areas by Population Growth, 2000 to 2006 and 2006 to 2009
 2000 to 2006 2006 to 2009
  Change to   Change from
  2006–  Population  2000–  Population 
 Rank 2009 Metro Area Change (%) Rank 2006 Metro Area Change (%)
   Highest Growth    Highest Growth
	 1	 -1	 provo, uT 29.3	 1	 99	 new orleans, lA 20.5
	 2	 -9 las Vegas, nV 27.6	 2	 -1 provo, uT 13.0
	 3	 -45 cape coral, fl 27.5	 3	 1	 raleigh-cary, nc 12.7
	 4	 1 raleigh-cary, nc 24.2	 4	 4 Austin, Tx 11.5
	 5	 -2 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 23.4	 5	 7	 charlotte, nc-Sc 10.2
	 6	 -24 riverside-San bernardino-ontario, cA 21.1	 6	 5 McAllen, Tx 8.4
	 7	 -6	 boise city, iD 20.9	 7	 -2 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 7.8
	 8	 4 Austin, Tx 20.8	 8	 14	 ogden, uT 7.6
	 9	 -32 orlando, fl 20.7	 9	 7	 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx 7.5
	 10	 -4	 Atlanta, gA 19.6	 10	 14 San Antonio, Tx 7.2
   lowest Growth/Decline    lowest Growth/Decline 
	 91	 17 bridgeport-Stamford, cT	 -0.8	 91	 -32	 Virginia beach-norfolk-newport news, VA-nc 0.1
 92	 2 Syracuse, ny -0.8	 92	 -2 Akron, oh 0.0
	 93	 -5 Dayton, oh	 -0.9	 93	 -7 providence, ri-MA -0.2
	 94	 6	 rochester, ny -1.1	 94	 -12 Toledo, oh -0.2
	 95	 -2	 cleveland, oh -2.1	 95	 2 pittsburgh, pA -0.3
	 96	 7	 Scranton, pA -2.1	 96	 2	 buffalo, ny -0.6
	 97	 2 pittsburgh, pA -2.8	 97	 -2 cleveland, oh -0.7
	 98	 2 buffalo, ny -3.2	 98	 -5	 Dayton, oh -0.8
	 99	 -1 youngstown, oh-pA -4.3	 99	 -10 Detroit-Warren, Mi -1.8
	 100	 99 new orleans, lA -24.6	 100	 -1	 youngstown, oh-pA -2.3
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates data
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Figure 3. The Housing Market Crisis Disrupted Metropolitan Migration Across and Within Regions
Net Domestic Migration for Metro Areas by State/Region, 2000-2001 to 2008-2009
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates data
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exhibited the migration gain to loss scenario. The 
Miami metro area, which lost residents to migration 
throughout the decade, suffered particularly steep 
declines from 2006 to 2007. 
large metro areas in Texas, including Dallas, 
houston, and Austin, exhibit an entirely different pat-
tern. They experienced far greater net in-migration 
in the latter years of the decade, at the same time 
that the migration bubble popped in florida metro 
areas.5 Those Texas areas did not experience the 
same run-up in home prices and speculative mort-
gage lending seen throughout most of florida.6
coastal california metro areas display something 
of a mirror-image migration pattern to their interior 
West counterparts. The San francisco bay Area, San 
Diego, and especially los Angeles saw increasing 
out-migration through the middle part of the decade, 
due in part to increasingly unaffordable home prices. 
That trend moderated (along with home prices) over 
the past few years, such that San francisco posted 
small migration gains between 2007 and 2009. los 
Angeles lost only about a third as many migrants in 
2008–2009 as it did in 2005–2006. its net migra-
tion pattern roughly inverts that of the phoenix 
metro area, the destination for many Angelenos in 
the early to mid-2000s. las Vegas and riverside 
also received many of their migrants from coastal 
california during that earlier period but have since 
seen those inflows turn to small outflows.
other areas of the country that experienced 
significant migration outflows during the housing 
bubble years also saw their trends turn less nega-
tive in the second half of the decade. The boston 
and chicago metro areas shed increasing numbers 
of migrants through the middle part of the decade, 
but began to stanch the outflow by 2006. The 
same held for the new york area; while net out-
migration reduced its population by fully 110,000 in 
2008–2009, that was well below half the annual loss 
it sustained in the middle of the decade.
pittsburgh posted its first net migration gain 
in more than a decade, while rising outflows from 
buffalo, cleveland, and providence moderated after 
peaking mid-decade. The latter two metro areas have 
among the weakest regional economies in the united 
States today, however, and their migration fortunes 
may slip once again as long-distance household 
mobility begins to rise. yet for the present, their 
migration patterns are mirror images of past years, 
when they lost many residents to fast-growing areas 
of the Sun belt. 
Immigration as a Metropolitan Migration 
“Cushion”
The recent downturn in domestic migration left a 
slight imprint on international migration as well, with 
the most recent inflows becoming noticeably less 
than the average 1 million per year over the last 20 
years. nonetheless, immigration remained an impor-
tant contributor to population gains in larger metro-
politan gateways throughout the 2000s, providing 
a demographic “cushion” to bolster small gains or 
losses from domestic migration.
Despite the continued spread of foreign-born 
population across the nation, immigration remained 
relatively concentrated in major gateway areas dur-
ing the 2000s. from 2000 to 2009, 21 percent of all 
net immigrant gains occurred in the two largest met-
ropolitan magnets, new york and los Angeles (which 
account for roughly 10 percent of u.S. population). 
fully 46 percent of gains went to the eight largest 
metro areas (Table 3). 
Metropolitan new york and los Angeles each 
withstood considerable domestic out-migration, 
especially during the “bubble years” when many 
of their residents were drawn to growing, more 
Immigration 
remained an 
important 
contributor to 
population gains 
in larger metro-
politan gateways 
throughout 
the 2000s.
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affordable destinations in the South and West. 
During all of these years, international migration 
gains served to counter domestic migration declines 
in these areas. And as net domestic out-migration 
fell rapidly from its mid-decade peak by 2007–2009, 
immigration—while down from its own peak early in 
the decade—held steady. 
Similar patterns defined Miami, chicago, 
Washington, D.c., and San francisco during this 
period, though the latter two areas exhibited recent, 
small domestic migration inflows to complement 
their immigration gains. Dallas and houston showed 
steadily declining, though positive and significant, 
levels of migration from abroad. unlike those other 
gateways, however, net domestic migration to these 
metro areas remained mostly positive throughout, 
and in recent years contributed more to these areas’ 
population gains than international migration.
Table 3. Immigration Cushioned Many of the Largest Metropolitan Gateway Populations from Domestic  
Out-Migration in the 2000s
International and Domestic Migration by Metropolitan Area and year, 2000-2001 to 2008-2009
            
  2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 Total
New york international 159,787	 147,104	 125,082	 110,156	 113,065	 114,870	 103,640	 100,643	 100,669	 1,075,016
 Domestic -177,171	 -207,348	 -236,039	 -247,541	 -283,328	 -288,260	 -220,521	 -150,259	 -110,278	 -1,920,745
           
Los Angeles international 116,487	 108,487	 93,158	 83,517	 87,057	 86,426	 78,155	 75,265	 75,062	 803,614
 Domestic -103,877	 -109,081	 -119,572	 -140,643	 -199,800	 -243,722	 -222,018	 -118,909	 -79,900	 -1,337,522
           
Miami international 64,635	 62,654	 56,216	 52,514	 56,673	 58,160	 52,639	 51,384	 51,548	 506,423
 Domestic -3,576	 -1,499	 -20,179	 -3,295	 -10,086	 -70,414	 -93,453	 -53,037	 -29,321	 -284,860
           
Chicago international 56,281	 50,473	 40,344	 38,716	 37,933	 38,584	 34,082	 33,358	 33,363	 363,134
 Domestic -55,024	 -68,594	 -72,392	 -65,648	 -77,413	 -73,066	 -52,317	 -42,587	 -40,389	 -547,430
           
Dallas international	 44,847	 42,193	 36,731	 33,856	 35,399	 35,545	 32,369	 31,430	 31,571	 323,941
 Domestic 48,668	 13,847	 -1,389	 8,203	 23,471	 76,443	 50,566	 42,857	 45,241	 307,907
           
Washington, D.C. international 39,465	 36,262	 28,210	 36,343	 35,552	 37,697	 32,573	 32,216	 31,904	 310,222
 Domestic 15,978	 1,377	 -8,734	 -14,785	 -17,011	 -51,414	 -36,945	 -17,430	 18,189	 -110,775
           
Houston international 40,294	 37,990	 33,099	 30,221	 31,686	 31,707	 28,779	 27,876	 27,996	 289,648
 Domestic 4,532	 24,472	 2,824	 6,370	 6,104	 91,985	 19,466	 37,158	 49,662	 242,573
           
San Francisco international 36,691	 34,296	 29,622	 26,852	 27,983	 27,867	 25,264	 24,367	 24,376	 257,318
 Domestic -24,885	 -78,931	 -74,108	 -64,631	 -51,031	 -44,753	 -19,866	 6,394	 7,977	 -343,834
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data 
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CITy AND SUBURBAN TRENDS
As with the 1990s, the post-2000 period was largely 
a good one for big city populations. Among the pri-
mary cities of the 100 large metros, 67 showed gains 
from 2000 to 2008.7 As Table 4 shows, the fastest 
growing primary cities tended to be located inside 
some of the fastest growing metropolitan areas, 
including many in the Southeast, Texas, interior 
california and the intermountain West. likewise, 
declining primary cities were located in metro areas 
that experienced slow growth or decline, such as 
youngstown, cleveland, buffalo, and pittsburgh. 
These metro areas saw population losses in their 
suburbs as well.
interestingly, the fastest growing suburbs in the 
100 largest metro areas do not match up closely with 
the fastest growing primary cities; eight of the 10 are 
different. not on the list are the suburbs of the fast 
Table 4. The Fastest Growing Cities in the 2000s Were in Different Metro Areas than the Fastest Growing Suburbs
Highest and Lowest Ranked Primary Cities and Suburbs by Population Growth, 2000 to 2008
             
  Primary Cities of Metro Area  Suburbs of Metro Area
   Population Change  Population Change 
 Rank Metro Area 2000–2008 (%) Metro Area 2000–2008 (%)
  Highest Growth  Highest Growth
	 1	 cape coral, fl 51.8 provo, uT 54.0
	 2 raleigh-cary, nc 34.7	 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 49.8
	 3 bakersfield, cA 31.0 Austin, Tx 48.7
	 4 Atlanta, gA 27.9 boise, iD 44.3
	 5 palm bay, fl 26.6 las Vegas, nV 43.9
	 6 McAllen, Tx 21.3 raleigh-cary, nc 35.9
	 7	 charlotte, nc-Sc 20.6 colorado Springs, co 32.6
	 8 orlando, fl 19.3 charlotte, nc-Sc 31.7
	 9 Sacramento-roseville, cA 17.5 Tucson, AZ 30.9
	 10 Stockton, cA 17.4 Jacksonville, fl 29.7
     
  lowest Growth/Decline  lowest Growth/Decline 
	 91 Syracuse, ny -5.5 rochester, ny 0.6
	 92 birmingham, Al -5.5 Syracuse, ny 0.4
	 93 rochester, ny -5.7 Detroit-Warren, Mi 0.1
	 94 Toledo, oh -6.4 Dayton, oh 0.0
	 95 Dayton, oh -7.0 cleveland, oh -1.0
	 96 pittsburgh, pA -7.1 new orleans, lA -1.2
	 97 buffalo, ny -7.3 Scranton, pA -1.4
	 98 cleveland, oh -9.0 pittsburgh, pA -2.6
	 99	 youngstown, oh -10.8 buffalo, ny -2.7
	 100	 new orleans, lA -35.5 youngstown, oh -5.3
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates data
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Figure 4. A Burst Housing Bubble Provided a Population Lift to Cities and Slowed Growth in Suburbs
Population Change by year, Selected Metro Areas, Primary Cities versus Suburbs, 2000-2001 to 2007-2008
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data
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growing cities of Atlanta and orlando. Suburbs that 
grew considerably faster than their cities included 
several in the interior West, such as provo, boise, 
colorado Springs, and Tucson.
notably, the city population rebound that began 
in the 1990s continued into the 2000s. figure 4 
shows that growth of primary city populations of the 
nation’s 100 metropolitan areas accelerated from 
2006 to 2008, at the same time that suburban popu-
lation growth slowed. Some of this resurgence of 
big cities is due to inherent strengths, such as broad 
economic diversity at a time when smaller cities 
and one-industry towns are vulnerable to economic 
shocks. but much is attributable to a “windfall” of 
residents attracted to and retained in cities, who 
might—in the absence of the housing crisis and deep-
ening recession—have moved to the suburbs.
The effects of a burst housing bubble on big city 
populations were evident nationwide. Among the 
100 primary cities of large metropolitan areas, 73 
grew faster in 2007–2008 than in 2004–2005. on 
the pacific coast, San Diego, San Jose, oakland, 
portland, and Seattle each exhibited its fastest 
growth rate of the decade that year. growth rate 
increases also appeared in large Midwestern primary 
cities that are less steeped in manufacturing (par-
ticularly auto manufacturing), such as Minneapolis-St 
paul. Some Southern cities that were less exposed to 
the mortgage meltdown, such as raleigh, charlotte, 
and Austin, showed high, though sometimes 
Figure 5. Cities and Inner Suburbs Made Late-Decade Gains as Outer Suburban Growth Slowed
Annual Population Growth Rate by City/Suburban Type, 100 Largest Metro Areas, 2000-2001 to 2007-2008
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data
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decreasing, growth rates. Atlanta managed to con-
tinue its recent gains, even as foreclosures wracked 
its outer suburbs. in this way, cities have benefited, 
at least in the short term, from declines in American 
mobility and the collapse of fast-developing subur-
ban housing markets.
in fact, both primary cities and inner, dense 
suburbs achieved late decade growth upticks at the 
expense of outer suburbs and exurbs (figure 5). The 
latter areas rode the wave of strong housing bubble 
related growth up through 2005–2006 only to come 
crashing down in the subsequent two years.
LOOKING AHEAD
The 2000s amounted to a tale of two epochs in met-
ropolitan population and migration trends. While the 
first part of the decade resembled a continuation of 
the 1990s shift from Snow belt to Sun belt, and rapid 
growth of suburbia, the latter part upended those 
trends. The dramatic impact of the housing boom 
and bust, followed by a financial crisis and the deep-
est recession of the postwar era, have put the brakes 
on migration in general, and on growth in many Sun 
belt metro areas. 
As a new decade dawns, questions about future 
growth patterns across and within metropolitan 
America abound. Will the downward growth trajecto-
ries of Sun belt metro areas continue? Will suburban 
and exurban growth be permanently stunted? is the 
recent growth “bounce” for northern and coastal 
metropolitan areas and large primary cities simply a 
short-term demographic windfall, or the beginning of 
a longer-run transition to a new settlement pattern? 
reliable answers to these questions await a 
rebound in our economy and housing markets. 
Meanwhile, the late decade lull in migration provides 
While the first 
part of the 
decade resem-
bled a continua-
tion of the 1990s 
shift from Snow 
Belt to Sun Belt, 
and rapid growth 
of suburbia, 
the latter part 
upended those 
trends.
an opportunity to re-think metropolitan growth 
prospects in light of each area’s attributes and 
assets, such as age, racial and ethnic composition, 
educational attainment, and wage structure. As sub-
sequent chapters explore, metropolitan areas exhibit 
great diversity on these and other dimensions, and 
those differences may be growing more pronounced 
over time. n
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II. rAce & eThniciTy
WILLIAM H. FREy
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83%
Non-white share of  
population growth,  
United States,  
2000 to 2008
2
Rank of Atlanta among all 
metro areas for black  
population, 2008 
(surpassing Chicago)
17/31
Metro areas (out of 100) 
with “majority minority” 
total population / under-18 
population, 2008
12
Primary cities (out of 100) 
with gains in share  
of population that is white, 
2000 to 2008
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OVERVIEW
n  Racial and ethnic minorities accounted for 83 percent of U.S. population growth from 2000 to 2008. 
The continued faster growth of hispanic, Asian, and black populations put the country as a whole on track 
to reach “majority minority” status by 2042, and for children to reach that milestone by 2023. More than 
three-quarters of racial and ethnic minorities today live in the nation’s 100 largest metro areas.
n  A majority of Asians, and a near-majority of Hispanics, live in just 10 metropolitan areas. yet during 
the 2000s a slow dispersal of these groups continued away from major immigrant gateway areas like los 
Angeles, new york, and San francisco. fast-growing areas of the South like Dallas, houston, Atlanta, and 
Washington, D.c. ranked among the largest gainers of Asian and hispanic population from 2000 to 2008.
n  Metro areas in the Southeast and the Interior West, and a few in the Midwest, exhibited some of the 
most rapid gains in Hispanic and Asian populations in the 2000s. During the latter part of the decade, 
however, hispanic and Asian growth retrenched toward major gateways like los Angeles, chicago, and 
Miami, as the housing market collapse and recession slowed the movement of these groups to places like 
riverside, phoenix, and orlando.
n  Blacks continue to move southward, as metro Atlanta surpassed metro Chicago for total black popu-
lation by 2008. Whites moved to many of these “new South” areas in large numbers as well during the 
2000s, though their population shrank in large, coastal metro areas like los Angeles and new york that 
continued to attract significant minority populations.
n  For the first time, a majority of all racial/ethnic groups in large metro areas live in the suburbs. Deep 
divides by race and ethnicity still separate cities and suburbs in metro areas like Detroit, but others like 
los Angeles show much greater convergence between jurisdictions. in a handful of cities including Atlanta, 
boston, and Washington, D.c., the share of population that is white increased during the 2000s.
NATIONAL TRENDS
The racial and ethnic profile of the united States 
continued to evolve rapidly in the 2000s. its direc-
tion built on the trend of the 1990s, with non-white 
minorities dominating national population growth. 
This reflects the combined impact of continued 
immigration, largely from latin America and Asia, 
and higher fertility for minorities than for whites. 
The latter factor has become increasingly important 
as these groups gain a larger presence in u.S. soci-
ety; two-thirds of the decade’s hispanic population 
growth was due to natural increase (more births than 
deaths) rather than immigration. 
Whites still account for a majority of u.S. popula-
tion at 66 percent (figure 1). however, this is down 
from 76 percent in 1990. from 2000 to 2008, they 
accounted for only 17 percent of national population 
growth, and their total numbers increased by only 
The racial and 
ethnic profile 
of the United 
States continued 
to evolve rapidly 
in the 2000s. Its 
direction built on 
the trend of the 
1990s, with non-
white minori-
ties dominating 
national popula-
tion growth. 
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2 percent. by contrast, the population of hispanics 
during this period rose by 31 percent, Asians by 26 
percent, and blacks by 8 percent. Additionally, people 
of two or more races, while still a small share of total 
u.S. population, represent a growing presence in u.S. 
society.
With their increasing numbers and higher growth 
rates, America’s racial and ethnic minority repre-
sentation is projected to increase substantially over 
time. According to the census bureau’s most recent 
estimates, the u.S. population will become minor-
ity white in the year 2042, at which time hispanics 
would comprise 27 percent of the population, blacks 
12 percent and Asians 7 percent.1 under this same 
scenario, the nation’s under-18 population would 
achieve the same status in 2023.
Despite these recent gains and long-term projec-
tions, the national growth of hispanics and Asians 
especially tapered off toward the end of the decade, 
due to the great recession and its impacts on immi-
gration. from 2000 to 2006, hispanic population 
rose at an annual rate of 3.9 percent, which fell to 
2.9 percent over the next two years. The drop-off in 
the Asian growth rate was even more dramatic, from 
4.3 percent in the 2000 –2006 period to 1.1 percent 
thereafter. 
Minority populations in the united States concen-
trate even more heavily in large metropolitan areas 
than the overall population. in 2008, the 100 largest 
metro areas contained 66 percent of total u.S. popu-
lation, but 77 percent of non-whites and hispanics. 
This included 74 percent of blacks, 80 percent of 
hispanics, and 88 percent of Asians.2 As described 
below, a number of these large metro areas are 
on the cutting edge of the nation’s transition to a 
“majority minority” society.
METROPOLITAN TRENDS
Dispersal Amid Concentration  
of Hispanics and Asians
The historical clustering of America’s immigrant 
minorities resulted from the initial settlement of 
these groups into a handful of “gateway” metro-
politan areas. friendship and family networks have 
drawn them to these traditional ports of entry, 
Figure 1. Non-Whites Accounted for the Bulk of  
U.S. Population Growth in the 2000s
Share of 2008 U.S. Population by Race/Ethnicity
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data
Share of 2000-2008 Population Change  
by Race/Ethnicity
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even during times when labor market conditions 
would suggest they move elsewhere. The past two 
decades reflect a growing but incomplete dispersal 
of hispanics and Asians from these gateways to the 
country as a whole.3 
As recently as the 1990 census, taken 25 years 
after the 1965 immigration Act liberalized the entry 
of more hispanics from latin America, the group 
remained relatively geographically concentrated. At 
that time, the 10 metropolitan areas with the largest 
hispanic populations housed fully 55 percent of all 
of u.S. hispanics, with the top two—los Angeles and 
new york—accounting for nearly three in 10 nation-
wide. Since 1990, only phoenix—where the hispanic 
population mushroomed—newly joined the top 10, 
taking over the eighth spot from San francisco. Still, 
Table 1. Hispanics and Asians Continued a Gradual Shift Away from Large Gateways in the 2000s
Large Metro Areas Ranked by Hispanic and Asian Population, 2008, and Change, 2000 to 2008
  
   2008 Population   2000 to 2008 Growth
 Hispanics
  Change 
  from      Population 
 Rank 1990 Metro Area Population Rank Metro Area Change
	 1	 0 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA 5,719,249	 1 riverside–San bernardino–ontario, cA 635,298
	 2	 0 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA 4,111,527 2 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx 596,917
 3	 0 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl 2,142,735	 3 houston, Tx 574,059
	 4	 1 houston, Tx 1,945,238 4 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA 567,599
	 5	 -1 chicago-naperville-Joliet, il-in-Wi 1,903,748	 5 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA 515,298
	 6	 0 riverside-San bernardino-ontario, cA 1,879,350 6 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 492,187
	 7	 1 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx 1,731,274	 7 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl 421,573
	 8	 4 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 1,321,713 8 chicago-naperville-Joliet, il-in-Wi 395,647
	 9	 -2 San Antonio, Tx 1,080,482	 9 Atlanta, gA 245,299
	 10	 0 San Diego, cA 926,926 10 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV 225,638
Asians
	 1	 0 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA 1,782,387	 1 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA 355,698
 2 0 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA 1,777,325 2 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA 205,292
	 3	 0 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA 960,769	 3 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA 130,925
 4 1 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa clara, cA 550,527 4 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV 119,481
	 5	 1 chicago-naperville-Joliet, il-in-Wi 504,597	 5 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa clara, cA 108,892
 6 -2 honolulu, hi 471,090 6 chicago-naperville-Joliet, il-in-Wi 105,979
	 7	 0 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV	 460,337	 7 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx 96,405
 8 1 Seattle-Tacoma-bellevue, WA 368,449 8 houston, Tx 90,308
 9	 1	 houston, Tx 326,301	 9 Seattle-Tacoma-bellevue, WA 87,905
	 10 -2 San Diego, cA 311,343 10 riverside–San bernardino–ontario, cA 86,436
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates data        
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the pecking order of the top three has not budged in 
the past two decades.
nonetheless, the largest hispanic settlement 
areas are showing signs of losing their grip. The top 
ten metro areas in 2008 housed nearly half (48 per-
cent) of all hispanics, but garnered only 40 percent 
of the nation’s hispanic growth from 2000 to 2008. 
The metropolitan areas gaining the most hispanics 
during that period (Table 1, right panel) include two 
outside the top 10. Washington, D.c.’s and Atlanta’s 
strong employment opportunities during most of the 
decade helped attract new hispanic immigrants and 
longer-term residents from other parts of the united 
States. riverside ranked first in total hispanic gains 
from 2000 to 2008, owing in part to its attraction of 
hispanics from nearby los Angeles. The Texas metro 
areas of Dallas and houston follow riverside in regis-
tering the largest hispanic gains. 
A shift away from southern california, toward 
florida, also underlies these patterns. During the 
1990s, los Angeles and new york led all metro  
areas in both numbers of hispanics and total 
hispanic population gains. but from 2000 to 2008, 
los Angeles gained less than half as many hispanics 
as it did during the 1990s (567,000 vs. 1.2 million). 
Meanwhile, Tampa, orlando, and Jacksonville each 
gained more hispanics in the first eight years of his 
decade than they did throughout the 1990s. This 
shift may have been temporary, however, given sharp 
downturns in the housing market in some of these 
newer destinations. 
Asians concentrate even more heavily in tradi-
tional immigrant magnet areas than hispanics. The 
same 10 metro areas that housed the most Asians 
in 1990 remain on the list for 2008 (Table 1 bot-
tom left). Still, dispersal occurred, with the share of 
total u.S. Asian population those areas represent 
slipping from 61 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 
2008. The top three areas—los Angeles, new york, 
and San francisco—still house one-third of all Asians 
nationwide.
As with hispanics, the largest gateways have 
garnered a lower share of recent Asian gains. They 
drew less than half (44 percent) of Asian population 
gains from 2000 to 2008, compared with 53 percent 
in the 1990s. Dallas and riverside, two metro areas 
not among those with the most Asians, ranked 7th 
and 10th, respectively, among those gaining the most 
Asians this past decade (Table 1, bottom right). The 
jump in riverside’s rank, from 18th biggest gainer 
during the 1990s to 10th from 2000 to 2008, reflects 
a spillover effect from los Angeles also evident for 
hispanics. A similar pattern in northern california 
vaulted Stockton from 43rd on Asian gains in the 
1990s to 26th from 2000 to 2008.
Hispanic and Asian Growth Centers  
of the 2000s
The metro areas experiencing the highest recent 
growth rates for hispanics and Asians diverge from 
those above that registered the highest numeric 
gains. They provide a measure of where the newest 
gains are taking place, often in places undergoing 
significant in-migration.
The Southeast, especially florida, dominates 
the list for fastest hispanic growth in the 2000s 
(Table 2). cape coral rose in rank from number 11 
in the 1990s to number one from 2000 to 2008, 
and lakeland moved up 7 notches to number five. 
The Midwestern metro areas of indianapolis and 
columbus make the top 10 as well.
A large number of metropolitan areas crossed 
significant thresholds for hispanic population—either 
5 percent or 10 percent—over the past two decades 
(Map 1). These metro areas began to spread to the 
Southeast, intermountain West, and across new 
The past two 
decades reflect 
a growing but 
incomplete 
dispersal of 
Hispanics and 
Asians from 
major gateways 
to the country as 
a whole.
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Table 2. Metro Areas in the Southeast and Interior West Had Fast-Growing Hispanic and 
Asian Populations in the 2000s
 Highest Ranked Large Metro Areas by Hispanic and Asian Population Growth Rate, 2000 to 2008
 
   Hispanics    Asians
  Change    Change 
  from   Population  from  Population 
 Rank 1990s Metro Area Change (%) Rank 1990s Metro Area Change (%)
	 1	 10 cape coral, fl 142.1	 1	 0 las Vegas, nV 76.2
	 2	 -1 charlotte, nc-Sc 117.6	 2	 4 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 70.2
	 3	 -1 raleigh-cary, nc 113.7	 3	 25 riverside-San bernardino-ontario, cA 58.8
 4	 0 nashville, Tn 105.7	 4	 -2 Atlanta, gA 58.0
	 5	 7 lakeland, fl 102.3	 5	 -2 orlando, fl 57.4
	 6	 0 indianapolis, in 99.5	 6	 1 indianapolis, in 55.7
	 7	 2 provo, uT 94.1	 7	 -2 Tampa-St. petersburg-clearwater, fl 53.7
	 8	 -3 Atlanta, gA 89.2	 8	 16 San Antonio, Tx 48.3
	 9	 8 columbus, oh 86.0	 9	 3 columbus, oh 47.6
	 10	 -7 greensboro-high point, nc 80.5	 10	 -6 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx 47.2
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates data      
   
Map 1. Hispanics Represent a Significant Share of Population in an Increasing Number of Metro Areas
Period in which Hispanic Population Share Crossed 5% / 10% Threshold, Large Metro Areas
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data
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england and eastern pennsylvania. in this respect, 
new hispanic destinations coincide with recent 
growth centers for overall u.S. population, such as 
Atlanta, orlando, provo, and charlotte.
for the Asian population, further moves into the 
interior West characterized growth patterns in the 
2000s. las Vegas ranked first among large metro 
areas for Asian growth rate from 2000 to 2008, 
just as it did during the 1990s. Moving up notice-
ably to the second and third spots were phoenix and 
riverside, the latter vaulting from 28th place in the 
1990s. Several metropolitan areas in florida and 
other parts of the South make the list as well, includ-
ing Atlanta, orlando, Tampa, San Antonio, and Dallas. 
As with hispanics, indianapolis and columbus make 
the list of fastest Asian gainers; their Midwestern 
neighbors cincinnati and St louis climbed to 11th and 
15th as well (not shown). because Asians comprise 
a much smaller share of the u.S. population (4.5 
percent) than hispanics (15.4 percent), there are 
far fewer places with significant Asian populations. 
nonetheless, there are signs of continued “spreading 
out,” as Asians comprised at least 5 percent of popu-
lation in 22 of the nation’s 100 largest metro areas, 
up from nine in 1990. 
Late-Decade Hispanic Retrenchment
Just as the housing market collapse and ensuing 
recession severely curtailed overall growth in many 
of the nation’s real-estate driven migration magnets, 
it also impacted dispersal among racial and ethnic 
minorities. This was especially true for hispanics, 
as labor market opportunities in fast-growing metro 
areas in fields like construction and retail diminished 
rapidly with the bursting of the housing bubble. 
The “retrenchment” of hispanics toward tradi-
tional gateway areas is most vivid within california. 
hispanic gains in metropolitan los Angeles qua-
drupled in 2007-2008 compared with just two years 
earlier, at the same time that they halved in metro-
politan riverside. other traditional hispanic areas, 
including chicago, new york, Miami, San francisco, 
and San Diego, saw increased gains in 2007-2008, 
at the same time that hispanic growth declined sig-
nificantly in places like phoenix, las Vegas, orlando, 
and Atlanta.  About half of the nation’s 100 largest 
metro areas showed hispanic growth slowdowns that 
year, mostly represented by non-traditional hispanic 
areas.  Jacksonville, provo, and las Vegas, compared 
against los Angeles, demonstrate this trend (figure 
2). until employment opportunities reappear in these 
areas in significant number, the widespread spatial 
assimilation of hispanics in some new destinations 
may be on hold.
Figure 2. Hispanic Growth Retrenched Toward Traditional  
Gateway Areas After the Housing Crash
Change in Hispanic Population by year, Selected Metro Areas,  
2000-2001 to 2007-2008
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data
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Continued Southward Shift of Blacks
The historic pattern of black settlement in the united 
States can be measured more in centuries than in 
decades. The most prominent shifts occurred during 
much of the 20th century, with the “great Migration” 
out of the South, first to cities in the northeast 
and Midwest, and then to the West. Still, through 
the 1960s, the South housed more than half of the 
nation’s black population. in the early 1970s, African 
Americans began to follow white population into the 
South. Since then, and especially during the 1990s, 
black movement to the South has become substan-
tial.4 it has occurred less in historic “old South” 
states such as louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, 
and more in “new South” growth centers such as 
Texas, north carolina, georgia, and florida.
This trend expanded in the 2000s. The region’s 
share of total u.S. black population continued to rise 
from 54 percent in 1990 to 57 percent in 2008. The 
South accounted for fully 75 percent of the nation’s 
black population gains from 2000 to 2008, up from 
65 percent in the 1990s. northern destinations for 
blacks during the great Migration still figure promi-
nently among the metropolitan areas with the larg-
est black populations in 2008, as do several areas 
in the South (Table 3, left panel). The biggest shift 
occurred in metropolitan Atlanta, which rose rapidly 
from seventh in 1990 to fourth in 2000, and in the 
2000s surpassed chicago to house the second-larg-
est African American population in the united States. 
in the process it more than doubled its black popula-
tion, overtaking the metropolitan area whose city 
Martin luther king, Jr. once called the “birmingham 
of the north.”
Atlanta also far surpassed other metropolitan 
areas in its black population gain during the 2000s 
(Table 3, right panel). its large middle-class black 
population, along with its diversified and growing 
Table 3. Black Population Continued to Head Southward in the 2000s
Large Metro Areas Ranked by Black Population, 2008, and Growth, 2000 to 2008
     
    2008 Population   2000 to 2008 Growth  
        Population 
 2008 2000 1990 Metro Area Population Rank Metro Area Change
	 1	 1	 1 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA 3,162,284	 1 Atlanta, gA 445,578
	 2	 4	 7 Atlanta, gA 1,669,518	 2 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx 159,494
	 3	 2	 2 chicago-naperville-Joliet, il-in-Wi 1,667,376	 3 houston, Tx 151,362
 4	 3	 3 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV 1,370,929	 4 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV 97,874
	 5	 5	 4 philadelphia, pA-nJ-De-MD 1,169,265	 5 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl	 95,876
	 6	 8	 8 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl 1,042,874	 6 charlotte, nc-Sc 94,171
	 7	 6	 6 Detroit-Warren, Mi 1,008,171	 7 orlando, fl 71,698
	 8	 9	 9 houston, Tx 942,101	 8 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 62,884
	 9	 7	 5 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA 898,695	 9 baltimore, MD 60,351
	 10	 10	 11 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx 874,216	 10 Tampa-St. petersburg -clearwater, fl 59,997
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates data        
 
S
TA
T
e
 o
f
 M
e
T
r
o
p
o
l
iT
A
n
 A
M
e
r
ic
A
 |
 R
A
C
E
 &
 E
T
H
N
IC
IT
y
58
economy, provided a continued draw for African 
Americans from across the country. nine of the 
top 10 metro areas for black population gains from 
2000 to 2008 are located in the South, including the 
three “new South” areas of charlotte, orlando, and 
Tampa. These regions are attracting more highly-
educated blacks, including those from northern 
destinations. Washington, D.c., Atlanta, and Dallas 
rank sixth, ninth, and 25th, respectively, on the share 
of black adults with a bachelor’s degree, whereas 
philadelphia and Detroit rank, respectively, 59th  
and 79th.
White Gains and Losses
compared to hispanic, Asian, and black population, 
white population distributes much more evenly 
across the country. With lower fertility and minimal 
growth through immigration, whites’ movement 
among metropolitan areas effectively amounts to a 
zero-sum game, reflecting domestic in- and out-
migration to a greater degree than for minorities.
consequently, metropolitan areas among the 
nation’s 100 largest exhibited both significant gains 
and losses of white population during the 2000s. 
Those with the largest gains included metropoli-
tan areas in the South and West, such as phoenix, 
Atlanta, Dallas, charlotte, and raleigh (Table 4, left 
panel). While many of these areas also experienced 
fast growth of hispanics and Asians in the 2000s 
(Table 2), they contrast with traditional immigrant 
magnets such as los Angeles, new york, and 
chicago, where gains of those groups were greatest 
over the decade (Table 1). 
indeed, the list of metropolitan areas sustain-
ing the greatest white population losses over the 
2000–2008 period contains many of these tradi-
tional immigrant magnets (Table 4, right panel). out-
migration in response to the high cost of housing 
Table 4. White Population Losses in Coastal and Midwestern Metro Areas Counterbalanced Gains  
in the South and West
Large Metro Areas Ranked by White Population Gains and Losses, 2000 to 2008
 
  Gains   losses 
   Population   Population 
 Rank Metro Area Change Rank Metro Area Change
	 1	 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 353,665	 1 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA -662,170
	 2 Atlanta, gA 285,981	 2 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA -490,380
	 3 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx 214,150	 3 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA -106,025
 4 Austin, Tx 164,567	 4 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa clara, cA -106,017
	 5	 charlotte, nc-Sc 157,566	 5 philadelphia, pA-nJ-De-MD -100,147
	 6 raleigh–cary, nc 149,081	 6	 pittsburgh, pA -84,597
	 7 houston, Tx 145,071	 7 San Diego, cA -72,769
	 8 portland-Vancouver, or-WA	 133,127	 8 riverside-San bernardino–ontario, cA -72,530
	 9 nashville, Tn 130,293	 9 honolulu, hi -70,912
	 10 provo, uT 125,091	 10 buffalo, ny -60,620
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates data      
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through most of the decade in those expensive 
coastal metro areas contributed to their losses. 
in areas like pittsburgh, buffalo, cleveland, and 
hartford that also lost significant white population, 
economic stagnation and aging of the population 
were more important factors. overall, more than 
one-third (35) of the 100 largest metro areas lost 
white population during this time.
Majority-Minority Metro Areas
As described above, America is on its way to becom-
ing a much more racially and ethnically diverse coun-
try, with whites expected to account for less than 
half the population by 2042. but the historic cluster-
ing of immigrant and African American settlement, 
and the continued growth of these populations, has 
led numerous areas to become “majority minority” 
already (figure 3). This is now the case for 17 metro 
areas, up from 14 in 2000 and just five in 1990. The 
Texas border metro areas of McAllen and el paso, 
where more than four-fifths of the population is 
hispanic, lead the list. Among metro areas with at 
least 1 million people, los Angeles has the smallest 
white population share at 33 percent. eight of the 
17 are located in california, and another four are in 
Texas. The new york metro area, which clocked in 
at 50.7 percent white in 2008, will soon cross this 
threshold as well, perhaps by this year’s decennial 
census.
because the younger part of the population is 
even more racially and ethnically diverse than adults 
(see the Age chapter), fully 31 metro areas already 
possess “majority minority” child populations (Map 
2). They include all of the regions in figure 3, as well 
Figure 3. Seventeen Large Metro Areas Have Majority-Minority Populations
Share of Population by Race/Ethnicity, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data
Note: Metro area names are shortened
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as many that have more of a “white” image overall 
but a minority-dominated child population beneath 
the surface, such as phoenix, las Vegas, Washington, 
D.c., orlando, Atlanta, and chicago.
CITy AND SUBURBAN TRENDS
for much of the post-World War ii period, “white 
flight” to the suburbs and concentrations of blacks 
and immigrants in urban areas combined to create a 
common perception of cities as having large minor-
ity presences, surrounded by largely white suburbs. 
These patterns changed gradually as a consequence 
of civil rights-era anti-discrimination legislation, the 
rise of hispanic and Asian populations in suburbs, 
Map 2. In 31 Large Metro Areas, A Majority of Children Are From Racial/Ethnic Minority Groups
Large Metro Areas with Majority-Minority Child (Under 18) Populations, 2008
Figure 4. A Majority of All Racial/Ethnic Groups in 
Major Metro Areas Live in the Suburbs
Share of Population in Suburbs by Race/Ethnicity,  
Large Metro Areas, 2000 and 2008
Includes 93 of 100 metro areas for which data are available
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American 
Community Survey data
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data
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and less segregated development patterns in newer 
metropolitan areas.
While whites reside in the suburbs in larger num-
bers and shares than any minority group, the first 
decade of the new century brought the united States 
to a new benchmark. for the first time, more than 
half of all racial and ethnic groups residing in large 
metro areas live in the suburbs (figure 4). This was 
the case already for Asians and hispanics in 2000, 
and blacks crossed this threshold during the decade. 
in 2000, 43 percent of blacks in major metro areas 
lived in the suburbs, but that share increased rapidly 
to more than 50 percent by 2008.
notably, this transformation occurred as the 
total number of blacks living in suburbs rose from 
2000 to 2008, but dropped in cities by a small 
amount, and by a larger margin than for whites. new 
orleans alone accounted for a significant part of this 
difference; the aftermath of hurricane katrina con-
tributed to a significant reduction in the city’s black 
population, and a less-severe decline in its white 
population.5
because whites are far more likely to be subur-
ban residents than minorities, the racial and ethnic 
composition of suburbs still tilts rather heavily 
toward whites, though this too varies across metro-
politan areas. About two-thirds of all suburbanites 
are white, compared to 43 percent in primary cities 
(figure 5). At one extreme are slow-growing, black/
white metro areas like Detroit with a longstanding 
pattern of racial and ethnic segregation. Today, more 
than four-fifths of residents in Detroit’s suburbs are 
white, compared to less than one-fifth of the city’s 
population. At the other extreme is los Angeles, 
whose prototypical “melting pot suburbs” are almost 
as diverse as its city population. in between are fast 
Figure 5. Metro Areas Vary Considerably in the Location of their Racial/Ethnic Populations
Share of Population by Race/Ethnicity and Metropolitan Location, Selcted Metro Areas, 2008
*Includes 93 of 100 metro areas for which data are available
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
For the first time, 
more than half 
of all racial and 
ethnic groups 
residing in large 
metro areas live 
in the suburbs.
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growing destinations like Atlanta, whose suburbs are 
still “whiter” than its city, but whose black popula-
tion has also increasingly suburbanized with declines 
in segregation and growth of the black middle class.
in fact, Atlanta and a few other cities experienced 
a somewhat new phenomenon in the 2000s—a gain 
in the share of population that is white. in Atlanta, 
whites increased from 32 percent of population in 
2000 to 36 percent in 2008. Similar, though smaller, 
increases occurred in new york, Washington D.c., 
San francisco, boston, and primary cities in another 
seven of the nation’s 100 largest metro areas. What 
some have termed a “demographic inversion” in 
metro areas, with whites repopulating cities and 
minorities moving out to the suburbs, is not yet a 
widespread phenomenon, but bears watching in the 
years and decades ahead as metro areas grow even 
more diverse.6
Still, there are notable gradations within suburbia. 
At the national level, exurbs and emerging outer 
suburbs are predominantly white; mature suburbs 
reflect more of the national race-ethnic profile;  
and inner high-density suburbs are highly diverse 
(figure 6).
LOOKING AHEAD
beginning with the 1990s, and continuing into the 
2000s, there has been a noticeable blurring of the 
regional and city-suburban racial and ethnic divide. 
At the regional level, much of this blurring owes to 
the widespread dispersal of hispanics, both native- 
and foreign-born, to new parts of the country where 
employment opportunities lured them away from 
traditional settlement areas. To a lesser extent, 
Asians have also moved to many of the same areas. 
And while blacks have dispersed to some degree, 
Figure 6. Racial/Ethnic Diversity Decreases Father Away from the Urban Core in Metro Areas
Share of Population by Race/Ethnicity and Metropolitan Community Type, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
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their major shift has been to the South, in a reversal 
of the great Migration at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Despite these dispersals, minorities still 
concentrate unevenly across metropolitan America. 
notwithstanding the growth of more majority- 
minority metro areas, more than half of the 100 larg-
est are over 70 percent white, and whites comprise 
more than 80 percent of population in more than  
a quarter. 
As the growth rates of hispanic and Asian popula-
tions continue to dwarf those of the nation’s aging 
white population, more metropolitan areas will 
undoubtedly show a reduced presence of whites, 
suggested by the large and growing number of metro 
areas with majority-minority child populations. yet 
a truly nationwide integration of racial and ethnic 
minorities still seems a long way off. The latter part 
of the decade indicates that further dispersal of 
hispanics into new destinations over the short run 
may await significant improvement in underlying 
labor market conditions. over the longer run, the 
growth of second- and third-generation minority 
groups that are more assimilated into the “main-
stream” labor market suggests that their movements 
will increasingly mirror those of the overall popula-
tion. Still, the emerging “cultural generation gap” 
between a largely minority, multiethnic child and 
young adult population, and a primarily white elderly 
and older baby boomer population, suggests that a 
more gradual assimilation may take place.
finally, within metropolitan areas, the 2000s 
indicate that the nation is well on its way toward 
achieving greater city-suburban racial and ethnic 
integration. This, too, is an uneven phenomenon 
regionally, and the demographic similarities between 
cities and suburbs in faster-growing metro areas of 
the South and West exceed those in slower-growing 
parts of the northeast and Midwest. Still, 20th-
century notions of who lives in cities and suburbs are 
increasingly out of step with 21st century realities. 
Tracking the further movement of these groups into 
suburbia, and examining the underlying forces and 
resulting outcomes, will be a clear priority for both 
the public and private sectors for the foreseeable 
future. n
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III. iMMigrATion
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OVERVIEW
n  About one in eight Americans in 2008 was an immigrant. This represented a dramatic rise from 1970, 
when fewer than one in 20 Americans was foreign born, and reflects a tectonic shift in sources of u.S. immi-
gration away from europe and toward latin American and Asia in the late 20th century.
n  Metropolitan areas in the Southeast gained immigrants at a faster rate than most other regions during 
the 2000s. Many metro areas in the great plains, Texas, inland california and the Mountain West also had 
above average growth. immigrant growth across all metropolitan areas was strong but down from the break-
neck pace of the 1990s, and appeared to subside further with the onset of the recession in 2008. 
n  High and low-skilled immigrants distribute unevenly across U.S. metro areas. immigrants with the 
lowest levels of english language ability and educational attainment cluster in Texas, inland california, and 
Sun belt markets that experienced fast growth during the decade’s housing boom. More highly-educated 
immigrants populate former gateways like pittsburgh and baltimore, and high-tech economies like the San 
francisco bay Area. Major metro areas in the Southeast, as well as established gateways like chicago and 
new york, draw a mix of immigrants by skill level.
n  The “second generation” represents a large share of the child population in several established met-
ropolitan gateways. in the los Angeles, Miami, and San francisco metro areas, more than half of children 
have at least one foreign born parent or are themselves foreign born. The new york area has 1.8 million such 
children, 44 percent of all children metro-wide.
n  More than half of the foreign born live in large metropolitan suburbs, up from 44 percent in 1980. in 
metropolitan areas with a more recent immigration history, such as Atlanta, las Vegas, and Washington, 
D.c., immigrants account for a similar or higher share of suburban than city population. More than one in 
three immigrants in large metro areas lives in the high-density suburbs that surround cities, and nearly one 
in five lives in mature, mid-20th century suburbs. 
NATIONAL TRENDS
high levels of immigration in the 2000s increased 
the foreign-born population from 31 million to 38 
million as of 2008. Despite that increase, the pace 
of growth in this decade was slower than the rapid 
immigrant population growth of the 1990s. The 
steep downturn in the economy that began in late 
2007 has had an impact on migration worldwide, 
and immigration to the united States appeared to 
have slowed by 2008. While some of these changes 
in flows may be momentary, other changes signal 
longer-term trends. 
This chapter highlights immigrant settlement 
trends, particularly in new destination areas and 
suburbs. it also explores social, economic, and migra-
tion characteristics of the foreign born at various 
The steep 
downturn in the 
economy that 
began in late 
2007 has had an 
impact on migra-
tion worldwide, 
and immigration 
to the United 
States appeared 
to have slowed 
by 2008. 
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geographic levels. examining immigration trends in 
metropolitan areas, and their cities and suburbs, is 
helpful for understanding how places will weather 
the current economic downturn, and how immigrants 
may respond to changing labor demands once recov-
ery is underway.
As of 2008, 38 million immigrants lived in the 
united States, or 12.5 percent of the population, a 
rising share but still lower than in the early part of 
the 20th century (figure 1). immigrant settlement 
trends during the early part of the century largely 
followed economic activity in cities and suburbs. 
industrial and commercial growth in the northeast 
and Midwest drew population, including immigrants, 
in large numbers, until the great Depression stalled 
immigration. 
The middle of the twentieth century saw immigra-
tion to the united States wane as the supply of labor 
from europe dwindled during that region’s rapid 
recovery after World War ii. The nadir in absolute 
terms coincided with the baby boom, yielding a 
national population that was less than 5 percent for-
eign born in 1970. This period also marked the rapid 
growth of the metropolitan Sun belt, when many 
Americans were lured to warmer year-round climates 
and open space, spreading from the Southwest 
to the Southeast. by the end of the century and 
continuing into the current decade, the South saw 
burgeoning growth in its metropolitan areas, and 
immigrant settlement has mirrored this recent trend. 
u.S. immigration policy changed in 1965, with 
the abolition of national origin quotas, and insti-
tuted a preference system for sponsored relatives 
of American citizens and workers with certain skills. 
coincident with these changes was the economic 
growth and development of many latin American, 
caribbean, and Asian nations, leading to substantial 
out-migration from those world regions. in addition, 
civil and political strife induced emigration from vari-
ous countries in those same regions beginning in the 
1970s. by the end of the 1990s, outflows of students, 
professionals, and refugees from Africa increased 
dramatically, and in this decade, Africans are arriving 
in the united States at a higher rate than immigrants 
from any other world region. 
These economic, political, and policy dynamics 
induced a dramatic shift in the origin of America’s 
immigrant population over time (figure 2). in 1970, 
among the 9.6 million foreign-born u.S. residents, 
fully 60 percent were from europe, largely a mani-
festation of earlier waves of immigration. At that 
point, only 8 percent of the total were from Mexico, 
and another 11 percent were from the rest of latin 
America and the caribbean. nine percent came from 
the countries of Asia, another 8 percent from other 
north American countries (mostly canada), and less 
than 1 percent from the African continent. by 2008, 
the dramatic transformations in opportunities across 
Figure 1. The Foreign-Born Share of U.S. Population Is Rising, 
but Still Below Levels from the Early 20th Century
Foreign-Born Population and Share of Population that is Foreign Born,  
United States, 1900–2008
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and 2008 American Community Survey data
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the world are apparent in the composition of the  
38 million u.S. foreign born: only 13 percent are  
from europe; Mexican immigrants comprise fully  
30 percent of the total with another 23 percent from 
other latin American and caribbean countries;  
27 percent are from Asia; Africans represent nearly 
4 percent of the total; and only 2 percent are from 
north America.
METROPOLITAN TRENDS
Location of the Foreign Born
The u.S. foreign-born population concentrates dis-
proportionately in large metropolitan areas. in 2008, 
about 85 percent of u.S. immigrants lived in the 100 
largest metro areas, compared to 66 percent of total 
population. This proportion was down slightly from 
87 percent in 1990, reflecting a greater spread of the 
foreign-born population across the u.S. landscape 
over time. The remainder in 2008 lived in smaller 
metropolitan areas (10 percent) and micropolitan 
and other non-metropolitan areas (5 percent). The 
disproportionate share of immigrants living in large 
metro areas gave those areas a considerably higher 
foreign-born population share in 2008 (over 16 per-
cent) than the nation as a whole.
new york and los Angeles top the list of metro-
politan areas with the largest number of immigrants, 
with 5.3 and 4.4 million, respectively, followed by 
other well-established destination areas includ-
ing Miami and chicago (see Table 1, upper panel). 
however, when metro areas are ranked by the 
percentage of foreign born, nine of the top 10 are 
in the Sun belt states, all with long-standing immi-
grant populations (Table 1, lower panel). Six are in 
california (San Jose, los Angeles, San francisco, 
Stockton, oxnard and San Diego); two lie along the 
Texas border (McAllen and el paso); and Miami and 
new york round out the top 10.
Among the 100 largest metropolitan areas, the 
foreign born grew by 21.3 percent between 2000 
and 2008. That equated to a robust annual growth 
rate of roughly 2.4 percent, though it was down 
from the swift 4.5 percent annual growth rate of the 
1990s. Metropolitan areas in the Southeast gained 
immigrants at a faster rate than most other regions 
Figure 2. The Region of Origin for U.S. 
Immigrants Shifted Dramatically Over Time
Share of Foreign Born by Region of Birth, 
United States, 1970
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and  
2008 American Community Survey data
Share of Foreign Born by Region of Birth, 
United States, 2008
As of 2008,  
38 million  
immigrants  
lived in the 
United States,  
or 12.5 percent 
of the population, 
a rising share  
but still lower 
than in the  
early part of the 
20th century.
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during this decade (Map 1). Many metro areas in 
the great plains, Texas, inland california, and the 
Mountain West also had above-average growth. 
conversely, metropolitan areas in the great lakes 
and industrial northeast, and along the West coast 
saw slower-than-average growth or no significant 
change at all.
further, many metropolitan areas saw immigra-
tion slow considerably toward the end of the 2000s 
as the economy entered recession. Among the 15 
metro areas with the largest number of immigrants, 
only four posted significant, positive growth in 
their foreign-born populations between 2007 and 
2008 (houston, Dallas, Atlanta, and Seattle). The 
Table 1. Immigrants Are Greatest in Number and Population Share in Long-Established 
Gateway Metro Areas
Metro Areas Ranked by Foreign-Born Population and Population Share, 2008
 
  largest Number of Immigrants
 Rank Metro area Immigrants
		 1 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA 5,328,033
 2 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA  4,374,583
	 3 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl  1,995,037
 4 chicago-naperville-Joliet, il-in-Wi  1,689,617
 5 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA  1,258,324
 6 houston, Tx  1,237,719
	 7 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx  1,121,321
 8 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV  1,089,950
	 9 riverside-San bernardino-ontario, cA  894,527
 10 boston-cambridge, MA-nh  731,960
  All large metro areas 32,425,888
  Highest Foreign-Born Population Share
 Rank Metro Area % Foreign Born
	 1 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl  36.8
 2 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa clara, cA  36.4
	 3 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA  34.0
 4 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA  29.4
 5 McAllen, Tx  29.2
 6 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA  28.0
 7 el paso, Tx  27.3
 8 Stockton, cA  22.8
 9 oxnard-Thousand oaks-Ventura, cA  22.3
 10 San Diego, cA  22.1
  All large metro areas 16.3
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data   
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remainder, mostly well-established destination areas, 
saw either a significant decline (los Angeles and 
phoenix) or no change (new york, Miami, chicago, 
San francisco, Washington, riverside, boston, San 
Diego, and San Jose). The deepening of the reces-
sion in late 2008 suggests that this stall in immigra-
tion may have spread further the following year.
Migration Characteristics 
immigrant tenure and whether they become natural-
ized citizens both have implications for immigrants 
themselves, their families, and the communities in 
which they live. in many newer destination areas, 
residents worry that newcomers may overwhelm 
schools, health care systems, and other local 
services. These areas often lack the developed 
infrastructure to assist immigrants and their fami-
lies in the integration process that long-standing 
destination metropolitan areas facilitate.
Metropolitan areas with high proportions of 
foreign-born newcomers, including even estab-
lished areas, are grappling with these challenges. 
Several newer destinations such as las Vegas and 
Washington, D.c. have seen large shares of their 
residents arrive in the united States since 2000, 
but traditional settlement areas in california, Texas, 
and new york also continue to draw new immigrants 
through networks of those already in place (Table 2). 
rates of naturalization provide another measure 
of the “rootedness” of immigrant populations (Table 
2). The decision to become a u.S. citizen has ele-
ments of both practicality and emotion; however, the 
bureaucratic process intentionally takes some time. 
eligibility depends on five years of legal permanent 
residence (three years if married to a u.S. citizen), 
knowledge of u.S. history and civics, and a degree of 
Map 1. Metro Areas in the Southeast Had the Highest Rates of Immigrant Growth in the 2000s
Percent Change in the Foreign-Born Population, 2000–2008
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and  
2008 American Community Survey data
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english language ability. As a result, naturalization 
rates vary widely by country and region of origin 
(including proximity to the united States), length of 
time in the united States, socioeconomic character-
istics, and refugee status. nationwide in 2008, u.S. 
citizens accounted for 60 percent of foreign-born 
individuals from europe, 58 percent from Asia, and 
31 percent from latin American and the caribbean. 
At the metropolitan level, naturalization rates 
vary considerably, and relate to the level and 
recentness of immigration. The places with the 
highest shares of naturalized citizens include older 
industrial metro areas with very low levels of recent 
immigration, such as youngstown, portland (Me), 
pittsburgh, and Dayton. continuous gateways such 
as San francisco and new york also claim at least 
half of their foreign-born populations as u.S. citi-
zens. on the lower end of the scale are both newer 
destination areas and those in which a majority of 
immigrants hail from Mexico, the proximity of which 
to the united States has led to lower naturalization 
rates among that group; houston and las Vegas 
exemplify such areas.
Human Capital Characteristics
Some of the most contentious arguments around 
immigration concern the role of immigrants in the 
economy. how skilled are immigrants and where do 
they fit into the labor market, both nationally and 
locally? english language ability and educational 
attainment provide two important markers of immi-
grants’ labor market prospects, and these indicators 
vary widely across u.S. metropolitan areas.
on english language ability, several metro areas 
along the Mexican border and in california’s central 
Valley exhibit high levels of immigrants with limited 
proficiency and large shares of households that are 
“linguistically isolated” (where no members over the 
Table 2. Both New and Established Immigrant Gateways Have Large Shares of Foreign-Born Newcomers
Metropolitan Areas Ranked by Share of Total Population Arriving in United States Since 2000, and Percent Naturalized 2008
       
  Highest Foreign-Born Newcomer Share    lowest Foreign-Born Newcomer Share  
   % Population  % Foreign-   % Population % Foreign-  
   Arriving in U.S. Born    Arriving in U.S.  Born 
 Rank Metro Area Since 2000 Naturalized Rank Metro Area Since 2000 Naturalized
	 1 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa clara, cA  10.2	 49.2	 91 Scranton, pA  1.3	 40.3
 2 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl  10.2	 48.4	 92 Jackson, MS  1.1	 33.1
	 3 McAllen, Tx  8.3	 23.4	 93 baton rouge, lA  1.1	 39.5
 4 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA  7.4	 44.8	 94 Toledo, oh  1.1	 49.2
	 5 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA 	 7.4	 54.3	 95 Augusta-richmond county, gA-Sc  1.1	 47.5
 6 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA  7.4	 51.4	 96 Dayton, oh  1.0	 53.2
	 7 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV 	 7.0	 44.7	 97 chattanooga, Tn-gA  1.0	 38.8
 8 houston, Tx  6.9	 32.3	 98 pittsburgh, pA  1.0	 53.3
	 9 las Vegas, nV  6.7	 36.9	 99 portland, Me  0.7	 54.1
	 10 bridgeport-Stamford, cT  6.5	 41.0	 100	 youngstown, oh-pA  0.4	 65.6
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data     
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age of 14 speak english very well). in these metropol-
itan areas, foreign-born populations are dominated by 
Spanish-speakers, and upwards of 60 percent of all 
foreign-born residents age five and over are consid-
ered to be limited english proficient (Table 3). in the 
border metro areas of McAllen and el paso, approxi-
mately one in five households is linguistically isolated.
like immigrants themselves on measures of 
educational attainment (see Educational Attainment 
chapter), metropolitan areas diverge in their immi-
grant skill profiles. yet distinctive regional patterns 
are evident in how immigrants of varying educational 
attainment distribute across metropolitan labor 
markets.1 
lower-skilled immigrants cluster in fast-growing 
places, reflecting the changing needs of labor 
markets there (Map 2). Metro areas throughout the 
intermountain West, Texas, and up the i-35 corridor 
in the great plains states have high shares of 
immigrants lacking a high school diploma, reflect-
ing educational standards and expectations in their 
largely latin American home countries. Many of 
these immigrants responded to labor market needs 
in (what was) the booming construction industry and 
burgeoning service sector in these metro areas that 
mushroomed before the housing market crash and 
resulting deep recession set in.
immigrants with higher levels of educational 
attainment are overrepresented in metropolitan 
areas that no longer receive many immigrants, 
where the foreign born that remain tend to be older, 
long-term u.S. residents. These destinations are pri-
marily in metropolitan areas east of the Mississippi 
river, including in the established immigrant gate-
ways in the northeast (filling niches in finance, 
healthcare, and technology), in new destinations 
Table 3. Immigrants in Border-State Metro Areas Exhibit the Lowest Levels of English Language Ability
Metro Areas Ranked by Share of Foreign Born Who are Limited-English Proficient, and Share of Households 
that are Linguistically Isolated, 2008
 
   % Limited English % Linguistically  
 Rank Metro Area Proficient Isolated Households
	 1 McAllen, Tx  70.5	 22.8
	 2 bakersfield, cA  68.3	 10.1
	 3 el paso, Tx  67.5	 18.8
	 4 Modesto, cA  65.8	 8.8
	 5 fresno, cA  65.1	 10.4
	 6 Stockton, cA  62.3	 10.3
	 7 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA  62.2	 14.8
	 8 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx  61.9	 8.4
	 9 houston, Tx  61.0	 10.9
	 10 oxnard-Thousand oaks-Ventura, cA  60.0	 8.0
    
  All large metro areas 52.2	 6.3
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
Note: Linguistically isolated households are those where no members over the age of 14 report speaking English “very well.”
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in the Southeast (diverse economies attracting 
higher-skilled, often “pioneer” immigrants), and in 
the former industrial metro areas in the great lakes 
region (older foreign-born cohorts that have aged in 
place). Western coastal “tech” metro areas such as 
Seattle, San francisco and San Jose also register as 
high-skill. 
Metropolitan areas with foreign-born populations 
with more “balanced” skill levels, reflecting both 
higher- and lower-skilled immigrants, run the gamut 
of u.S. regions and settlement histories. They include 
many newly emerging gateways in Southern states 
such as nashville, charlotte, Atlanta, and orlando, as 
well as some of the largest immigrant destinations 
such as chicago, new york, and Miami.
Second Generation
of growing interest and concern is how the children 
of immigrants are faring in u.S. schools and the 
labor market, given the variation in human capi-
tal and resources of their parents. The 16 million 
children (under age 18) in the “second generation,” 
as measured here can be either born abroad or in 
the united States but live with at least one foreign-
born parent. They make up 23 percent of all chil-
dren in the united States and 29 percent across all 
large metropolitan areas. in several metropolitan 
areas, they represent more than half or nearly half 
of all children (Table 4). new york and los Angeles 
have the largest cohorts of second-generation 
children, nearly two million each. not surprisingly, 
Map 2. High- and Low-Skilled Immigrants Distribute Unevenly Across U.S. Metro Areas
Skill Profile of the Foreign Born, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data and based on analysis by Hall et al, forthcoming; see Endnote 1
Note: The immigrant skill profile reflects the ratio of bachelor's degree holders to those without high school diplomas among the foreign-born population. High connotes a ratio of 1.25 or 
greater; balanced connotes a ratio of 0.75 to 1.24; and low connotes a ratio below 0.75.
S
TA
T
e
 o
f
 M
e
T
r
o
p
o
l
iT
A
n
 A
M
e
r
ic
A
 |
 I
M
M
IG
R
A
T
IO
N
73
other established immigrant gateways such as San 
francisco and San Diego also figure among the top 
10. of course, not all children of immigrants are in 
disadvantaged households. however, a large second-
generation population undoubtedly has impacts on 
schools, and at the local level may indicate segrega-
tion by limited language proficiency, poverty, and 
race and ethnicity.2 
CITy AND SUBURBAN TRENDS 
The growth and development of metropolitan areas 
with extensive suburbs has led to an increasing pref-
erence among immigrants for a suburban residence.3 
in 1980, 41 percent of u.S. immigrants lived in the pri-
mary cities of the top 100 metro areas. by 2008, that 
share had decreased to 34 percent. now, a majority 
of immigrants nationwide (51 percent) live in the 
suburbs of large metropolitan areas, compared to 
just 44 percent in 1980. These suburban immigrants 
numbered 19.5 million in 2008.
Smaller metro areas (under 500,000 popula-
tion) and non-metropolitan areas have maintained 
their shares of about ten percent and five percent, 
respectively, of the nation’s immigrant population. 
These steady proportions, however, mask the high 
growth rates in these areas. in fact, between 1990 
and 2008, the immigrant population grew fastest in 
non-metro areas (183 percent), followed by smaller 
metro areas (122 percent). in suburbs and cities, 
by contrast, the immigrant population grew by 112 
percent and 57 percent, respectively, over the same 
period, though from a much larger base. individually, 
some counties within metropolitan areas, as well 
as some smaller metro areas and nonmetropolitan 
Table 4. The "Second Generation" Represents Nearly Half or More of All Children in Several Metro Areas
Metro Areas Ranked by Second Generation* Proportion of Children, 2008
 
   Number of Share of All  
 Rank Metro Area Children Children (%)
	 1 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa clara, cA 258,910	 61.0
	 2 los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA 1,865,272	 59.6
 3 McAllen, Tx 144,779	 57.7
 4 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl 619,993	 54.3
 5 el paso, Tx 110,638	 51.5
 6 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA 436,136	 49.6
 7 Stockton, cA 82,206	 45.1
 8 riverside-San bernardino-ontario, cA 492,887	 44.4
 9 San Diego, cA 309,571	 43.9
	 10 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA 1,844,762	 43.5
    
  All large metro areas 13,642,110	 29.0	
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
* Children under age 18, born abroad or in the United States, living with at least one foreign-born parent  
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counties experienced much faster growth, prompting 
residents and officials to confront immigration for 
the first time.4
The degree to which immigrants live in suburbs 
within specific metropolitan areas follows their 
individual settlement histories. immigrants still 
compose a larger share of overall primary city (21 
percent) than suburban (14 percent) population, 
but they have suburbanized over time along with 
the larger population. in 2008, 63 of the 95 largest 
metro areas had a majority of their foreign born liv-
ing in suburbs. long-established gateways like new 
york and San francisco have high shares of foreign-
born population overall, and their cities record even 
higher shares than their suburbs (figure 3). in newer 
gateways like Atlanta, las Vegas, portland (or), and 
Washington, D.c., the foreign born are at least as 
prevalent in suburbs as in cities, with new arrivals 
often skipping the city altogether. A similar pattern 
holds in former immigrant strongholds like buffalo, 
cleveland, and Detroit, but owes more to the long-
Figure 3. Immigrants Comprise a Similar or Larger Share of Suburban 
than City Populations in Many Newer Destinations
Share of Population that is Foreign Born, Primary Cities vs. Suburbs, 
Selected Metro Areas, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
* Metro area names are abbreviated
Table 5. Immigrants Are Over-Represented in High-Density Suburbs As Well As Cities
Total and Foreign-Born Population by Metropolitan Community Type, 2008
       
      
    Foreign-Born Share of Large Metro Share of Large Metro 
  Total Foreign-Born Share of Areas' Total Areas' Foreign-Born 
  Population Population Population (%) Population (%) Population (%)
 primary cities 61,828,840	 12,943,625	 20.9	 31.0	 39.9
 high-Density Suburbs 54,184,145	 11,507,510	 21.2	 27.2	 35.5
 Mature Suburbs 49,491,155	 6,015,360	 12.2	 24.9	 18.6
 emerging Suburbs 23,638,770	 1,598,070	 6.8	 11.9	 4.9
 exurbs 10,009,665	 361,460	 3.6	 5.0	 1.1
      
 All large metro areas 199,152,575	 32,426,025	 16.3	 100.0	 100.0
 
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data      
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run suburbanization of older foreign-born workers 
and families in those metro areas than to settlement 
patterns of newly arriving populations.
immigrants distribute unevenly across different 
types of suburbs, too (Table 5). Across all major 
metro areas in 2008, 40 percent of the foreign born 
lived in primary cities, and 60 percent lived in sub-
urbs. The latter included 36 percent living in high-
density suburban counties, 19 percent in mature, 
mid-20th century suburban counties, 5 percent in 
emerging suburban counties, and just 1 percent in 
the exurbs. As in cities, immigrants represent an 
outsized share of population in high-density sub-
urbs; their population share in mature suburbs now 
approaches the national average.
 
LOOKING AHEAD
Trends in immigration reveal an uneven portrait 
of the foreign born across America’s metropolitan 
areas. overall, immigration to the united States is 
slowing, and some of the fastest-growing places have 
seen drops in their foreign-born population. The 
imprint of the recession also shows up in many of the 
fastest-growing places of the past decade, now reel-
ing from the bursting of the housing bubble. These 
metro areas, such as phoenix and las Vegas in the 
intermountain West, saw many immigrant newcom-
ers join the once burgeoning construction sector and 
associated industries only to witness a significant 
outflow in the past year. other Sun belt metro areas—
such as Atlanta, Dallas, and charlotte, also relatively 
new destinations—saw continued growth in immigra-
tion during the past year. because immigrants, par-
ticularly more recent ones, tend to be fairly mobile, 
we expect to see some destination shifting as we 
look ahead to an uneven economic recovery across 
metropolitan areas. 
in the next decade, certain trends that have taken 
hold are likely to persist. We will see a continuing 
spread of immigrants into newer destinations and 
suburban areas, as immigrants seek opportunities 
for housing, jobs, and quality of life. The skills dif-
ferentials across metro areas may also continue as 
immigrants consolidate further in new destination 
areas, bringing the next wave of immigrants and 
highlighting the language and educational aspects of 
immigrant integration.
The growth of immigrants in the suburbs under-
scores the need for jurisdictions across metropolitan 
areas to work together to adequately and coherently 
respond to changing demographic conditions. This 
is especially the case for those areas that have well-
established, lower-skilled immigrant populations with 
high shares of children. n
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IV. Age
B y  T H E  N U M B E R S
49%
Growth in the 55-to-64 
year-old population,  
United States, 2000-2010
65%
Projected growth in  
65-and-over population, 
Chicago metro area,  
2010-2030
44% / 
85%
Share of under-18 /  
65-and-over population  
that is white,  
Phoenix metro area, 2008
71%
Share of 45-and-over  
population that lives  
in suburbs, 100 largest 
metro areas, 2008 
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OVERVIEW
n  America’s population of “pre-seniors” (age 55 to 64) grew by half in the 2000s. This leading edge of 
the baby boom generation will not only transform the profile of seniors in u.S. society, but will contribute to 
massive growth rates of the 65-and-over population in the next two decades.
n  Metropolitan areas experiencing the fastest senior growth in the 2000s differed from those with  
the largest concentrations of seniors. The former group included destinations in the intermountain  
West and Southeast that accumulated working-age migrants who are now “aging in place” into seniorhood.  
The latter group included florida retirement magnets and also mostly older industrial areas of the  
northeast and Midwest where young populations have declined, leaving seniors as a greater share of the 
remaining population.
n  Pre-senior populations grew rapidly everywhere. The 55-to-64 year-old population grew fastest in the 
2000s in Sun belt destinations like raleigh and Austin, as well as areas with natural and cultural ameni-
ties like boise and Madison. yet even slower-growing major metro areas such as new york, philadelphia, 
and chicago will witness rapid increases in senior population over the next two decades due to the aging of 
these leading-edge boomers.
n  Child populations grew in two-thirds of large metro areas in the 2000s, but declined in one-third. This 
divergence has created metro areas in the Southwest with large child-to-worker ratios, as well as metro 
areas in the industrial Midwest with larger senior-to-worker ratios. Moreover, boomer aging amid ongoing 
diversification of u.S. children is creating wide “cultural generation gaps” in metro areas like los Angeles, 
phoenix, and riverside that have young hispanic and Asian populations, and older white populations.
n  Most growth in the senior population in years ahead will take place in the suburbs. in 2008, 71 percent 
of pre-seniors lived in suburbs, and their numbers (as well as those of seniors) grew faster in suburbs than in 
cities during the 2000s. This reflects boomers’ status as America’s “first suburban generation,” and signals 
their likelihood to remain in these communities as they grow older.
NATIONAL TRENDS
The phrase “demography is destiny” was never 
more appropriate than when used to character-
ize the impending “age tsunami” that is about to 
hit America’s population. After modest growth in 
the past two decades, America’s senior population 
will begin to mushroom as the leading edge of the 
huge baby boom generation turns 65 in 2011. As this 
unique generation has plowed its way through the 
nation’s school systems and labor, housing, and stock 
markets, it has transformed institutions both public 
and private in its path. boomers’ impending senior-
hood carries important implications not just for 
themselves or even the nation as a whole, but also 
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for the specific places where they will live, and the 
other portions of the population (such as children) 
with whom they will share those communities.
The next two decades portend rapid increases in 
America’s senior (age 65 and over) population. from 
2000 to 2010, “pre-seniors” (age 55 to 64) expe-
rienced the nation’s fastest growth, as the leading 
edge of the baby boomers (born between 1946 and 
1955) entered those ages and expanded their overall 
numbers by half (figure 1). The 45-to-54 year-old 
group continued to grow as well, as the larger, 
younger boomer cohort (born between 1956 and 
1965) increasingly occupied that demographic ter-
ritory. The result is that over the next two decades, 
from 2010 to 2030, the nation’s 65-and-over popula-
tion will grow much faster than in recent u.S. history. 
While the nation as a whole is projected to grow at 
roughly 8 to 9 percent each decade, senior growth 
rates will top 30 percent.
The aging of the baby boom generation is note-
worthy not only because of its large size, but also 
because its members’ social and demographic profile 
contrasts sharply with earlier generations at retire-
ment age.1 boomers possess more education, have 
more women in the labor force, are more likely to 
occupy professional and managerial positions, and 
are more racially and ethnically diverse than their 
predecessors. At the same time, their higher rates of 
divorce and separation, lower rates of marriage, and 
fewer children signal the potential for greater divi-
sions in seniorhood between those who will live com-
fortably, and those who will have fewer resources 
available to them.
At the other end of the age spectrum, America’s 
child population (under age 15) registered a low 
growth rate (3 percent) in the 2000s. This reflected 
in part its replacing the relatively large “echo boom” 
cohort, which has entered its late teens and early 
Figure 2. The Nation's Child Population is Considerably More Racially 
and Ethnically Diverse than its Older Population
Population by Race/Ethnicity and Age Group, United States, 2009
Figure 1. The Nation's Pre-Senior Population Expanded by  
Nearly Half in the 2000s
Change in Population by Age Group, United States, 2000-2010
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data 
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data and projections
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adult years. Still, at 62 million strong—roughly one-
fifth of the nation’s population—children in the united 
States today are a demographically important group, 
with an increasingly distinctive racial and ethnic 
profile compared with older groups (figure 2). only 
a little more than half in 2009 were non-hispanic 
whites, versus three-quarters of the pre-senior  
population, and even higher shares of those aged  
65 and over.
REGIONAL AND  
METROPOLITAN TRENDS
Recent Senior Population Shifts
recent geographic shifts among the 65-and-over 
population, driven by the World War ii generation, do 
not yet reflect the experiences of the baby boomers 
soon to reach seniorhood. yet these shifts do signal 
the parts of the country where seniors are growing, 
and where they are concentrated—two types of areas 
that exhibit only limited overlap. 
Senior populations grew unevenly across the 
nation in the 2000s. The fastest growing states 
for seniors from 2000 to 2008 were located in the 
West, and to a slightly lesser extent, in the Southeast 
(Map 1). Alaska and nevada saw increases in their 
senior populations of more than 35 percent, fol-
lowed closely by utah and Arizona. in this way, senior 
populations are spreading well beyond what are 
usually thought of as “retirement magnet” states like 
florida. on the other hand, a broad swath of states in 
the Midwest, parts of the northeast, and the inte-
rior South displayed senior growth rates below the 
national rate of 10.8 percent; these included states 
experiencing declines in senior population (rhode 
island, pennsylvania, and north Dakota).
At the metropolitan level, the Sun belt/Snow belt 
growth distinction holds. provo, raleigh, Austin, 
Atlanta, and boise registered the highest senior 
growth rates from 2000 to 2008, exceeding 35 
percent. Twenty-four (24) metro areas, mostly in the 
Sun belt, saw increases of at least 20 percent in the 
first eight years of the decade. by contrast, 38 large 
metro areas, located mostly in the northeast and 
Midwest, registered senior growth rates below the 
national average. eleven (11) showed losses in senior 
populations during this time, led by Scranton, new 
orleans, pittsburgh, buffalo, and youngstown.
The phenomenon of “aging in place,” rather than 
senior migration, explains much of the difference 
between areas with fast- and slow-growing senior 
populations. Aging in place refers to the ascension 
of existing under-65 populations into the 65-and-
over age category over time. States and metropoli-
tan areas experiencing fast senior growth, such as 
Arizona and Austin, typically accumulated large 
numbers of working-age in-migrants who remained 
in these areas as they got older. These places tend to 
have senior populations with higher incomes, more 
education, and more people in their “young senior” 
(age 65 to 74) years. in contrast, metro areas in the 
northeast and Midwest with slow senior growth lost 
working-age migrants in past decades, and thus have 
smaller aging-in-place populations today; many are 
also losing younger seniors.2
Senior Concentrations
Areas that exhibit the fastest senior growth differ 
(with a few exceptions, such as florida) from those 
in which seniors represent the greatest shares of 
population (Map 2). pennsylvania, for example, has 
the third-highest share of seniors among all states 
at 15.3 percent, but it is one of three states in which 
senior population dropped from 2000 to 2008. 
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What’s going on here?
places with high senior shares of population 
have typically experienced one or more decades of 
declines among their younger populations, leaving 
seniors, who are far less mobile than people in their 
20s or 30s, behind. Many states with large shares of 
seniors have more in the “mature senior” age group 
of 75 and above. Their social and demographic pro-
files may not be as favorable to firms catering to the 
younger segment of the senior population. Moreover, 
the public expenditures required for health care and 
other social support for older senior segments may 
be higher than in states with more youthful elderly. 
florida, for its part, registered the highest senior 
share of any state, at 17.4 percent (compared to the 
national percentage of 12.8 percent). This resulted 
not from out-migration of younger people, but from 
decades of attracting seniors from other parts of 
the country. As such, the Sunshine State continued 
in the 2000s to grow in both its young senior and 
mature senior segments. florida’s metropolitan 
areas stand out, too, occupying six of the top 10 
rankings for senior share of population. yet among 
the 33 metro areas in which seniors represent more 
than 13 percent of the population, the majority are 
located in the northeast and Midwest.
At the other extreme are states and metro areas 
with low senior population shares. These are usu-
ally areas that experienced recent rapid growth of 
seniors alongside continued growth in their younger 
populations. Thus provo, Austin, raleigh, houston, 
Atlanta, and Dallas have senior shares below  
9 percent of population, even as they rank among 
the leaders in recent senior population growth.
Areas that 
exhibit the fast-
est senior growth 
differ from those 
in which seniors 
represent the 
greatest shares 
of population.
Map 1. Senior Growth in the 2000s Was Most Rapid in the Intermountain West and Southeast
Change in 65-and-Over Population, States and Selected Metro Areas, 2000–2008
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Population Estimates Program data
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Seniors in Waiting:  
Recent Boomer Growth 
During the past decade, the leading edge of the 
much heralded baby boom replaced the World War 
ii generation in the 55-to-64 year-old cohort. Where 
this pre-senior group is growing fastest today coin-
cides with the areas where senior growth will likely 
dominate in the decades to come.
not surprisingly, the metropolitan areas showing 
the fastest growth in pre-seniors from 2000 to 2008 
are located disproportionately in the South and 
West. because of their high employment growth over 
the last several decades, as well as their increasing 
lure of “pre-retirees,” raleigh and Austin lead all 
other metro areas in growth among 55-to-64 year-
olds, both exceeding 80 percent (Table 1). Also on the 
fast-growing list are areas with natural and cultural 
amenities such as boise, portland (or), and Madison. 
fully 27 metro areas saw their pre-senior populations 
jump by at least half from 2000 to 2008, including 
the large metro areas of houston, Denver, Seattle, 
phoenix, orlando, and Minneapolis-St. paul.
because the huge baby boom generation is 
inflating pre-senior growth everywhere, even metro 
areas with the lowest growth rates, such as Scranton, 
buffalo, and youngstown, saw increases in this popu-
lation of more than 20 percent from 2000 to 2008. 
The surprisingly low levels of pre-senior growth in 
florida metro areas such as bradenton, cape coral, 
palm bay, and lakeland owe to their already large 
pre-senior populations, which serve to minimize 
growth rates from in-migration and aging in place.
The pre-senior population differs somewhat in 
its social and demographic composition between 
Map 2. Seniors Are Most Prevalent in Areas of the Northeast, Midwest, and Florida
Share of Population 65 and Over, States and Selected Metro Areas, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Population Estimates Program data
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faster and slower growing parts of the nation. for 
instance, pre-seniors in states experiencing the 
fastest growth in that group are more likely to have 
attended at least some college, or to have earned a 
degree. hispanics and Asians are the primary minor-
ity groups among 55-to-64 year-olds in these states, 
versus African Americans in states experiencing 
slower growth.3
Just as older boomers swelled the ranks of the 
55-to-64 year-olds in the 21st century’s first decade, 
they will begin to inflate the ranks of senior popu-
lations over the next two decades. Due largely to 
“aging in place,” senior populations in major met-
ropolitan areas such as new york, philadelphia, 
chicago, and los Angeles are projected to grow by  
at least 10 percent over each five-year period 
from 2010 to 2030. growth rates are projected to 
be higher still in booming Sun belt markets like 
houston, Dallas, and Atlanta.
Table 1. Southern and Western Metro Areas Outpaced Others in Pre-Senior Growth During the 2000s
Metro Areas Ranked by Change in Pre-Senior (Age 55 to 64) Population, 2000 to 2008
       
  Highest Pre-Senior Growth Rates   lowest Pre-Senior Growth Rates  
   Population   Population 
 Rank Metro area Change (%) Rank Metro area Change (%)
	 1	 raleigh-cary, nc 89.4	 91	 new orleans, lA 29.2
 2 Austin, Tx 84.3	 92 Dayton, oh 27.2
 3 provo, uT 78.0	 93 bridgeport-Stamford, cT 27.1
	 4 Atlanta, gA 73.7	 94 youngstown, oh-pA 27.1
 5 boise city, iD 72.9	 95 buffalo, ny 26.7
	 6 portland-Vancouver, or-WA 71.3	 96 lakeland, fl 26.3
 7 charlotte, nc-Sc 71.0	 97 palm bay, fl 26.1
	 8 Madison, Wi 66.4	 98 cape coral, fl 25.5
	 9 houston, Tx 64.7	 99 Scranton, pA 25.5
	 10 Denver-Aurora, co 64.6	 100 bradenton, fl 22.0
        
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Population Estimates Program data
          
Figure 3. The Next Two Decades Will Bring High Senior 
Growth Rates in Major Metro Areas 
Change in 65-and-Over Population by 5-year Period,  
Selected Metro Areas, 2000 to 2030
Source: Brookings projections based on U.S. Census Bureau data 
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Growth and Decline in Child Populations
While a massive aging movement of the u.S. popula-
tion is clearly at hand, a selective youth movement 
in also taking place in some parts of the country. 
employment growth and relatively affordable hous-
ing in many parts of the South and West attracted 
younger families with children during the 2000s. 
fully 20 states registered gains in their child (under 
age 18) populations from 2000 to 2008, led by 
nevada, Arizona, utah, georgia, Texas, and north 
carolina (Map 3). At the same time, slower grow-
ing areas in the northeast and Midwest experi-
enced fewer births and higher out-migration of 
their younger population segments. Thirty-one (31) 
states and the District of columbia showed absolute 
declines in their child populations, with new england 
and industrial portions of the Midwest and northeast 
leading the way.
Among the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan 
areas, 34 experienced declines in their child popu-
lations from 2000 to 2008. hurricane-damaged 
new orleans led the list, joined by a slew of older 
industrial great lakes metro areas including buffalo, 
youngstown, Syracuse, rochester, and pittsburgh. 
conversely, among the 66 metro areas in which child 
populations grew during the 2000s, growth rates 
topped 30 percent in the Southern and Western 
locales of provo, cape coral, raleigh, las Vegas, 
Austin, phoenix, and charlotte.
 The twin patterns of aging and “young-ing” of 
the American population contribute to regionally 
distinct dependency ratios, which reflect the level of 
support that the working-age population can provide 
to retirees or children. Metro areas with the highest 
Map 3. Child Populations Declined in Many Older Industrial Areas of the Northeast and Midwest in the 2000s
Change in the Under-18 Population, States and Selected Metro Areas, 2000–2008
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
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child dependency ratios tend to be located in interior 
california, utah, and along the Texas border. These 
areas have large hispanic and/or Mormon popula-
tions, and with more than four children for every 
10 working-age adults, the needs of families with 
children come more to the fore. Alternatively, places 
with the highest age (elderly) dependency ratios lie 
in florida and the industrial Midwest. With more than 
two seniors for every ten adults, and ratios sure to 
rise in the future, the concerns of aging populations 
will increasingly take center stage there.
Cultural Generation Gaps
As explored earlier, one of the distinguishing fea-
tures of u.S. population is the juxtaposition of its 
racially and ethnically diverse young population and 
its largely white older population. These differences 
will become more muted over time as younger 
generations age into adulthood and, eventually, into 
middle and old age.4
for the present, however, metro areas that have 
attracted large numbers of hispanics and Asians dis-
play something of a “cultural generation gap,” more 
pronounced than that which exists at the national 
level (shown in figure 2).5 The distinctions are most 
noticeable above and below the 40 year-old mark. 
in los Angeles, less than a quarter of children are 
white, as are only 27 percent of those aged 18 to 
39 (figure 4). by contrast, 40 percent of the older 
middle-aged population is white, as is more than half 
of the senior population. The Atlanta metro area 
exhibits similar distinctions, with African Americans 
assuming a more prominent role in the gap. At the 
other extreme lie areas like predominantly white 
Table 2. Dependency Ratios Reflect the Regionally Distinct Prominence of Children and Seniors Among Local Populations
Metro Areas Ranked by Child and Age Dependency Ratios, 2008
       
  Highest Child Dependency Ratios   Highest Age Dependency Ratios  
   Child Dependency   Age Dependency 
 Rank Metro Area Ratio* Rank Metro Area Ratio**
	 1 McAllen, Tx 50.3	 1	 bradenton, fl 42.7
	 2	 provo uT 46.8	 2	 cape coral, fl 34.7
	 3 el paso, Tx 42.9	 3	 palm bay, fl 30.1
	 4 ogden, uT 42.0	 4	 Scranton, pA 25.4
	 5 fresno, cA 40.2	 5 lakeland, fl 25.2
	 6 bakersfield, cA 39.8	 6 Tampa-St. petersburg-clearwater, fl 24.7
	 7 Salt lake city, uT 39.1	 7 youngstown, oh-pA 24.3
	 8 Stockton, cA 39.0	 8 pittsburgh, pA 24.0
	 9 Modesto, cA 38.5	 9 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl 23.4
	 10 riverside-San bernardino-ontario, cA 38.3	 10 buffalo, ny 21.4
       
  All Large Metro Areas 33.3  All Large Metro Areas 15.9
       
* Population under age 18 divided by 18-to-64-year-old population and multiplied by 100     
** Population age 65 and over divided by the 18-to-64-year-old population and multiplied by 100     
Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Population Estimates Program data
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Minneapolis-St paul, where minorities are just begin-
ning to account for a significant share of the child 
population. 
This cultural generation gap is even more pro-
nounced in many of the metropolitan areas beyond 
los Angeles that have “majority-minority” child 
populations (see the race/ethnicity chapter). in 
riverside, for instance, about seven in 10 children 
are non-white or hispanic, while almost seven in 
10 seniors are white. phoenix, long a haven for 
Midwestern migrant retirees, shows sharp disparities 
between its 85 percent white senior population and 
its 44 percent white child population. Setting public 
priorities and fostering social cohesion in these and 
other regions may take on added challenges due to 
their unique racial/ethnic overlay.
CITy AND SUBURBAN TRENDS
Graying of Suburbia
baby boomers might be considered the “first subur-
ban generation,” as their parents began populating 
the nation’s burgeoning suburbs in the immediate 
postwar period. not surprisingly, then, the boomers 
(along with seniors, a group that includes their par-
ents) are more suburbanized than other metropoli-
tan age groups (figure 5). They are contributing to a 
significant “graying” of suburbia, as now almost  
40 percent of suburban residents are age 45 or 
older, up from 34 percent in 2000, and higher than 
their 35 percent share in primary cities. Moreover, 
their numbers—especially those of seniors—grew 
faster in suburbs than in cities over the course of 
Figure 4. The Size of the "Cultural Generation Gap" is Greatest in Metro Areas with  
Large Numbers of Hispanics
Share of Population by Race/Ethnicity and Age Group, Selected Metro Areas, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
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Figure 5. Boomers Are Highly Suburbanized, and Contributed More to Suburban  
than City Growth in the 2000s
Share of Population in Suburbs by Age Group,  
Large Metro Areas, 2008
Share of Population by Age Group, Primary Cities versus 
Suburbs, 2000 and 2008
Change in Population by Age Group, Primary Cities versus Suburbs, 2000 to 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data 
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Table 3. Selected Suburbs in Both the Snow Belt and Sun Belt Have Large Boomer and Senior Populations
Metro Area Suburbs Ranked by Share of Population Age 45 and Over, 2008
       
  Highest Share of Population Age 45+   lowest Share of Population Age 45+   
   Population   Population 
 Rank Suburbs of Metro Area Share (%) Rank Suburbs of Metro Area Share (%)
	 1 cape coral, fl 50.3	 86 houston, Tx 33.2
 2 palm bay, fl 49.8	 87 fresno, cA 32.6
	 3 pittsburgh, pA 47.2	 88 Austin, Tx 32.5
 4 youngstown, oh 46.6	 89 riverside-San bernardino-ontario, cA	 31.6
	 5 Tucson, AZ 46.5	 90 bakersfield, cA 30.6
 6 Scranton, pA 46.4	 91 Salt lake city, uT 30.6
	 7 buffalo, ny 45.9	 92 ogden, uT 29.6
 8 Tampa-St. petersburg-clearwater, fl 45.5	 93 McAllen, Tx 26.5
	 9	 Milwaukee, Wi 44.4	 94 el paso, Tx 26.3
	 10 cleveland, oh 44.1	 95 provo, uT 22.7
        
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data     
Reflects data for 95 of 100 large metro areas
Table 4. More Than a Third of Suburban Areas Lost Population Under Age 45 During the 2000s
Metro Area Suburbs Ranked by Greatest Under Age 45 Decline, and Greatest Age 45+ Growth, 2000 to 2008
       
  Greatest Rate of Decline, Under Age 45 Population   Highest Growth Rate, Age 45+ Population   
   Under Age Age 45+   Under Age Age 45+ 
 Rank Suburbs of Metro Area 45 (% Change)  (% Change) Rank Suburbs of Metro Area 45 (% Change) (% Change)
	 1 youngstown, oh -12.7	 6.8	 1 Austin, Tx 38.7	 68.4
	 2 buffalo, ny -10.8	 11.3	 2	 provo, uT 48.9	 62.5
	 3 new orleans, lA -10.5	 16.7	 3 el paso, Tx 11.3	 60.4
	 4 pittsburgh, pA -10.2	 9.1	 4	 colorado Springs, co 12.0	 58.7
	 5 Syracuse, ny -7.8	 17.0	 5 phoenix–Mesa–Scottsdale, AZ 52.5	 56.3
	 6 bridgeport-Stamford, cT -7.8	 17.6	 6 raleigh–cary, nc 34.5	 56.0
	 7 cleveland, oh -7.6	 13.4	 7 houston, Tx 25.9	 54.0
 8 Dayton, oh -6.6	 15.0	 8	 boise city, iD 32.8	 53.7
	 9 Scranton, pA -6.5	 5.7	 9	 Dallas–fort Worth–Arlington, Tx 21.5	 52.1
	 10 rochester, ny -6.5	 18.9	 10	 Atlanta, gA 19.2	 51.1
   
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data    
Reflects data for 95 of 100 large metro areas	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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the decade. The suburbs are thus poised to house an 
older population than has been the case in the past.
Similar to metropolitan areas overall, suburbs 
divide between those with high concentrations 
of older populations, and those experiencing fast 
growth among those populations. The suburbs of 
cape coral, where half the population is age 45 and 
over, lead the former group, which includes other 
metropolitan suburbs in florida, as well as rapidly 
aging areas around youngstown, buffalo, pittsburgh, 
Scranton, and cleveland (Table 3). in most of these 
suburbs, the “below 45” population declined in the 
2000s, accelerating their overall aging (Table 4). 
in fact, fully 32 of 95 large metro areas showed no 
growth or loss in their younger populations from 
2000 to 2008, even as their older populations 
continued to gain. The rapid aging that has ensued 
increasingly flies in the face of the common stereo-
type of suburbs as havens for young families and 
child rearing. 
The other type of suburb, exemplified by metro 
areas in the intermountain West, Texas, and portions 
of the Southeast, is characterized by fast growth in 
older populations, amid healthy gains for younger 
adults and children. in most cases, growth rates 
there among the 45-and-over population still out-
strip those for younger populations, but the greater 
balance of growth among age groups may ease the 
graying of those suburbs over time.
LOOKING AHEAD
current and future geographic shifts of America’s 
senior and pre-senior populations, with baby 
boomers on the verge of entering their retirement 
years, are among the most potentially influential 
demographic trends in metropolitan America today. 
emerging senior populations will break with those of 
the past, not only in terms of their size, but in their 
educational profiles, their household diversity, and 
their greater gender equality, as well as their poten-
tial for exhibiting greater economic inequality. The 
sheer size of the baby boom tsunami will magnify 
these distinct social and demographic attributes, 
altering metropolitan, city, and suburban populations 
in both growing and declining parts of the country.
What are the local and regional ramifications 
of this impending transformation? With boomer-
dominated pre-senior populations now residing in 
Southern and Western metropolitan areas and sub-
urbs in large numbers, relatively well-off older popu-
lations should emerge in areas like charlotte, Dallas, 
and Atlanta—places heretofore known primarily for 
their youthful profile. These populations may create 
demands for new types of housing and cultural ame-
nities, and may continue to fuel the economic and 
civic growth of these areas as they remain involved 
in the labor force. That noted, the housing bust 
that affected senior and pre-senior magnets in the 
intermountain West and florida in the latter part of 
the decade may reduce, for the foreseeable future, 
household wealth and cause some older workers to 
remain in—or re-enter—the labor market. 
on the other hand, slow-growing metropolitan 
areas, mostly in the northeast and Midwest, will age 
as well, amid slow growth or even decline in their 
younger populations. if anything, the severe eco-
nomic contraction that some of these areas experi-
enced during the great recession could accelerate 
the out-migration of working-age adults, once hiring 
and interstate migration resumes. As a result, large 
senior populations in these metropolitan areas could 
be comprised of disproportionately older individu-
als who are less well-off financially or health-wise. 
They may require greater social support, along with 
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affordable private and institutional housing, and 
accessible health care providers. To the extent those 
resources are currently more focused on central 
cities, greater regional action and cooperation may 
be needed to ensure adequate supply and access for 
suburban seniors who are aging in place.
The metropolitan divide between areas experienc-
ing growth versus decline of their child populations 
reflects a longer-term redistribution of population 
that is making the Sun belt more youthful than 
other parts of the country. in the decades ahead, all 
parts of the country will experience aging in place 
among baby boomers. places that can gain young 
people through immigration, domestic migration, or 
increased births to existing families may be better 
able to cope with the new demands brought on by an 
aging society.
yet in these areas and others, another potential 
divide looms, between the racial and ethnic pro-
files of a highly diverse younger population and a 
mostly white older population. our aging society 
renders unavoidable generational debates over local, 
regional, and state public resources (e.g., funding 
for schools versus senior services or tax levels) and 
so-called “quality-of-life” factors in all parts of the 
country. in these metropolitan areas, the strong 
cultural distinction between the young and old could 
add further complexity and challenge to these delib-
erations, and amplify the role of civic sector actors 
that promote community engagement and bridge 
generational divides. 
Age changes across the nation’s landscape over 
the next few decades will be uneven, but will inevi-
tably create new challenges for all types of commu-
nities. fortunately, tracking the trajectory of these 
changes and planning for the future will be relatively 
straightforward for most places, because house-
holds already residing there will provide the primary 
source of their senior growth. public and private-
sector leaders should thus be poised to evaluate 
how the impending senior explosion, and continued 
diversification of the child population, will once again 
transform the economic and social landscape of 
America’s metropolitan areas. n
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with children households, 
Las Vegas / youngstown 
metro areas, 2000 to 2008
50%
Share of households  
containing a married couple, 
Bakersfield city, 2008
53%
Share of households not 
containing a married couple, 
Springfield suburbs, 2008
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OVERVIEW
n  For the first time in several decades, U.S. population is growing at a faster rate than U.S. households. 
With baby boomers well past their peak household-formation years, and new immigrants fueling growth, 
places that are losing population have less of a household “buffer” to sustain housing demand and tax base.
n  Married couples with children accounted for just over one in five U.S. households in 2008, about half 
their share in 1970. These households declined in number during the 2000s, as non-family households—
mostly people living alone—grew at a rapid clip to account for more than one in three households in 2008.
n  Many metro areas with already-high shares of married couples with children experienced strong 
growth in these households in the 2000s. in contrast to these “married with children” magnets like 
raleigh, boise, and Austin, northern industrial metro areas like Dayton, Toledo, and youngstown saw their 
married couples with children decline by at least one-sixth over the eight-year period.
n  Many fast-growing cities in the South and West added larger families in the 2000s, even as declining 
cities in the Midwest shed them. cities such as charlotte, bakersfield, and lakeland added households of 
all types, including married couples with children. cities such as cleveland, Detroit, and pittsburgh lost all 
types of households, but losses were more modest among their aging non-family households.
n  People living alone and non-married-couple families are the fastest-growing household types in sub-
urbs. A majority of married-couple families of all races and ethnicities live in the suburbs today. but as their 
share of households declined to one-quarter or less in all types of suburbs, non-families became the most 
prominent suburban household type by 2008.
NATIONAL TRENDS
households and families are critical organizing units 
of our society. Major life events—birth, leaving home 
for college or a job, marriage, divorce, death—all 
register as changes to the number or composition of 
our households and families. The members of house-
holds make most major spending decisions—for hous-
ing, food, transportation, and education—collectively. 
They are the units from which most government rev-
enues are collected, and to which most government 
services are rendered. indeed, households are the 
sampling unit for the American community Survey, 
on which most of this report is based.
The shape of America’s households and families 
also reflects a number of large, long-run demo-
graphic forces transforming our society. Delays in 
marriage, increases in life expectancy, and rising 
immigration from shifting source nations have all 
contributed to growth and decline of different types 
of households in the united States, with greater 
impacts in some parts of the country than others.
Along those lines, the united States passed an 
important milestone in the 2000s. in a break from 
the past several decades, the national household 
The shape of 
America’s  
households and 
families reflects 
a number of 
large, long-run 
demographic 
forces transform-
ing our society. 
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growth rate sank slightly below that for total popula-
tion. beginning in the 1970s, the large baby boom 
cohorts started to enter adulthood and the tradi-
tional ages at which new households are formed. not 
only were they more numerous than previous gen-
erations at those ages, but also they waited longer to 
“double up” as couples to start families, and eventu-
ally they had fewer children per household than their 
parents did.
With boomers dominating the American demo-
graphic landscape, the number of households in the 
1970s grew at more than twice the rate of the u.S. 
population (figure 1). This growth differential nar-
rowed somewhat during the 1980s, but the rate of 
household growth generated by the second half of 
the boomers (born between 1956 and 1965) during 
that decade still exceeded the population growth 
rate by more than half.
After the household-population growth gap fur-
ther narrowed in the 1990s, the relationship flipped 
Figure 1. For the First Time in Decades, Population Growth 
Outpaced Household Growth
Change in Population and Households by Decade, United States, 1970 to 2008
CLASSIFyING HOUSEHOLDS 
This chapter classifies households at the 
national, metropolitan, and city/suburban levels 
into five basic types:
Married with children: The traditional 
“nuclear family” household type, married 
couples with children under 18 years old
Married without children: young, often two-
earner couples who have not yet had children, 
older “empty nester” couples whose children 
may recently have left home, and elderly couples 
who may have grandchildren of their own
Other families with children: usually single-
parent family households; and four of five are 
headed by females. While disadvantaged single 
mothers who gave birth at a young age make 
up a significant portion of these households, 
the category also includes most divorced and 
separated parents with children, never-married 
mothers who had children at a later age, and 
unmarried partners with children
Other families without children: Single 
adults with parents living in their home, single 
parents with children over 18 living in their home, 
and adult relatives (such as brothers and sisters) 
living in the same household
Non-families: More than 80 percent of 
non-family households are single persons living 
alone; of these, more than one-third are 65 years 
and older. other non-family households consist 
of nonrelatives living together, including unmar-
ried partners with no children
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial censuses and 2008 American Community Survey
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in the 2000s, so that population growth exceeded 
household growth. in the past, places that sustained 
population declines could nevertheless count on con-
tinued demand for housing due to a robust house-
hold growth rate. but now that population growth 
has overtaken household growth, these places may 
only be able to enjoy sustained housing demand 
and growing tax bases if their populations are also 
increasing.
Declines in household growth have been attrib-
uted to the smaller post-boomer generations who 
entered their household formation years begin-
ning in the 1990s. on the other hand, increases in 
population growth can be attributed in large part to 
immigrant waves who have younger age structures 
than the native-born u.S. population, and often 
higher birth rates. The households these newcomers 
form are different from those formed in the 1970s 
by “coming-of-age” baby boomers. immigrants and 
children of immigrants are more likely to marry ear-
lier and form larger households with children. 
As these trends imply, the structure of u.S. house-
holds has also shifted markedly over time. 
Although the “ozzie and harriet” married couple 
with children persists as the archetypal American 
household, the seeming explosion of such families 
in the immediate post-World War ii decades, thanks 
to the baby boom, represented an aberration of 
long-term u.S. household trends.1 The share of u.S. 
households that are married couples with children 
under 18 years old began a steady slide as the boom-
ers came of age in the 1970s, and today stands at 
just 21 percent—roughly half its level from 40 years 
ago (figure 2). 
A number of societal shifts ushered in by the baby 
boom generation—among them delayed marriage, 
reduced childbearing within marriage, higher divorce 
rates, and increased life expectancy—have driven 
Figure 2. Married Couples with Children Today Account for Barely Half the Share of U.S. Households as in 1970, 
and Their Numbers Fell in the 2000s
Share of Households by Type, United States, 1970 to 2008 Change in Households by Type, United States, 2000 to 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial censuses and 2008 American Community Survey data
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these dramatic changes in household composition 
over the last 40 years.2 over this period, there has 
also been an increased tendency for women to bear 
children outside of wedlock, increasingly in the 
context of cohabiting couples. The larger shifts away 
from the so-called “traditional family” occurred dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s.
All family types except married couples with 
children have grown since 2000 (figure 2). yet a 
mini-rebirth in married-with-children families in some 
parts of the country, associated with the growth of 
the hispanic and Asian populations, suggests that 
the movement away from “traditional families” might 
have bottomed out among the post-boomer gen-
erations.3 The next decades will, of course, also see 
gains in households associated with aging boomers, 
such as childless couple “empty nesters” and non-
families, including people living alone.
finally, the overall household type profile of the 
united States disguises significant differences in the 
prevalence of these types across racial and ethnic 
groups (figure 3). for Asians and hispanics, mar-
ried couples with children are the most numerous 
of household types, reflecting their younger ages 
and higher fertility rates. for whites, non-families 
and married couples without children predominate, 
reflecting their older ages. And for blacks, non- 
families and female-headed families (with and with-
out children) are the largest household types. These 
differences influence the household character of the 
different places across the metropolitan landscape 
where these groups cluster.
METROPOLITAN TRENDS
Household versus Population Growth
in the nation as a whole, and for large metropolitan 
areas in the aggregate, the large discrepancy between 
household growth and population growth in the 
1970s and 1980s diminished sharply in the 1990s, and 
population growth surpassed household growth in the 
2000s.4 yet more of the nation’s 100 largest metro 
areas (92) gained households from 2000 to 2008 
than gained population (89). overall, metro areas 
exhibited less extreme gains or declines in households 
than in population, which buffered their housing mar-
kets against even wider swings in demand.
The “bunching up” of population growth is most 
prominent in metro areas with large numbers of 
immigrant minorities and recent gains of young 
people in their childbearing years. Among the top 
10 are Southern and intermountain West locations 
such as las Vegas, raleigh, boise, and Austin (Table 
1). other areas with population gains exceeding 
Figure 3. Major Racial and Ethnic Groups Possess Distinctive  
Household Type Profiles
Share of Households by Type and Racial/Ethnic Group, United States, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
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household gains include Sun belt destinations 
riverside, Stockton, Dallas, and Atlanta.
About one-third of metro areas that added 
households in the 2000s added population more 
slowly. These include places which attracted smaller-
sized households, both young singles and older 
“empty nesters,” such as charlotte, boise, Seattle, 
and Minneapolis. other metro areas with somewhat 
slower population than household growth include 
those with older, established hispanic populations 
such as Albuquerque, McAllen, and el paso.
At the other end of the spectrum are metropolitan 
areas in which household numbers are dropping or 
growing very slowly. These areas, especially those 
located in the industrial heartland, typically show 
greater declines in population than households, 
reflecting a selective out-migration of younger, larger 
households. youngstown, pittsburgh, cleveland, 
Dayton, and rochester rank among such areas.
Married-with-Children Metropolitan  
Magnets
Although married-with-children households now 
comprise only about one-fifth of all u.S. households, 
and declined in number from 2000 to 2008, they 
maintain a substantial presence in some parts of the 
country. The Age chapter of this report indicates that 
while most of the country is getting older, selected 
parts are “younging,” and a good part of that 
younger population lives in married-with-children 
households.
in 18 of the nation’s 100 largest metro areas, mar-
ried couples with children comprise more than one-
quarter of all households (Map 1). Many are located 
in the West and Southwest, especially in california, 
utah, and Texas, although raleigh and bridgeport 
also make the list. These areas have large hispanic 
populations, high fertility, or have become magnets 
for young families with children. Married couples 
Table 1. Population Growth Exceeded Household Growth in Many Fast-Growing Metro Areas
Large Metro Areas Ranked by Change in Households (%), 2000 to 2008
       
  Highest Household Growth     lowest Household Growth/Household Decline  
   Household Population    Household Population 
   Change Change Difference   Change Change* Difference 
 Rank Metro Area (%)* (%)* (% pts) Rank Metro Area (%) (%) (% pts)
	 1 McAllen, Tx 34.9	 28.0	 -6.9	 91 Toledo, oh 0.4	 -1.5	 -2.0
	 2 provo, uT 34.3	 43.5	 9.2	 92 rochester, ny 0.3	 -0.7	 -1.0
	 3 las Vegas, nV 33.6	 35.9	 2.3	 93	 Dayton, oh 0.0	 -1.4	 -1.4
	 4 raleigh-cary, nc 31.0	 37.2	 6.3	 94 bridgeport-Stamford, cT -0.1	 0.7	 0.8
	 5 charlotte, nc-Sc 29.6	 28.6	 -1.0	 95 pittsburgh, pA -0.8	 -3.4	 -2.6
	 6 boise city, iD 29.4	 27.6	 -1.8	 96 youngstown, oh-pA -1.4	 -6.5	 -5.1
	 7 cape coral, fl 29.3	 34.1	 4.8	 97 providence, ri-MA -1.7	 0.6	 2.3
	 8 Austin, Tx 27.9	 32.4	 4.4	 98 cleveland, oh -1.9	 -2.9	 -1.0
	 9 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 22.4	 32.2	 9.8	 99 Detroit-Warren, Mi -2.5	 -0.8	 1.8
	 10 ogden, uT 21.8	 20.5	 -1.2	 100 new orleans, lA -23.0	 -13.9	 9.1
 
* population in households 
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data          
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with children comprise 40 percent of all households 
in provo, the highest share nationally, and the same 
share as the united States back in 1970.
At the other end of the spectrum are 18 met-
ropolitan areas where these “traditional families” 
comprise less than 18 percent of all households. They 
are located largely in the industrial northeast and 
Midwest, florida, Tennessee, and Arizona. Most of 
these areas are largely white or have large African 
American minority populations, and contain large 
senior populations. bradenton’s married-with-
children share of households, at 13.5 percent, ranks 
lowest nationally. 
Many of the areas experiencing the largest 
growth in married couples with children during the 
2000s also registered large shares of these house-
holds in 2008. only 41 large metro areas gained 
married-with-children households from 2000 to 
2008, and just 17 exhibited growth of more than 10 
percent. in eight of the 10 metro areas with the fast-
est growth rates among this household type, married 
couples with children represented a larger than  
average share of all households in 2008. in this 
sense, the ever-more atypical “typical” American 
household is congregating in a smaller number of 
u.S. metro areas.
This relationship (in reverse) looms even stronger 
in declining markets. The familiar list of industrial 
northeastern and Midwestern metro areas, along 
with new orleans, recorded the largest percentage 
declines in married couples with children from 2000 
to 2008; the youngstown area had fully one-quarter 
fewer of these households in 2008 than eight years 
prior. in all of these metro areas, married couples 
with children accounted for a well below-average 
share of all households. With rapidly aging popula-
tions, over one-third of their households are non-
families, mostly older people living alone.
Map 1. In Only 18 Metro Areas Are Married Couples with Children More than a Quarter of Households
Share of Households that Are Married Couples with Children, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
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CITy AND SUBURBAN TRENDS
The faster population-than-household growth 
occurring in the 2000s carries special implications 
for cities. in past decades, many sustained greater 
population losses than household losses due to the 
“flight” of families to suburbs, but were able to retain 
some tax base and housing demand in the process. 
in the 2000s, however, 58 of 95 primary cities added 
population living in households, while 61 registered 
increases in households. More so than for metropoli-
tan areas, primary cities exhibited a greater “bunch-
ing up” of population growth. Among the 61 cities 
where households grew, only 34 had population 
growth exceeding household growth. cities gaining 
these larger-than-average households included cape 
coral, palm bay, raleigh, and bakersfield (Table 3). 
Table 2 : Married Couples with Children Grew in Metro Areas with Already-Large Shares of These Households
Metro Areas Ranked by Change in Married Couples with Children (%), 2000-2008
 Share of Households, 2008 (%)
   Change in Married Married Couples 
 Rank Metro Area Couples w/ Children (%)  w/ Children Non-Families
Highest Growth in Married Couples with Children
 1 cape coral, fl	 35.5	 16	 33
	 2 las Vegas, nV 29.7	 21	 36
 3 raleigh-cary, nc 29.3	 26	 33
 4 provo, uT 24.0	 39	 20
 5 boise city, iD 22.7	 27	 31
 6 Austin, Tx 22.7	 23	 38
 7 charlotte, nc-Sc 20.1	 22	 34
	 8 lakeland, fl 19.3	 20	 30
 9 McAllen, Tx 15.0	 33	 18
	 10 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 14.5	 22	 34
largest Declines in Married Couples with Children
	 91 pittsburgh, pA -14.1	 18	 37
 92 providence, ri-MA -14.2	 19	 36
	 93 Syracuse, ny -14.3	 19	 38
	 94 buffalo, ny -14.5	 17	 39
	 95 Akron, oh -15.6	 18	 36
	 96 rochester, ny -16.2	 19	 36
 97 Dayton, oh -16.7	 18	 35
	 98 Toledo, oh -17.9	 17	 38
	 99 youngstown, oh-pA -24.5	 16	 36
	 100 new orleans, lA -36.1	 17	 36
  All Large Metro Areas -1.5	 22	 34
      
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data     
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And among the 34 primary cities that registered 
household declines, populations declined even 
faster in 16 of them. Dayton, cleveland, youngstown, 
rochester, and pittsburgh fit this profile. new 
orleans exhibits a greater household decline than 
population decline, reflecting its post-katrina loss of 
single-person and larger households.
City Household Types
Trends in the types of households growing and 
declining in cities in the 2000s follow distinct 
regional patterns. cities in the South and West, as 
was the case in the 1990s, added all types of house-
holds, most notably married couples, including those 
with children. Slow-growing cities of the northeast 
and Midwest, on the other hand, showed declines in 
almost all types of households, but especially mar-
ried couples with children.
fast-growing cities are characterized by the 
considerable presence of married couples, including 
those with children, among their residents and new 
arrivals. in each of the 10 fastest growing primary 
cities, married couple households [with and without 
children] account for more than 40 percent of all 
city households, and more than half in cape coral, 
bakersfield, McAllen, and palm bay (Table 4). in six of 
these cities, married-with-children household shares 
equal or exceed the national average of 21 percent. 
The growth of younger, racial and ethnic minor-
ity populations in these cities has boosted these 
“traditional” family types. That noted, most of these 
cities experienced significant growth in other types 
of households as well; in fact, their growth rates for 
other families and non-families generally exceeded 
those for married-couple families.
in primary cities with decreasing numbers of 
households in the 2000s, declines in married couples 
with children outpaced declines in other types of 
Table 3. Growing Cities Tended to Add Larger-than-Average Households, While Shrinking Cities Tended to Lose Them
Primary Cities Ranked by Change in Households (%), 2000 to 2008
       
  Highest Household Growth     Highest Household Decline  
   Household Population    Household Population 
   Change Change Difference   Change Change* Difference 
 Rank Primary Cities (%) (%)* (% pts) Rank Primary Cities (%) (%) (% pts)
	 1 cape coral, fl 42.1	 51.1	 9.0	 86 Albany, ny -8.1	 -5.5	 2.7
	 2 charlotte, nc 32.8	 27.0	 -5.9	 87 youngstown, oh -9.1	 -14.9	 -5.8
	 3 raleigh-cary, nc 28.0	 32.0	 4.1	 88	 birmingham, Al -9.5	 -13.1	 -3.6
	 4 bakersfield, cA 26.6	 30.9	 4.3	 89 pittsburgh, pA -9.6	 -12.3	 -2.7
	 5 McAllen, Tx 24.9	 21.1	 -3.8	 90 cleveland, oh -11.5	 -14.8	 -3.3
	 6 palm bay, fl 22.3	 28.3	 6.0	 91 Dayton, oh -11.7	 -14.5	 -2.7
	 7	 lakeland, fl 20.9	 22.6	 1.6	 92 rochester, ny -13.3	 -13.5	 -0.2
	 8 charleston, Sc 19.4	 19.1	 -0.4	 93 cincinnati, oh -14.8	 -11.7	 3.2
	 9 las Vegas, nV 18.8	 20.8	 2.0	 94 Detroit-Warren, Mi -19.1	 -16.2	 2.9
	 10 Sacramento-roseville, cA 18.4	 18.4	 0.0	 95 new orleans, lA -53.7	 -36.4	 17.3
* population in households
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data          
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households. eight of the ten cities with the fastest 
overall household declines lost at least 30 percent 
of their married-with-children households over the 
eight-year period. And while these households made 
up at least 20 percent of all households in most of 
the fastest-growing cities by 2008, they represented 
less than half that share of households in many of 
the fastest-declining cities that year. A few of these 
cities did manage to post gains or much more mod-
est declines in non-families, which accounted for 45 
percent or more of their households in 2008. This 
does not necessarily indicate that they attracted 
large numbers of “coming-of-age” singles; rather, the 
loss of spouses in elderly married-couple families 
may have increased the number of older people liv-
ing alone.
Table 4 . Cities with Fast-Growing Household Populations Added All Types of Households in the 2000s
Change in Households by Type (%), Primary Cities Ranked by Total Household Growth/Decline, 2000 to 2008
 Percent Change 2000-2008 Share of Households, 2008 (%)
   Married Married   Married 
   Couples Couples Other Other Couples 
 Rank Primary Cities of Metro Area w/Children w/o Children Families Non-Families w/Children Non-Families
Highest Household Growth
 1 cape coral, fl	 58	 17	 53	 61	 25	 29
	 2 charlotte, nc 23	 27	 45	 36	 19	 39
 3 raleigh-cary, nc	 12	 39	 34	 29	 20	 42
	 4 bakersfield, cA 28	 15	 28	 33	 29	 28
 5 McAllen, Tx	 11	 13	 64	 25	 29	 21
 6 palm bay, fl 10	 17	 40	 28	 21	 30
 7 lakeland, fl	 18	 19	 21	 23	 13	 40
	 8 charleston, Sc	 3	 22	 15	 25	 12	 48
	 9	 las Vegas, nV 14	 10	 34	 21	 21	 34
	 10 Sacramento-roseville, cA	 24	 12	 9	 24	 21	 41
 Highest Household Decline
	 86 pittsburgh, pA -22	 -12	 -18	 -2	 10	 52
	 87	 Albany, ny -25	 6	 -2	 -11	 8	 53
	 88	 Dayton, oh -31	 -9	 -19	 -4	 10	 48
	 89 rochester, ny -32	 -11	 -16	 -8	 9	 50
	 90 cleveland, oh -33	 -18	 -14	 -1	 9	 46
	 91	 cincinnati, oh -33	 -12	 -17	 -11	 8	 53
	 92 Detroit-Warren, Mi -36	 -22	 -21	 -9	 11	 39
	 93 birmingham, Al -41	 -15	 -11	 4	 8	 46
	 94	 youngstown, oh -59	 -23	 2	 6	 5	 45
	 95 new orleans, lA -63	 -44	 -66	 -46	 11	 46
        
  All Primary Cities -7	 1	 2	 8	 17	 42 
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
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The selective out-migration of larger, married-
couple family households characterizes many older 
shrinking cities. Most are located in regions of the 
country where neither primary cities nor suburbs are 
gaining residents from other parts of the country. 
Additionally, none of these cities is benefiting appre-
ciably from the recent immigration waves that have 
fueled growth in many fast-growing cities. in earlier 
decades, these cities could count on boomer coming-
of-age households, including married couples, to 
locate there prior to moving to the suburbs. for 
demographic and economic reasons, such growth 
prospects are no longer strong.
Suburban Household Types
in the 2000s, suburban growth continued to domi-
nate the metropolitan landscape. its household 
sources, however, were quite different from those 
associated with the iconic suburbs of the mid-20th 
century.
overall, households in the suburbs grew by nearly 
11 percent from 2000 to 2008, compared to just 
over 2 percent in primary cities. faster suburban 
growth was not limited to certain types of house-
holds. Across four of the five major household types, 
suburban growth rates far exceeded primary city 
growth rates. And while married couples with chil-
dren declined by more than 7 percent in cities in the 
2000s, they actually grew—although minimally—in 
suburbs (figure 4).
 With minimal growth in their married-with-
children household populations, the suburbs of large 
metropolitan areas are home to growing numbers 
of household types traditionally associated with 
cities. non-families and families without married 
couples (with and without children) grew fastest 
in suburbs from 2000 to 2008. These household 
types in suburbs may look somewhat different from 
those in cities. for example, compared with cities, 
a greater share of “other families with children” 
households in the suburbs may be the product of 
divorce, separation, or cohabitation. Accordingly, 
the housing they seek may be somewhat different 
than that demanded by the larger household types 
that traditionally dominated the suburbs. in 2008, 
less than one-quarter of suburban households were 
Figure 4. Non-Traditional Households Grew in  
Suburbs at High Rates During the 2000s
Change in Households by Type, 
Primary Cities vs. Suburbs, 2000 to 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American  
Community Survey data
Data reflect 95 of 100 large metropolitan areas
With minimal 
growth in their 
married-with-
children house-
hold populations, 
the suburbs of 
large metro-
politan areas are 
home to grow-
ing numbers of 
household types 
traditionally 
associated 
with cities. 
Share of Households by Type, Primary Cities vs.  
Suburbs, 2008
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married families with children, and 30 percent were 
non-families (five in six of whom were people living 
alone). 
nonetheless, suburbs are still the dominant loca-
tion of married couples (with and without children). 
This is true across racial and ethnic groups (figure 
5). for large metro areas, the percentage of house-
holds living in the suburbs (compared with primary 
cities) is highest for married couples with children, 
lowest for non-families, and in-between for childless 
married couples and other families. Thus, even as 
“traditional families” become a less prominent part 
of the metropolitan landscape, those families still 
choose suburban locations at a significant rate. This 
is especially the case among African Americans, 
whose metropolitan populations are dominated by 
unmarried households. for that group, only married-
couple households are more likely to live in suburbs 
than in primary cities.
As with primary cities, sharp distinctions in 
household types separate fast-growing and slow-
growing suburban areas (Table 5). in five of the 10 
fastest-growing metropolitan suburbs, married cou-
ples with children account for more than 30 percent 
of households, led by provo, where fully 43 percent 
of all suburban households are married couples with 
children. This contrasts sharply with the situation of 
the slowest growing suburbs. Six of those 10 suburbs 
have “traditional family” shares at less than one-
fifth of all households, and, in nearly all, non-family 
households exceed married couples with children. 
perhaps most striking, these struggling suburbs 
each show declines in their married-with-children 
couples over the decade. Among 95 large metropoli-
tan suburbs, in only three—new orleans, providence, 
and youngstown—did the number of households drop 
between 2000 and 2008. nonetheless, fully 51 of 
these metropolitan suburbs showed declines in their 
married-couple-with-children populations, suggest-
ing that the family-raising image of the suburbs 
continues to fade.
Moreover, married-with-children families repre-
sent no more than one-quarter of households even 
in the farther-out, less developed mature and emerg-
ing suburbs and exurbs of metropolitan areas (figure 
6). They do have somewhat higher shares of mar-
ried couples with no children, and somewhat lower 
shares of non-families, than higher-density suburbs 
surrounding cities. yet these still-developing areas 
surprisingly seem no more or less “family-oriented” 
based on their household types than suburbs in 
general. 
LOOKING AHEAD
focusing exclusively on population change offers 
only a partial picture of metropolitan growth dynam-
ics. change in the number and composition of 
Figure 5. A Majority of Married-Couple Households in Every Major  
Racial/Ethnic Group Live in Suburbs
Share of Large Metropolitan Households Living in Suburbs  
by Race/Ethnicity and Household Type, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
M w/ C = married couple with children; M w/o C = married couple without children; OF = other family;  
NF = non-family
Reflects data from 95 of 100 largest metro areas
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households may be a better indicator of changes in 
demand for housing, schools, health services, as well 
as the fiscal ability to meet critical local needs.
The changes in America’s households reflect a 
complicated mix of long-run trends that together 
have upended traditional notions of city and subur-
ban household profiles. Suburbs are no longer bas-
tions of families and child-rearing, just as cities are 
not solely home to young singles and older residents. 
Still, shifts in the household makeup of cities and 
suburbs continue to occur within a nationwide con-
text of dispersing households and population. The 
trend of faster suburban than city growth pervades 
fast-growing and slow-growing metropolitan areas 
alike, and holds for all household types. 
The growth of child-centered city populations in 
Table 5. Other Families and Non-Families Were the Fastest Growing Household Types in Growing and Shrinking Suburbs
Change in Households by Type (%), Suburbs Ranked by Total Household Growth/Decline, 2000 to 2008
 Percent Change 2000-2008 Share of Households, 2008 (%)
   Married Married   Married 
   Couples Couples Other Other Couples 
 Rank Metro Area Suburbs w/Children w/o Children Families Non-Families w/Children Non-Families
Highest Household Growth
	 1 provo, uT 31	 50	 78	 66	 43	 16
	 2 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 40	 34	 58	 46	 23	 30
	 3 las Vegas, nV 38	 31	 42	 52	 21	 36
	 4 boise city, iD 36	 31	 45	 59	 31	 26
	 5 Austin, Tx 26	 39	 47	 56	 29	 28
	 6 McAllen, Tx 16	 39	 56	 72	 34	 17
	 7 raleigh-cary, nc 41	 22	 35	 39	 32	 26
	 8 el paso, Tx 1	 69	 43	 69	 38	 13
	 9 houston, Tx 17	 33	 41	 32	 30	 23
	 10 colorado Springs, co 8	 35	 46	 37	 29	 22
 Highest Household Decline
	 86 Springfield, MA -7	 -1	 11	 7	 19	 37
	 87 new haven, cT -6	 2	 3	 6	 21	 34
	 88 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA -5	 -1	 6	 7	 26	 29
	 89 Scranton, pA -9	 3	 11	 2	 18	 34
	 90 cleveland, oh -10	 -3	 5	 11	 21	 35
	 91 pittsburgh, pA -13	 0	 8	 8	 19	 34
	 92 bridgeport-Stamford, cT -1	 -1	 14	 -1	 29	 26
	 93 youngstown, oh-pA -22	 -3	 9	 13	 17	 35
	 94 providence, ri-MA -15	 -2	 6	 5	 19	 35
	 95 new orleans, lA -28	 0	 -3	 11	 19	 33
        
  All Suburbs 1	 11	 18	 16	 24	 30
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data      
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the country’s diverse metropolitan areas, especially 
those in the South and West, presents several chal-
lenges. They create new needs for public and private 
services like childcare; they may further test the 
adequacy of urban school systems; and they may put 
new stresses on the fiscal positions of these cities. 
At the same time, though, household patterns in the 
fastest-growing cities suggest that burgeoning family 
populations create opportunities for vibrant neigh-
borhoods and continued growth that may not exist in 
other cities.
The picture is quite different in a growing number 
of northeastern and Midwestern suburbs home to 
increasing numbers of non-family and single-parent 
family households The need for affordable, multi-
family housing in these jurisdictions will only con-
tinue to increase. elderly homeowners, both married 
couples and individuals living alone, may demon-
strate a greater demand over time for services like 
transportation and home healthcare as they “age in 
place” in the suburbs.
Whether these changes ultimately spur greater 
cooperation across city and suburban borders will 
undoubtedly depend on complicated local dynamics, 
as well as a broader realization that new realities 
have overtaken old perceptions of who inhabits our 
metropolitan communities. n
ENDNOTES
1.  Andrew J. cherlin, Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage 
(cambridge, MA: harvard university press, 1992).
2.  lynne M. casper and Suzanne M. bianchi, Continuity 
& Change in the American Family (Thousand oaks, cA: 
Sage publications, 2002).
3.  William h. frey, “Married with children.” American 
Demographics, March 2003, pp. 18–20.
4.  household growth and decline in a particular place can 
occur in a more dynamic, varied fashion than popula-
tion change. Aside from in-migration and out-migration, 
changes in the number of households result from 
household formation and dissolution. new households 
form largely when “coming-of-age” late teens and young 
adults leave their parents’ homes to form their own. 
changes in other existing households can also affect 
household growth. for instance, two non-family single 
households may combine to form a married couple 
household; likewise, a divorce may create two house-
holds from one. life transitions can also lead to changes 
in household type, as when a married couple without 
children household experiences the birth of a child (thus 
creating a married couple with children household), 
or the death of a spouse (thus creating a non-family 
household).
Figure 6. Household Types Vary Only Minimally 
Among Different Types of Suburbs
Share of Households by Type and Metropolitan 
Community Type, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
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VI. eDucATionAl ATTAinMenT
B y  T H E  N U M B E R S
32%/15%
Share of white and Asian/
Hispanic and black adults 
with bachelor’s degree, 
United States, 2008
47% / 15%
Share of adults with bach-
elor’s degree, Washington, 
DC (#1) / Bakersfield (#100) 
metro areas, 2008
58%
Share of adults with a  
high school diploma or  
less employed,  
Detroit metro area, 2008
91
Number of metro areas  
(out of 100) with  
significant increases in 
share of 18-to-24 year-olds 
enrolled in higher education,  
2000 to 2008
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OVERVIEW
n  Americans are growing more educated, but progress appears to be slowing among younger adults. 
While the share of u.S. adults holding a four-year college degree rose from 24 percent to 28 percent from 
2000 to 2008, a lower share of 25-to-34 year-olds than 35-to-44 year-olds held a four-year college degree 
in 2008, a reversal from the pattern in 2000. nearly a quarter of those younger adults have completed 
some college, but not a degree.
n  Smart metropolitan areas are getting smarter, faster. Already highly-educated metro areas such as 
boston, new york, San Diego, and San francisco ranked among the top gainers of college graduates in the 
2000s. Thirty-four percentage points separated the top- (Washington, D.c.) and bottom-ranked (bakersfield) 
large metro areas on college degree attainment in 2008, up from 26 points in 1990.
n  In every large metro area, educational attainment for whites exceeds that for both blacks and Latinos. 
educational disparities by race and ethnicity evident at the national level are uniformly present in large 
metropolitan areas, where overall, 36 percent of white adults possess college degrees, versus 19 percent of 
blacks and 14 percent of hispanics. Some metro areas in the West register higher degree-earning rates for 
African Americans, as do some in the Midwest, northeast, and florida for latinos.
n  Residents of older suburbs are more highly educated than other metropolitan residents. in cambridge, 
MA; Arlington, VA; bellevue, WA; and Sunnyvale, cA, more than half of adults have a four-year college 
degree, as do 36 percent of residents across all high-density suburbs. As a group, primary cities lost some of 
their share of college-educated residents to suburbs over the 2000s, reflecting in part the suburbanization 
of the large, highly-educated baby boomer generation. 
n  Throughout the country, more young people are going to college or graduate school. Among the 100 
largest metro areas, 91 experienced a significant increase in the share of their young adults enrolled in 
higher education between 2000 and 2008. Some of the largest increases occurred in older industrial metro 
areas of the northeast and Midwest, suggesting that young people in these struggling economies increas-
ingly recognize the need for a post-secondary degree to succeed in the labor market.
NATIONAL AND  
REGIONAL TRENDS
The united States is one of the most highly educated 
nations in the world. The organisation for economic 
cooperation and Development (oecD) places 
the united States second among 29 developed 
economies in the proportion of its working-age popu-
lation with a high school diploma and third among 30 
in the proportion with a post-secondary degree.1
on this front, the nation made continued gains 
over the past two decades. The share of adults with 
at least a high school diploma rose from 75 percent 
There are  
worrisome signs 
that younger 
Americans are 
not making the 
same level of 
progress on  
educational 
attainment 
as older 
generations. 
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in 1990 to 85 percent in 2008 (figure 1). Similar 
progress was evident for post-secondary degrees, 
which 35 percent of adults possessed in 2008, up 
from 26 percent in 1990. These gains have been 
uneven across regions, however. The northeast is 
now the most highly educated region, with just short 
of 40 percent of its adults holding some form of 
post-secondary degree, a trait shared by fewer than 
one-third of Southern adults.
even more significant than these regional differ-
ences are deep and abiding attainment differences 
by race and ethnicity across the united States (Table 
1). only 61 percent of hispanic adults have a high 
school diploma, reflecting both recent low-skilled 
immigration as well as below-average completion 
rates for native-born hispanics. And while that 
Figure 1. U.S. Adults Have Become More Highly 
Educated Over the Past Two Decades
Share of Population Age 25 and Over, 
by Highest Level of Attainment
Source: Brookings analysis of 1990 Census, Census 2000, and 2008 American 
Community Survey data
Table 1. Large Disparities by Race/Ethnicity, and Emerging Disparities by Age,  
Underlie Educational Attainment in America
Educational Attainment by Race/Ethnicity, Nativity, and Age, United States, 2000 and 2008
  
 High school diploma or more Some college Associate’s degree Bachelor’s degree 
  2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008
 Race/Ethnicity
	 White 85.5	 90.1	 21.9	 22.1	 6.6	 7.9	 27.0	 30.7
 black 72.3	 80.7	 22.5	 24.3	 5.8	 7.4	 14.3	 17.5
 Asian 80.4	 85.1	 14.0	 12.8	 6.6	 6.6	 44.1	 49.7
 hispanic 52.4	 60.8	 15.6	 16.6	 4.3	 5.3	 10.4	 12.9
 Nativity 
 native-born 83.3	 88.3	 22.3	 22.9	 6.5	 7.9	 24.4	 27.8
 foreign-born 61.9	 67.5	 13.6	 13.0	 5.1	 5.5	 23.8	 27.1
 Age  
 25 to 34 83.9	 86.4	 23.1	 23.5	 7.5	 8.3	 27.5	 29.5
 35 to 44 85.0	 87.3	 22.6	 21.4	 8.1	 8.7	 25.9	 30.8
 45 to 64 83.2	 87.6	 21.7	 21.9	 6.4	 8.2	 26.4	 28.9
 65 and over 65.5	 75.7	 15.7	 17.5	 2.5	 3.9	 15.4	 20.0
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data    
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rate increased by more than 8 percentage points 
since 2000, the share of hispanics with any sort 
of post-secondary degree increased by less than 
half that margin. Meanwhile, black adults posted 
above-average gains in high school diploma attain-
ment during the 2000s, but below-average gains in 
college degree completion. Today, just 13 percent of 
hispanics and 18 percent of African Americans hold a 
four-year college degree, compared to 31 percent of 
whites, and 50 percent of Asians. 
finally, there are worrisome signs that younger 
Americans are not making the same level of progress 
on educational attainment as older generations, 
which could threaten continued upward progress in 
u.S. living standards. over time, the united States 
has become more educated as younger adults 
gained credentials to access fields with growing edu-
cational requirements, replacing older workers who 
were aging out of industries and occupations that 
on average required less education. now, however, 
a gap is beginning to open in which younger adults 
are posting lower levels of attainment than some 
older groups. in 2000, 25-to-34 year-olds actually 
had a slightly higher (28 percent) rate of bachelor’s 
degree attainment than 35-to-44 year-olds (26 per-
cent) (Table 1). but by 2008, 29 percent of 25-to-34 
year-olds held a degree, compared to 31 percent of 
35-to-44 year-olds. A rising share of the 25-to-34 
year-old group—24 percent by 2008—indicated 
that they had completed some college, but had not 
obtained a degree, a troubling trend that is drawing 
increased attention in higher education.2
METROPOLITAN TRENDS
College Degree Attainment in 2008
considerable disparities exist across u.S. metropoli-
tan labor markets in the educational attainment of 
their residents, due to differences in their underlying 
economic and demographic structures, migration pat-
terns, and historical and cultural mores that affect the 
real and perceived return to education. As this section 
explores, however, recent trends may be “locking in” 
longstanding attainment differences across metro-
politan areas rather than narrowing the gaps.3
ranking all 100 metropolitan areas on the 
share of their population with a bachelor’s degree 
shows that the top (Washington, Dc) and bottom 
(bakersfield, cA) metro areas are separated by a 
factor of three (Table 2). Most metro areas at the 
top of the list are hubs for professional services and 
scientific/technical industries, including bridgeport, 
San Jose, San francisco, boston, and raleigh.4 
The metro areas with the lowest college attain-
ment rates include ones in california’s central Valley, 
along the Texas border, and in older industrial cen-
ters of the northeast, Midwest, and Southeast. These 
regions have historically been home to industries 
such as manufacturing, agriculture, and shipping, 
for which a college degree was not a prerequisite to 
obtaining a good-paying job. Some of these areas, 
such as Scranton, Modesto, or riverside may benefit 
from their proximity to more productive, higher-
cost markets, which during the 2000s helped them 
attract firms and households seeking lower costs. 
however, the relatively low education levels of adults 
in these metropolitan areas pose an important bar-
rier to their growing more productive industries, 
achieving greater economic diversity, and boosting 
the local standard of living. 
Recent trends 
may be 'locking 
in' longstanding 
attainment dif-
ferences across 
metro politan 
areas rather  
than narrowing 
the gaps.
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Changes in Attainment in the 2000s
notwithstanding the differences in 2008, adults 
nearly all 100 metropolitan areas achieved increases 
over the 2000 to 2008 period in their college 
degree attainment rates. The magnitude of those 
increases, however, varied widely, from a more than 
6 percentage-point increase in Worcester to a less 
than 1 percentage-point increase in new orleans and 
Albuquerque (Table 3). 
in general, two types of metro areas made 
significant gains: large, coastal regions with high 
value-added economies (e.g., boston), and mid-sized 
markets that have made a transition away from man-
ufacturing toward higher education and health care 
industries (e.g., pittsburgh, baltimore). Those metro 
areas nearer the bottom of the list include many that 
attracted large numbers of less-educated immigrants 
from latin America throughout the decade to fill 
jobs in their growing housing sectors. regions such 
as phoenix and california’s central Valley all grew 
at rapid rates prior to the housing crash due in part 
to the new construction built by these immigrant 
laborers.5
These recent changes in educational attainment 
at the metropolitan level reflect a striking “path 
dependency” to this attribute. That is, metro areas 
with higher levels of college degree attainment in 
the first place have tended to make greater gains 
than those starting out with lower educational levels. 
indeed, 9 of the 10 metro areas with the highest 
rates of college degree attainment in 2008 also 
ranked among the top 10 in 1990, and 9 of the 10 
at the bottom of the list in 2008 were also there 
in 1990 (Table 2).6 Meanwhile, the distance from 
the top to the bottom of the attainment distribu-
tion has grown; 34 percentage points separated the 
top-ranked and bottom-ranked metro areas on this 
indicator in 2008, up from 26 in 1990. This pattern is 
not immutable—indeed, initially low-ranked areas like 
louisville and las Vegas managed to post above-
Table 2. Higher Educational Attainment Levels Vary Widely Across Metropolitan Areas
Metro Areas Ranked by Proportion of Adults Age 25 and Over with a Bachelor’s Degree, 2008
 
   Highest Rates    lowest Rates  
 Rank Rank   Rank Rank 
 2008 1990 Metro Area   2008 1990 Metro Area 
	 1	 1	 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV  46.8	 91	 94 Scranton, pA  21.0
	 2	 2	 bridgeport, cT  43.8	 92	 91 el paso, Tx  19.6
	 3	 4 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa clara, cA  43.5	 93	 97 youngstown, oh-pA  19.1
	 4	 3 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA  43.4	 94	 92 riverside-San bernardino-ontario, cA  19.0
	 5	 7 boston-cambridge, MA-nh  41.9	 95	 87 fresno, cA  18.9
	 6	 8 raleigh, nc  41.5	 96	 99 lakeland, fl  18.7
	 7	 5 Madison, Wi  39.8	 97	 96 Stockton, cA  15.6
	 8	 6 Austin, Tx  38.2	 98	 100 McAllen, Tx  15.1
 9	 11 Minneapolis-St. paul, Mn-Wi  37.6	 99	 98 Modesto, cA  15.1
	 10	 9	 Denver-Aurora, co  37.5	 100	 95 bakersfield, cA  14.7
Source: Brookings analysis of 1990 Census and 2008 American Community Survey data      
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average gains in their shares of college-educated 
adults—but nevertheless indicates that gains in the 
“war for talent” among u.S. metro areas are accruing 
disproportionately to already better-educated places.
Slowing Attainment Growth
Another dynamic contributing to the gap among 
metro areas is the rate at which younger adults are 
earning college degrees compared to their prede-
cessors. As noted above, progress has slowed on 
this indicator at the national level, but outcomes at 
the metropolitan level remain diverse. There are 30 
metropolitan areas in which degree-earning rates 
for 25-to-34 year-olds exceed (by at least half a 
percentage point) those for 35-to-44 year-olds (Map 
1). Many lie in the northeast, including several with a 
strong university presence (e.g., new haven, boston, 
Syracuse, pittsburgh) that helps attract graduate 
students, or leads these regions to retain recent 
bachelor’s degree earners. yet there are many more 
metro areas where younger adults lag the previous 
cohort in attainment, with serious gaps evident in 
several Sun belt metro areas that already possess 
below-average attainment levels.7 even the gaps in 
metro areas with fairly well-educated populations 
overall, such as Atlanta and portland (or), may raise 
concerns about their future economic trajectory.
Racial and Ethnic Outcomes
At the metro-area level, the wide racial/ethnic 
disparities that characterize educational attainment 
nationally are replicated across the board. in each 
of the 100 largest metro areas, white college degree 
attainment exceeds that for blacks and hispanics. 
Across all 100, 50 percent of Asian adults and 36 
percent of white adults hold a four-year degree, 
compared to just 20 percent of blacks and 14 percent 
of hispanics. 
Among these demographic subgroups, edu-
cational attainment levels vary greatly across 
Table 3. Growth in College Degree Attainment Varied Widely Among Metro Areas in the 2000s
Metro Areas Ranked by Change in Proportion of Adults Age 25 and Over with a Bachelor’s Degree, 2000-2008
  
  Highest Growth   lowest Growth
 Rank Metro Area  Rank Metro Area 
	 1	 Worcester, MA  6.1	 91 Austin, Tx  1.5
	 2 Miami-fort lauderdale-pompano beach, fl  5.4	 92 Tucson, AZ  1.5
	 3 pittsburgh, pA  5.3	 93 phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  1.4
 4 indianapolis, in  5.3	 94 fresno, cA  1.3
	 5 baltimore, MD  5.1	 95 bakersfield, cA  1.1
 6 new haven, cT  5.0	 96 Stockton, cA  1.1
	 7 Akron, oh  5.0	 97 Modesto, cA* 1.1
 8 boston-cambridge, MA-nh  5.0	 98 Dallas-fort Worth-Arlington, Tx  1.1
	 9 cape coral, fl  5.0	 99 Albuquerque, nM* 0.9
 10 Des Moines, iA  5.0	 100 new orleans, lA  0.7
*Change not statistically significant at 90 percent confidence level
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
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metropolitan America. college degree-earning rates 
among blacks are relatively high in several of the 
high-tech metro areas that perform well overall 
(Map 2a), with Atlanta posting the second-highest 
rate for blacks. Also ranking high are a handful 
of Western metro areas, including phoenix, San 
Diego, los Angeles, and portland, where the his-
tory of racial segregation is not quite as severe as 
in the east. Metro areas with the highest educa-
tional levels for hispanics, by contrast, lie largely 
east of the Mississippi, and include Midwestern 
(St. louis, columbus, Minneapolis), northeastern 
(baltimore, rochester, boston), and Southern (Miami, 
Jacksonville, new orleans) locations (Map 2b). With a 
couple exceptions, these metropolitan areas tend to 
have relatively small hispanic populations.8 yet even 
the college degree attainment rates for minorities in 
these metropolitan areas lag the average for whites 
across all metro areas (36 percent). 
Metro areas at the bottom of the educational 
attainment list for blacks and hispanics are also 
quite distinct from one another. Manufacturing areas 
of the Midwest and South figure prominently among 
the regions with low educational levels for blacks, 
while 11 of the bottom 15 for hispanics are Western 
locations that have experienced significant immigra-
tion of less-skilled workers from latin America to fill 
construction, agricultural, and lower-level service-
sector jobs.
Employment Levels by Educational  
Attainment
As the great recession has demonstrated, there 
are clear linkages between educational attain-
ment and employment prospects.9 While we do 
not yet know how the downturn affected workers 
Map 1. In Many Metro Areas, Middle-Aged Workers Are More Highly Educated Than younger Ones
Share of 35-to-44 year-Old Adults versus 25-to-34 year-Old Adults with Bachelor's Degrees, by Metro Area, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 
American Community Survey data
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Map 2a. College-Degree-Earning Rates for Blacks are Relatively High in Many Western Metro Areas, 
and Low in the Manufacturing Belt
Top and Bottom Metro Areas on Share of Blacks/African Americans Age 25 and Over with Bachelor's Degree, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 
American Community Survey data
Map 2b. College-Degree-Earning Rates for Latinos are Relatively High in a Diverse Set of Metros, 
and Low in Some Southern and Western Metros
Top and Bottom Metro Areas on Share of Latinos Age 25 and Over with Bachelor's Degree, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008  
American Community Survey data
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at the metropolitan level, even before the worst 
of the recession set in, there were marked differ-
ences among metro areas in employment rates for 
less-educated workers. for the college-educated, 
employment rates were fairly consistent, with 97 of 
100 metro areas posting rates between 80 and 90 
percent. for those with no more than a high school 
diploma, however, prospects varied enormously 
(Table 4). in some metro areas, particularly those 
in the country’s mid-section, 70 percent or more of 
these adults were in work in 2008. yet at the same 
time, many metropolitan areas posted much lower 
employment rates for this group. They include sev-
eral manufacturing-oriented metro areas and a mix 
of those in the Southeast, california’s central Valley, 
and Detroit, regions with substantial numbers of 
African American adults who lack a college degree. 
The hard times these economies encountered in 
2009 are only likely to exacerbate the serious labor 
market challenges facing this group. 
Rising Enrollment Nationwide
perhaps in view of the increasing returns to higher 
education in America, the 2000s saw widespread 
increases in college and graduate school enrollment 
among young adults. nationally, 41 percent of 18 to 
24 year-olds were enrolled in higher education in 
2008, up from 34 percent in 2000. Metropolitan 
areas throughout new england and upstate new 
york all had more than half of their young adults 
enrolled in 2008. gains over the decade were par-
ticularly rapid in a number of older industrial metro 
areas in the great lakes region, including Toledo, 
Detroit, cleveland, and St. louis, where enrollment 
rates were up 10 percentage points or more (Map 3). 
it may be that the loss of manufacturing jobs over 
the course of the decade, many of which had not 
required a bachelor’s degree, spurred more young 
people in these regions to pursue higher education. 
Whether they will stay in these regions to pursue job 
opportunities after earning degrees remains to be 
seen. Most metro areas posting small gains already 
Table 4. Adults with No More than a High School Diploma Are Employed at Very Low Levels in Some Metro Areas
Metro Areas Ranked by Proportion of Adults Age 25 and Over with a High School Diploma 
or Less Employed in 2008
     
  Highest Rates   lowest Rates 
 Rank Metro Area  Rank Metro Area 
	 1	 Des Moines, iA  76.0	 91 Jackson, MS  61.2
 2 omaha, ne-iA  74.6	 92 Modesto, cA  60.9
 3 Madison, Wi  74.4	 93 el paso, Tx  60.7
	 4 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV  74.3	 94 Augusta-richmond county, gA-Sc  60.7
 5 Minneapolis-St. paul, Mn-Wi  74.2	 95 greenville, Sc  60.5
	 6 Salt lake city, uT  74.0	 96 Stockton, cA  59.9
	 7 ogden, uT  74.0	 97 McAllen, Tx  59.1
	 8 Denver-Aurora, co 73.9	 98 fresno, cA  58.9
 9 harrisburg, pA  73.7	 99 Detroit-Warren, Mi  57.6
	 10 Viginia beach-norfolk-newport news VA-nc  72.1	 100 bakersfield, cA  55.1
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
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Map 3. Enrollment in Higher Education Rose Everywhere in the 2000s,  
Especially the Northeast and Midwest
Change in Share of 18-to-24 year-olds Enrolled in College or Graduate School, 2000 to 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
had significant student bodies, such as baton rouge 
(lSu), Madison (university of Wisconsin), Austin 
(university of Texas), and provo (byu).10
CITy AND SUBURBAN TRENDS
Some have posited that big cities, in particular, play 
an increasing role in attracting and retaining the 
most educated workers, especially younger individu-
als.11 Across all metropolitan areas, however, college-
educated adults are actually slightly less likely to live 
in cities than the population as a whole (Table 5). 
cities with outsized proportions of their metro areas’ 
highly educated workers include mainly southern 
and western locales like charleston, little rock, and 
Seattle, as well as cities with rural, lower-income 
suburbs like McAllen and bakersfield. Selective 
outmigration from cities in the nation’s manufactur-
ing belt over several decades has left places such 
as Detroit, hartford, and cleveland with college 
degree attainment rates less than half those in their 
suburbs. 
Moreover, most metro areas saw further move-
ment of college degree holders away from big cities, 
toward suburbs, during this decade. A few large 
cities like new york, boston, and Washington posted 
a small edge over their suburbs in gaining college-
educated adults from 2000 to 2008. but many more, 
such as omaha, Tulsa, and baton rouge sustained 
significant losses in their share of metropolitan col-
lege graduates. This trend may indicate some degree 
of out-migration of the highly educated from cities, 
but probably owes at least as much to the aging of 
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highly suburbanized boomers, who account for an 
increasing share of the nation’s college-educated 
population.
These highly educated suburbanites live dis-
proportionately in the high-density suburbs that 
surround primary cities in most metropolitan areas. 
overall, 36 percent of adults in these suburbs hold  
a bachelor’s degree, versus 31 percent in mature  
suburbs, 28 percent in emerging suburbs, and 19 per-
cent in exurbs. inner suburban cities like cambridge 
(MA), Arlington (VA), bellevue (WA), and Sunnyvale 
(cA) exemplify the highly educated, high-income 
locales that abut central cities in many metro areas. 
in those cities, more than half of all adults hold a 
four-year degree.
Table 5. The Proportion of College-Educated Adults Living In Cities Dropped Slightly in the 2000s
Relative Likelihood of Adults with Bachelor’s Degree to Live in Primary Cities in 2008, and Change in Proportion 
Living in Primary Cities, 2000-2008
  Relative likelihood of college-educated    Change in relative likelihood of college-educated 
  to live in cities, 2008     to live in cities, 2000 to 2008    
   Share of College Share of    Share of College Share of College   
   Educated in All Adults in    Educated in Educated in Change, 
 Rank Metro Area City(ies) City(ies) Ratio* Rank Metro Area City(ies), 2000 City(ies) 2008 2000–08
 1 McAllen, Tx  35.5	 19.1	 185.5	 1 bakersfield, cA  53.0	 55.2	 2.2
	 2 charleston, Sc  26.6	 17.3	 153.8	 2	 Sacramento-roseville, cA  25.7	 27.5	 1.8
 3 little rock, Ar  41.9	 28.3	 147.7	 3 cape coral, fl  18.6	 20.3	 1.7
 4 bakersfield, cA  55.2	 39.8	 138.7	 4 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA  39.7	 41.3	 1.6
 5 Seattle-Tacoma-bellevue, WA  37.9	 27.9	 135.9	 5 St. louis, Mo-il  9.7	 11.1	 1.5
    	 	 	 	   
 91 Allentown, pA-nJ  7.1	 12.6	 56.4	 91 Jackson, MS  36.7	 29.0	 -7.7
 92 youngstown, oh-pA 	 6.0	 11.2	 53.7	 92	 omaha, ne-iA  54.0	 45.8	 -8.1
 93 cleveland, oh  9.1	 18.5	 49.3	 93 Tulsa, ok  57.9	 49.0	 -8.9
 94 hartford, cT  3.8	 8.5	 44.9	 94 baton rouge, lA  43.2	 33.7	 -9.4
 95 Detroit-Warren, Mi  8.5	 19.6	 43.3 95 new orleans, lA  40.6	 29.8	 -10.8
  All metro areas 30.4	 31.1	 97.8  All metro areas 31.5	 30.4	 -1.1
          
Results include 95 metros with primary city(ies) represented in 2008 ACS estimates
*ratio of share of college-educated in city(ies) to share of total adult population in cities; 100 = parity
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
Across all 
metropolitan 
areas, college- 
educated adults 
are actually 
slightly less 
likely to live in 
cities than the 
population as 
a whole. 
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LOOKING AHEAD
There is fairly broad recognition that the u.S. econ-
omy—and its constituent metropolitan economies—
remain on an inexorable path toward higher demand 
for education. Technological progress and the rise 
of developing economies will, on balance, further 
shift job growth in the united States and its regions 
toward service-related industries that require higher-
order skills, and place added value within industries 
on occupations and tasks that utilize such skills. 
rising enrollments in higher education suggest that 
young people recognize this reality as well.
if anything, the deep economic downturn of 2009 
magnified the educational challenge for the nation 
and its metropolitan labor markets. less-educated 
workers, as well as the metro areas in which they 
are most concentrated, have borne the brunt of the 
significant rise in unemployment. Many of the jobs 
that they occupied—in sectors such as manufactur-
ing, construction, and retail—have likely disappeared 
for a considerable length of time, if not permanently. 
Amid the worst labor market in a generation, more 
and more adults are going to college. The share of 
individuals aged 18 to 24 enrolled in school hit an 
all-time high in october 2008, and statistics from 
September 2009 indicate that it rose even further in 
the subsequent year, particularly in lower-cost com-
munity colleges.12 
What might be the longer-run impact of the great 
recession on the educational profile of metropolitan 
areas? Trends from the past decade, along with the 
regionally disparate character of the recession, sug-
gest that regional differences in educational attain-
ment could further widen across at least three types 
of metro areas.
first are the highly-educated, mostly coastal 
metropolitan areas that were making rapid gains in 
college degree attainment prior to the downturn. 
Metro areas like Washington, D.c., new york, boston, 
and the San francisco bay area have, in general, 
been less affected by the recession than other metro 
areas. Some of their better performance can be 
attributed to their higher educational levels, which 
research has suggested allow workers to transition 
more easily from declining to growing sectors.13 if, as 
some expect, professional, health, and educational 
services continue to become a more important 
source of u.S. exports, these metro areas are likely 
to grow and attract even more highly educated work-
ers and the firms that employ them.14
Second are Sun belt destinations in florida, the 
intermountain West, and inland california suffering 
a “housing hangover” in the wake of overbuilding 
and speculative lending during the early and middle 
years of the decade. With outsized shares of their 
economies concentrated in housing-related activities 
(e.g., construction and real estate) before the bubble 
burst, they may take some time to find a more stable 
equilibrium. Most face the added obstacle of low 
educational attainment among their adult popula-
tions, which resulted in part from rapid immigration 
(until the recession hit) of less-educated workers 
from Mexico and latin America. fortunately, many of 
these places still have in-demand amenities like mild 
weather that will probably attract more residents 
over the long haul. however, growing their base of 
educated workers will be critical to efforts to move 
these metropolitan economies up the value chain. 
Strategies to promote flexible economic oppor-
tunities for well-educated boomer residents and 
in-migrants, and better educate and retain young 
people who already live in these metropolitan areas—
especially latino minorities—could help improve their 
long-run outlook.
Third are the metropolitan areas of the 
If anything, the 
deep economic 
downturn of 
2009 magnified 
the educational 
challenge for 
the nation and 
its metropolitan 
labor markets. 
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manufacturing belt. in the wake of the great 
recession, employment levels in many of these areas 
may be permanently lower, especially for workers 
who possess no more than a high school education. 
recognizing this, states like Michigan are putting 
considerable resources into post-secondary educa-
tion and training for displaced workers. yet these 
workers and others who are coming of age in the 
great lakes region with high levels of education may 
nevertheless continue to leave to pursue opportuni-
ties elsewhere. younger college-educated adults 
from these metro areas may be attracted to large 
labor markets with diverse job opportunities, not 
just on the coasts but also in Midwestern locations 
like chicago and Minneapolis-St. paul. Mid-career 
workers who have some post-secondary educa-
tion and flexible skills may depart for economically 
healthier climes in Texas and parts of the Southeast. 
Such migration dynamics would probably leave these 
workers better off, but could further disadvantage 
the metro areas left behind—and their large numbers 
of less-educated African American residents—as they 
struggle to adapt to a knowledge-fueled economy. 
in sum, educational inequalities among metro-
politan areas seem likely to grow in the years ahead, 
absent more deliberate public policies to upgrade 
educational achievement and attainment in lagging 
corners of the country, and for the demographic 
groups that live there. n
ENDNOTES
1.  education at a glance 2009: oecD indicators.
2.  William g. bowen, Matthew M. chingos, and Michael S. 
Mcpherson, Crossing the Finish Line: Completing College 
at America’s Public Universities (princeton university 
press, 2009).
3.  The section focuses primarily on four-year college 
degree attainment, the level at which these distinctions 
are most evident.
4.  These regions and others near the top also boast very 
high proportions of adults holding graduate degrees; 
for instance, nearly half of all college graduates in the 
Washington region have such a degree.
5.  See the immigration chapter for further metropolitan-
level analysis of immigrant educational attainment in  
the 2000s.
6.  A simple linear regression of the trend from 1990 to 
2008 suggests that a metropolitan area with a college 
degree attainment rate one standard deviation above 
the mean in 1990 experienced a rise in that rate 2.3 
percentage points higher than a metropolitan area with 
a rate one standard deviation below the mean in 1990.
7.  colorado Springs and Virginia beach rank near the bot-
tom of the list due in part to the presence of major mili-
tary bases, which tend to inflate the number of young 
adults in these areas who lack a college degree, relative 
to the 35 to 44 year-old group.
8.  The latino population in these metropolitan areas is 
also characterized by a smaller share of Mexican-born 
members than in metro areas with a less highly edu-
cated latino population.
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workers with a four-year degree; 5.3 percentage points 
for workers with some college or an associate’s degree; 
5.7 percentage points for workers with only a high 
school diploma; and 7.4 percentage points for workers 
without a high school diploma.
10.  The data do not reflect a significant change in enroll-
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VII. Work
B y  T H E  N U M B E R S
+3.4% / 
-8.3%
Change in wages for high-
wage / low-wage workers, 
United States, 1999 to 2008
5
Metro areas (out of 100) in 
which wages increased for 
low-, middle-, and high-wage 
workers, 1999 to 2008
1.85
Ratio of earnings, workers 
with college degree to  
workers with high school 
diploma only, 100 largest 
metro areas, 2008
2
Metro areas (out of 20) 
experiencing among high-
est jumps in unemployment 
during last two recessions, 
2001-2003 and 2007-2009 
(Detroit and San Jose)
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OVERVIEW
n  Nationwide, wage inequality grew in the 2000s. from 1999 to 2008, the inflation-adjusted earnings of 
high-wage workers grew by 3.4 percent. This occurred while hourly earnings for middle-wage workers fell by 
4.5 percent and the wages of low-wage workers fell by an even greater 8.3 percent. 
n  In half of the 100 largest metropolitan areas, high-wage earners saw their wages grow, while  
middle- and low-wage workers experienced declines. Most large metro areas had wage growth at  
the top and sometimes at the midpoint of their wage distributions, but in only five metropolitan areas—cape  
coral, Jacksonville, providence, new haven, and Virginia beach—did wages grow for high-, middle-, and  
low-wage workers. 
n  Earnings inequality rose more sharply in the 100 largest metro areas than in the nation overall.  
All but three metro areas—Augusta, Syracuse, and Tucson—posted increases in their high- to low-wage 
earnings ratios. by 2008, five states accounted for 17 of the 20 large metro areas with the highest earn-
ings inequality. eleven (11) were located in either california or Texas, and colorado, louisiana, and new york 
contained two each. 
n  Overall metropolitan wage inequality levels are associated with wage outcomes by factors such as race 
and educational attainment. high levels of wage inequality in metro areas like houston, los Angeles, and 
new york accompany relatively large differences there in the earnings of whites versus other groups, and 
college graduates versus those with only a high school diploma. 
n  Unemployment rates skyrocketed between 2007 and 2009 in metropolitan areas most affected by the 
housing bubble and turmoil in the automotive industry. These effects are most obvious in metropolitan 
areas in california and florida, where the effects of the housing crisis have been widespread, and in the 
manufacturing-oriented states of ohio and Michigan. The geography of unemployment growth during this 
recession differed from that following the 2001 recession, primarily due to the extraordinary impact of the 
recent housing market collapse, though both downturns heavily impacted many great lakes metro areas.
NATIONAL TRENDS
The u.S. economy is the largest in the world, pro-
pelled by a vast labor force of some 154 million peo-
ple.1 but the great sums of income that the American 
labor force generates are distributed unevenly 
among these workers, and many millions of individu-
als who want to work are unable to find jobs. This 
chapter focuses on trends in these most basic labor 
market outcomes and the disparate experiences of 
workers across the many distinct metropolitan labor 
markets that together form the American economy.
following the 2001 recession, the united States 
entered a period of impressive productivity gains 
that lasted until the great recession took hold in 
The great sums 
of income that 
the American 
labor force 
generates are 
distributed 
unevenly among 
its workers. 
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2008.2 productivity growth is critical to increas-
ing standards of living because it allows workers to 
produce more without increasing hours.3 however, 
productivity growth alone does not guarantee that 
all, or even most, workers will see their standard of 
living improve. in the late 20th century, the gains 
from increased productivity—measured in terms of 
wages—were not distributed evenly, with high-wage 
workers benefiting more than middle- and low-wage 
workers.4 This chapter examines growth trends in 
hourly wages for full-time, full-year workers from 
1999 through 2008 in metropolitan areas, asking 
who has benefited from the productivity growth of 
the 2000s.5 
At the national level, wages at the top diverged 
from those at the middle and bottom. Middle-wage 
workers saw their inflation-adjusted hourly earnings 
decline by 4.5 percent from 1999 through 2008.6� 
in 2008, they earned $17.80 per hour, down from 
$18.64 in 1999 (all wages are expressed in 2008 dol-
lars). A steeper drop of 8.3 percent was recorded for 
low-wage workers, whose hourly earnings fell from 
$8.70 in 1999 to $7.98 in 2008. The trend was posi-
tive for high-wage workers, however. Their hourly 
earnings rose by 3.4 percent, to just over $40.00 in 
2008. in short, the productivity gains of the 2000s 
did not result in broadly shared wage gains.
This divergence caused earnings inequality to 
increase in the united States in the 2000s. in 1999, 
the high-to-low wage ratio—a broad measure of earn-
ings inequality that captures just how far high wage 
earners have “pulled away” from low wage earners—
stood at 4.5; by 2008, it had risen to 5.0, reversing a 
trend of declining wage inequality in the late 1990s.7 
This inequality in turn is associated with unequal 
wage outcomes in the labor market for workers 
with different characteristics. for example, middle-
wage male workers make 21 percent more than 
middle-wage female workers; white workers make 
29 percent more than black workers and 48 percent 
more than hispanic workers; and the college wage 
premium is especially high—workers with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher make nearly 78 percent more than 
workers with just a high school education.
of course, any discussion about work in America 
in the 2000s cannot overlook the labor market con-
vulsions that occurred at the end of the decade. The 
economy officially entered a recession in December 
2007, when the nation’s unemployment rate stood 
at 4.8 percent. one year later, the rate had risen 
to 7.1 percent, and workers nationwide were clearly 
feeling the recession’s effects. The jobs picture 
worsened greatly in subsequent months, and failed 
to improve noticeably during the second half of 
2009 despite growth in gDp. by December 2009, the 
Figure 1. Wages Declined for Middle-Wage and Low-Wage Workers 
in the 2000s, but Rose for High-Wage Workers
Inflation-Adjusted Hourly Wage by Wage Category, Full-Time,  
year-Round Workers, United States, 1999 and 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
Worker wage categories are defined by position in the wage distribution of all workers in year noted: low-wage 
(10th percentile); middle-wage (50th percentile); and high-wage (90th percentile)
Change in wages from 1999 to 2008 noted in parentheses
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u.S. unemployment rate was 9.7 percent—more than 
double the rate two years prior.
The persistence of high unemployment even after 
economic growth resumes is not a new story; indeed, 
a “jobless recovery” followed the early 2000s reces-
sion. While that recession officially lasted only eight 
months (March 2001 to november 2001), unemploy-
ment continued to rise for more than a year-and-a-
half after the recession ended and it didn’t approach 
pre-recession levels until late in 2006 (the national 
unemployment rate never did return to its March 
2001 rate).8 but the great recession has caused the 
national unemployment rate to soar far beyond its 
levels during the 2001 recession; not since 1983 have 
so many people been out of work. This makes the 
prospect of a jobless recovery all the more troubling 
as the nation moves further into 2010.
how the great recession will ultimately affect 
the distribution of wages in the united States is still 
unclear. We do know, however, that less educated 
workers have been hit particularly hard, at least 
in terms of employment. from December 2007 to 
December 2009, blS data show that the national 
unemployment rate for college graduates rose from 
2.0 to 4.7 percent compared with an increase from 
4.7 to 10.6 for high school graduates only. if extremely 
   5.0% to 10.3%
   0.0% to 5.0%
  -5.0% to 0.0%
-10.3% to -5.0%
Map 1. Middle-Wage Workers in 30 of 100 Large Metro Areas Experienced Wage Increases in the 2000s
Change (%) in Inflation-Adjusted Hourly Wages, Middle-Wage Workers, 1999-2008
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
Note: Middle-wage workers are those earning at the 50th percentile of wage distribution for specified year and metro area
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high unemployment among less educated, lower 
earning workers holds back wage growth for that 
group in the coming months and years, wage inequal-
ity at the national level could increase even further 
in the future. however, it is too soon to tell whether 
the disparity in unemployment between these two 
groups will persist as the economy recovers. 
METROPOLITAN TRENDS
Trends within the Wage Distribution
The 100 largest metropolitan areas together tended 
to follow national wage trends in the 2000s, but 
displayed notable variation among themselves in the 
relative performance of workers in different parts of 
the wage distribution. Across all 100 areas, middle-
wage workers suffered a less severe decline in wages 
(1.5 percent) than the national average (4.5 percent) 
from 1999 to 2008. in either case, these workers 
faced the troubling reality of being worse off near 
the end of the decade than at the start. 
Most, but not all, large metro areas shared in this 
trend. Middle-wage workers in 30 metro areas expe-
rienced a rise in hourly earnings from 1999 to 2008, 
from as little as 0.1 percent in colorado Springs to 
as much as 10.3 percent in cape coral (Map 1). The 
Map 2. Half of Large Metro Areas Saw Wages Rise for High-Wage Workers,  
and Fall for Middle- and Low-Wage Workers
Direction of Inflation-Adjusted Wage Changes by Worker Wage Category, 1999-2008 
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
Note: High-wage workers are those earning at the 90th percentile; middle-wage workers earn at the 50th percentile; low-wage workers earn at the 10th percentile of wage distribution 
for specified year and metro area
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positive trend extended to most large new england 
metro areas, as well as the mid-Atlantic areas of 
baltimore, Washington, richmond, and Virginia 
beach. california, florida, new york, and South 
carolina also had multiple metro areas in which 
middle-wage workers experienced wage growth 
in the 2000s. by the same token, 70 metropolitan 
areas saw wages for middle-wage workers decline 
over the decade. The declines were largest (greater 
than 5 percent) in a number of great lakes metro 
areas (e.g., Detroit, grand rapids, Toledo, rochester), 
as well as in utah and california metro areas where 
the mid-decade construction boom had fallen off 
rapidly by 2008.
compared to the national trend, wages at the top 
and bottom of the distribution in the nation’s 100 
largest metro areas diverged even more strongly in 
the 2000s. in these metro areas, high-wage work-
ers experienced wage growth of 4.3 percent from 
1999 to 2008 (versus 3.4 percent nationally), while 
at the same time low-wage workers’ hourly earnings 
declined by a full 10.0 percent (versus 8.3 percent 
nationally).
exactly half of the nation’s 100 largest metro areas fol-
lowed the national pattern at all three points in the wage 
distribution: growth for high-wage workers, and declines 
for middle- and low-wage workers (Map 2). Those metro 
areas could be found in nearly every region of the coun-
try, with the exception of new england. growth was more 
widely shared in another group of 23 metro areas where 
both high- and middle-wage workers saw increases. but 
in only five east coast metropolitan areas (cape coral, 
Jacksonville, new haven, providence, and Virginia beach) 
did workers at all three points of the wage distribution 
experience growth. More common was a pattern in 18 
metro areas, extending from the great lakes to portions 
of the Southeast and intermountain West, in which wages 
declined across the board during the 2000s.
 
Earnings Inequality Trends
While wages are somewhat higher in the 100 largest met-
ropolitan areas than in the nation as a whole at the low, 
Table 1. Only Three Metro Areas Saw a Decline in Wage Inequality in the 2000s; Increases Were Rapid in Others
Metro Areas Ranked by Change in Ratio of Wages for High-Wage Versus Low-Wage Workers, 1999-2008
Declines/Smallest Increases    Greatest Increases    
Metro Area 1999 2008 Change Metro Area 1999 2008 Change
Tucson, AZ 4.53	 4.43	 -0.10 greenville, Sc 3.89	 4.81	 0.93
Augusta-richmond county, gA-Sc 4.68	 4.62	 -0.06 knoxville, Tn 4.07	 5.00	 0.93
Syracuse, ny 3.93	 3.91	 -0.02	 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV 4.55	 5.50	 0.95
providence, ri-MA 3.96	 4.00	 0.04 charlotte, nc-Sc 4.20	 5.16	 0.96
youngstown, oh-pA 3.95	 4.06	 0.11 Austin, Tx 4.51	 5.48	 0.96
cape coral, fl 3.79	 3.91	 0.12 Jackson, MS 4.21	 5.17	 0.96
harrisburg, pA 3.70	 3.84	 0.14 Minneapolis-St. paul, Mn-Wi 3.58	 4.55	 0.97
greensboro-high point, nc 3.81	 3.97	 0.15 el paso, Tx 4.26	 5.25	 0.99
Albany, ny 3.94	 4.10	 0.16	 Denver-Aurora, co 4.16	 5.29	 1.14
Sacramento-roseville, cA 4.24	 4.40	 0.16 bridgeport-Stamford, cT 5.93	 7.20	 1.27
 
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data      
Note: High-wage workers are those earning at 90th percentile, and low-wage workers at 10th percentile, of wage distribution for specified year and metro area 
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middle, and high ranges of the distribution, the dif-
ference is greater at the high end. high-wage work-
ers in the 100 largest metro areas earned $44.00 
hourly in 2008, versus a national rate of $40.00 
hourly; large-metro low-wage workers earned only 
$0.40 more hourly than the national average ($8.40 
versus $8.00). As a result, wage inequality across 
large metro areas exceeds the national average, with 
a high-to-low wage ratio of 5.25. 
That ratio varied considerably across metropoli-
tan labor markets in 2008, from 3.7 in Springfield 
(MA) to 7.2 in bridgeport (Map 3). california and 
Texas had 11 of the 20 metro areas with the high-
est wage inequality, and colorado, louisiana, and 
new york each added two metropolitan areas to this 
group. Wage inequality was high in some high-wage 
metro areas such as new york, San francisco, and 
Washington, as well as in some relatively low-wage 
metro areas such as el paso, new orleans, and 
bakersfield. Size also related to wage inequality, 
with new york, houston, los Angeles, San francisco, 
Washington, Miami, and Dallas all ranking among 
the metro areas with the highest levels of wage 
inequality.
Metro areas with low levels of wage inequality, 
on the other hand, tended to cluster in the Midwest, 
northeast, and florida. las Vegas was the only met-
ropolitan area in the western united States to rank 
Map 3. California and Texas Have a Large Number of Metro Areas with High Levels of Wage Inequality
Ratio of Wages for High-Wage Workers to Wages for Low-Wage Workers, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
Note: High-wage workers are those earning at the 90th percentile, and low-wage workers earn at the 10th percentile, of wage distribution for specified year and metro area
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Table 2. Metropolitan Wage Inequality Reflects Underlying Wage Differences  
by Race/Ethnicity and Education
Metro Areas Ranked by Ratio of Wages for High-Wage versus Low-Wage Workers, 
and Wage Differences by Gender, Race/Ethnicity, and Educational Attainment
Highest overall Wage Inequality   
Metro Area High-Wage/Low-Wage Male/Female White/Non-White Bachelor's/HS Only
bridgeport-Stamford, cT 7.20	 1.22	 1.70	 2.05
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa clara, cA 6.31	 1.26	 1.44	 2.27
los Angeles-long beach-Santa Ana, cA 6.13	 1.11	 1.77	 2.00
houston, Tx 6.13	 1.21	 1.67	 1.93
oxnard-Thousand oaks-Ventura, cA 5.95	 1.18	 1.74	 2.05
new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA 5.87	 1.13	 1.60	 1.83
San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA 5.77	 1.13	 1.59	 2.06
San Diego, cA 5.77	 1.08	 1.41	 2.00
bakersfield, cA 5.60	 1.16	 1.54	 1.90
baton rouge, lA 5.54	 1.33	 1.52	 1.56
    
lowest overall Wage Inequality    
Metro Area High-Wage/Low-Wage Male/Female White/Non-White Bachelor's/HS Only
youngstown, oh-pA 4.06	 1.34	 1.16	 1.65
louisville/Jefferson county, ky-in 4.05	 1.16	 1.29	 1.67
providence, ri-MA 4.00	 1.22	 1.37	 1.63
greensboro-high point, nc 3.97	 1.21	 1.41	 1.79
cape coral, fl 3.91	 1.20	 1.35	 1.38
Syracuse, ny 3.91	 1.17	 1.42	 1.56
harrisburg, pA 3.84	 1.12	 1.31	 1.70
portland, Me 3.79	 1.22	 1.13	 1.64
Madison, Wi 3.75	 1.21	 1.38	 1.57
Springfield, MA 3.72	 1.11	 1.33	 1.47
 
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data   
Note: High-wage workers are those earning at 90th percentile, and low-wage workers at 10th percentile, of wage distribution for specified year and metro area
among those with the lowest levels of wage inequal-
ity, likely due to its high rates of union membership. 
consistent with the national trend, fully 97 of 
100 large metro areas experienced a rise in wage 
inequality in the 2000s. only three regions—Tucson, 
Augusta, and Syracuse—actually posted a decline in 
their high-to-low wage ratios (Table 1). however, in 
each of these metro areas, the decline resulted from 
a faster drop in wages for high-wage workers than 
for low-wage workers, rather than a real improve-
ment in wages at the bottom end. 
At the other extreme lay metro areas that experi-
enced large jumps in wage inequality. bridgeport and 
Denver exemplify two different patterns underlying 
the trend. hourly earnings for high-wage workers in 
bridgeport grew at a brisk 15.6 percent pace from 
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1999 to 2008 (highest among the 100 largest metro 
areas), while those for low-wage workers declined 
modestly by 4.8 percent. by contrast, wages for 
Denver’s highest earners grew at a relatively anemic 
2.8 percent rate, even as wages at the low end plum-
meted 19.3 percent (the second-largest decline). As 
shown above, this pattern of growth at the high end 
and decline at the low end led to increases in wage 
inequality in 73 of the 100 largest metro areas during 
the 2000s. 
Demographic Dimensions of Wage  
Inequality
At the national level, wages differ among groups of 
workers by gender, race and ethnicity, and educa-
tional attainment. places that are more diverse along 
the dimension of race and ethnicity, and where wage 
outcomes differ more widely by race and educational 
attainment, exhibit higher overall levels of overall 
wage inequality. 
generally speaking, metro areas with larger 
minority populations tend to have higher overall 
wage inequality and more unequal outcomes by 
race. Six california metro areas with relatively large 
hispanic populations, along with the highly diverse 
metro areas of houston and new york, rank among 
the 10 metro areas with the highest levels of overall 
wage inequality. All exhibit above-average differ-
ences in wages between whites and non-whites, or 
between workers with college degrees and those 
with only a high school diploma, or both.9 Metro 
areas with smaller minority populations, includ-
ing mid-sized manufacturing centers (youngstown, 
greensboro, Springfield) and those with state 
capitals (harrisburg, portland (Me), Madison) exhibit 
lower overall wage inequality, in part because of 
their smaller wage differences by race/ethnicity and 
educational attainment. notably, wage inequality 
by gender appears to be somewhat higher in these 
places than in metro areas with high overall wage 
inequality.
Trends in the 2000s exacerbated these demo-
graphic wage differentials. Across the 100 largest 
metro areas, the college/high school wage premium 
grew from 1.73 to 1.85, the result of flat wages for 
college-educated workers and falling wages for work-
ers with a high school diploma only. Similarly, overall 
wage gaps by race continued to widen from 1999 
through 2008 with the white/black wage differential 
growing from 1.29 to 1.34 and the white/hispanic dif-
ferential increasing from 1.53 to 1.60.
Unemployment
Wage trends provide one view of the disparate out-
comes experienced by workers in metropolitan areas 
in the 2000s. As the economy has struggled under 
the weight of the great recession, these divergent 
outcomes have become even more apparent in met-
ropolitan unemployment rates. 
According to data from the bureau of labor 
Statistics, in December 2009, unemployment rates 
varied considerably across the nation’s 100 largest 
metropolitan areas, from 5.0 percent in the omaha 
area to 17.5 percent in the Modesto area (Map 4). 
The geographic pattern reveals two of the major 
storylines of the great recession—the collapse of the 
housing market and the woes of auto and auto parts 
manufacturing. Seven of the 10 metro areas with the 
highest unemployment rates (12.8 percent or higher) 
were located in “housing bubble” areas of california 
and florida, joined by similarly hard-hit las 
Vegas. The auto-dependent regions of Detroit and 
youngstown areas rounded out the 10 most heavily 
affected metro areas. conversely, the 10 metro areas 
with the lowest unemployment rates (6.6 percent 
or less) lay mostly in the nation’s mid-section, and 
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portions of the intermountain West. each of the 100 
largest metro areas experienced an increase in its 
unemployment rate between December 2007 and 
December 2009. however, those increases ranged 
from under 2 percentage points in omaha to nearly 
8 percentage points in lakeland, Stockton, and  
cape coral. 
The 2000s were bookended by two recessions 
that, beyond obvious differences in their magnitudes, 
also affected America’s metropolitan landscape quite 
differently. of the 20 metropolitan areas experienc-
ing the largest increases in unemployment in the 
two years following the start of the great recession, 
only two—Detroit and San Jose—ranked among the 
hardest-hit 20 in the two years after the start of the 
2001 recession (Map 5). During that period, most 
large florida metro areas, and california metro areas 
outside the bay Area, experienced small- to medium-
sized upticks in unemployment. in another con-
trast, most metro areas in the nation’s mid-section, 
extending into the colorado and utah portions of 
the intermountain West, experienced above-average 
jumps in unemployment during and after the 2001 
recession, compared with below-average increases 
this time around. finally, in addition to large differ-
ences across metropolitan areas, trends in unem-
ployment within metro areas appear to differ from 
the early 2000s recession, as suburbs are tracking 
cities more closely than before.10
Some patterns, however, held in each recession. 
Map 4. Metro Areas Most Affected by Crises in the Housing and Manufacturing Sectors 
Have the Highest Unemployment Rates
Unemployment Rate, December 2009
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Map 5. The Two Recessions of the 2000s Drove Large Unemployment Increases in Different Sets  
of Metropolitan Areas
Change in Unemployment Rate 24 Months from Start of Two Most Recent Recessions— 
March 2001 to March 2003 and December 2007 to December 2009
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Several metro areas in the great lakes states of 
Michigan and ohio suffered large increases in unem-
ployment during both downturns, likely a reflection 
of decreased demand for cars and many of the other 
durable goods produced in those regions. A number 
of metro areas (such as Albany, Des Moines, Jackson 
(MS), honolulu, omaha, and Washington, D.c.) also 
experienced more stable unemployment rates during 
both periods.
Data from 2008 for metropolitan areas reflect the 
unemployment rate disparities by educational attain-
ment evident at the national level in more recent 
data. for the 100 largest metro areas combined, the 
unemployment rate in 2008 was 6.6 percent for indi-
viduals with only a high school diploma, versus 2.8 
percent for individuals with a bachelor’s degree.11 in 
every one of the 100 largest metro areas, the 2008 
unemployment rate was higher for those with only a 
high school diploma than for college degree hold-
ers. in Detroit and fresno, the gap was more than 
8.0 percentage points, while in Salt lake city, Tulsa, 
honolulu, harrisburg, and provo, it was less than 
2.0 percentage points. both fresno and Detroit have 
experienced large overall increases in unemploy-
ment during the great recession, suggesting that if 
national trends hold in these regions, unemployment 
rates among those with only a high school educa-
tion might very well be closer to 19 and 21 percent, 
respectively.12
LOOKING AHEAD 
The unemployment and wage inequality findings 
reported in this chapter raise profound questions 
about the future of economic opportunity in America 
at the regional level.  for most of the last century, 
the auto-producing metropolitan areas of the central 
great lakes region, with their combination of high 
overall wages and low wage inequality, exemplified 
broadly shared prosperity in a way that most other 
parts of the country did not.  As such, they showed 
what the u.S. economy, at its best, could deliver for 
working people.  The great recession decimated 
the economies of those metropolitan areas.  Will 
those economies recover anytime soon?  if so, will 
they recover in a way that restores broadly-shared 
prosperity?
it is not clear whether other metropolitan areas 
will take the place of the auto-producing areas as 
exemplars of such growth.  The housing-bubble 
metropolitan areas of florida, nevada, and much of 
california, which also suffered from very high unem-
ployment during the recession, mostly had much 
larger wage gaps between high- and low-wage work-
ers.  Absent major changes in the structure of their 
economies, they do not seem likely to inherit the 
mantle of broadly-shared prosperity even when their 
economies eventually recover.  The large coastal 
metropolitan areas, though generally hit less hard 
during the recession than either the auto-producing 
or housing-bubble areas, also had very large wage 
gaps.  So did the regional economies of Texas,  
where the great recession’s impact was more  
modest than elsewhere.
Two groups of metropolitan areas both suffered 
relatively little during the recession and had rela-
tively small gaps between high- and low-wage earn-
ers before the recession: (1) the broad swaths of the 
South and great plains that did not have a housing 
bubble and (2) the eastern great lakes metropolitan 
areas of western pennsylvania and new york that do 
not depend heavily on the auto industry.  either of 
these groups of metropolitan areas could point the 
way toward new forms of inclusive economic growth, 
but in each case there are obstacles that stand in the 
The unemploy-
ment and wage 
inequality find-
ings reported 
in this chapter 
raise profound 
questions about 
the future of 
economic oppor-
tunity in America 
at the regional 
level. 
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way of that outcome.  
for decades before the great recession, the 
growth of the non-housing-dependent South and 
great plains was based largely on low wages and a 
low cost of living.  As these regions grew, however, 
their wages and living costs rose relative to those 
in the northeast, West coast, and great lakes, 
potentially threatening their continued ability to 
attract employers from other parts of the nation and 
abroad.  Moreover, with few exceptions the states 
and metropolitan areas of the South and great 
plains lack public policies that would raise produc-
tivity to support high-wage job growth. The eastern 
great lakes metropolitan areas, despite suffering 
relatively small increases in unemployment during 
the recession, must still overcome the effects of 
decades of long-term manufacturing job loss.  Their 
regional economies, now based in large part on 
higher education, health care, and highly specialized 
manufacturing, are much smaller than they were just 
a few decades ago.  They may offer a regional model 
for shared economic growth, but perhaps on only a 
relatively small scale.
broadly shared prosperity is important at the 
metropolitan level, not just the national level.  Most 
people experience the economy where they live and 
work.  Almost no one lives or works throughout the 
nation; the vast majority live and work in economi-
cally distinct metropolitan areas.  if no metropolitan 
areas provide a model of what a more inclusive 
form of economic opportunity can look like in the 
21st century, then it will be increasingly difficult for 
Americans to imagine that such a future is  
possible. n
ENDNOTES
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cases puMAs extend beyond the boundaries of metro 
areas—resulting in overbounding error—and in other 
cases puMAs do not extend far enough—resulting in 
underbounding error. According to 2000 population 
data, in eight metro areas the sum of individuals errone-
ously assigned (or not assigned) to a metropolitan area 
due to overbounding error (or underbounding error) 
equals between 10 and 20 percent of the actual metro 
area population; in three metro areas (Des Moines, 
grand rapids, and greenville), this amounted to approxi-
mately 22 percent of the actual metro area population. 
Due to population growth since 2000, errors may be 
more substantial for 2008 data; available data do not 
allow us to precisely measure error as of 2008, though 
our analysis reveals that it is likely Des Moines repre-
sents the extreme in 2008 with an underbounding error 
around 30 percent.
6.  To represent low-, medium-, and high-wage workers, we 
use the 10th, 50th, and 90th hourly wage percentiles. A 
wage at a given percentile describes the share of work-
ers earning more or less than that wage. for example, 
if the 10th percentile hourly wage is $8/hour, it implies 
that 10 percent of workers made less than that amount 
and 90 percent made more. All calculations of wage 
change have been carried out using inflation-adjusted 
data. 
7.  Mishel, bernstein, and Shierholz, The State of Working 
America. note that this trend is based on a more broad 
group of workers than the full-time, full-year working 
population covered in this chapter. 
8.  Analysis uses seasonally adjusted data.
9.  however, in three metro areas where 50 percent or 
more of the population was a race other than non- 
hispanic white (honolulu, Stockton, and Modesto),  
the wage ratio of white to non-white workers was rela-
tively low.
10  elizabeth kneebone and emily garr, “The landscape 
of recession: unemployment and Safety net Services 
Across urban and Suburban America” (Washington: 
brookings institution, 2010).
11.  based on data from the 2008 American community 
Survey. 
12.  These figures are meant to approximate 2009 annual 
unemployment rates. They were calculated by apply-
ing 2008–2009 growth rates for the labor force and 
unemployed population (according to national-level blS 
data) to the metro-level American community Survey 
data for each metro area and education group. note that 
data from the 2008 AcS is published for the population 
age 25 to 64 while blS data by educational attainment 
cover the population age 25 and older.
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VIII. incoMe & poVerTy
B y  T H E  N U M B E R S
-$2,241
Change in real median 
household income, United 
States, 1999 to 2008
+8.2% / 
-17.1%
Change in real median 
household income,  
Worcester / Detroit metro 
areas, 1999 to 2008
53%
Share of poor individuals 
living in suburbs, 100 largest 
metro areas, 2008
+2.2
Projected percentage-point 
change in poverty rate, 100 
largest metro areas, 2008 
to 2009
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OVERVIEW
n  The middle class shrank over the course of the decade as income for the typical U.S. household 
declined. in 2008, u.S. median household income was $52,029—a real decline of $2,241 since 1999. over the 
same period, the share of households earning “middle class” incomes fell by 1.8 percentage points. in 2008, 
racial income disparities persisted, with the typical black household lagging u.S. median income and the 
typical Asian household exceeding it by nearly the same margin ($17,000 and $18,000, respectively). 
n  Even as incomes fell for the typical metropolitan household, large disparities persisted across and 
within metro areas. between 1999 and 2008, metro areas in every census region saw median incomes 
decline. Midwestern metro areas—led by regions like Detroit, grand rapids, and youngstown—experienced the 
greatest decline in median income (8.2 percent). Meanwhile, the difference in median income between the 
10th-ranked and 90th-ranked metro area rose from $19,500 to $22,000.
n  Suburbs are home to the fastest growing and largest poor population in the country. between 1999 and 
2008, the suburban poor population grew by 25 percent—almost five times the growth rate of the primary 
city poor—so that by 2008 suburbs were home to almost one-third of the country’s poor population, and 
1.5 million more poor than primary cities. While city and suburban poor residents generally resemble one 
another, slightly more of the suburban poor are high-school graduates, married, and white; blacks and 
latinos make up a disproportionate share of the poor in both cities and suburbs.
n  Income declined and poverty increased in the first year of the Great Recession, particularly in Sun 
Belt metro areas. Metro areas in california and florida saw some of the greatest declines in median house-
hold income, along with the largest increases in city and suburban poverty between 2007 and 2008, likely 
reflecting the early timing and impact of the housing market collapse. based on unemployment increases 
over the past year, Sun belt metro areas like cape coral, Modesto, and Stockton, and manufacturing metro 
areas like Detroit and youngstown may see their poverty rates rise by at least 3 percentage points in 2009. 
NATIONAL TRENDS
The great recession has brought about falling 
incomes and increased economic hardship across 
the country. but income growth for the typical 
American household had stalled even before its 
onset (figure 1). by 2007, median household income 
in the united States had fallen by almost $1,600 
since the start of the decade. it fell further in 2008 
to $52,029, a real decrease of 4.1 percent, or $2,241, 
from its level in 1999.
As income in the typical household fell, the  
relative size of the middle class declined. between 
1999 and 2008, the share of middle-income  
households (i.e., between 80 and 150 percent of 
median income) dropped to 28.2 percent, while the 
share of households at both the upper and lower 
ends of the income spectrum increased (figure 2).1 in 
2008, lower-income households continued to make 
Income growth 
for the typical 
American house-
hold had stalled 
even before the 
onset of the 
Great Recession. 
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up the largest share of American households  
(40.5 percent).
The country also saw significant increases over 
the 2000s in the number of individuals living below 
the poverty line, which was $21,834 for a family of 
four in 2008. from 1999 to 2008, the poor popula-
tion in the united States grew by 5.2 million people, 
or 15.4 percent—almost twice the growth rate of the 
population as a whole. by 2008, more than 39.1 mil-
lion individuals lived in poverty, or 13.2 percent of the 
nation’s population. That represented a significant 
increase over 1999 (12.4 percent) and put the rate on 
par with that in 1990 (13.1 percent).
Amid a decade of economic stagnation or decline 
for most American households, large economic 
disparities among different racial and ethnic groups 
persisted. nationally, the median income for African 
American households ($35,425) was almost $17,000 
Figure 2. The Share of Middle Class Households Declined in the 2000s
Share of U.S. Households by Income Category, 1999 and 2008
Figure 1. Median Household Income in the United States Declined Over 
the Course of the Decade
U.S. Median Household Income, 1999, 2007, and 2008 ($2008)
Figure 3. Minority Householders are Over- 
Represented Among Low-Income Households
Share of U.S. Households by Race and 
Income Category, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data Source: Brookings analysis of internal 2008 American Community Survey data
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below the median for all households in 2008, while 
the gap for the typical latino household ($41,470) 
was $11,000. in contrast, white households had a 
median income of $56,826—almost $5,000 above 
the median for all households—and the typical 
income for an Asian household ($70,069) exceeded 
the overall median by $18,000. At the same time, 
black and latino households made up a dispropor-
tionate share of low-income households and were 
under-represented among middle- and upper-income 
households (figure 3). 
METROPOLITAN, CITy, AND  
SUBURBAN TRENDS
Median Household Income
Taken together, the country’s largest metro areas 
saw income in the typical household fall more than 
$2,100, or 3.5 percent, between 1999 and 2008 
(Table 1). by far the most marked decreases occurred 
in Midwestern metro areas, which experienced a 
drop of over 8 percent—more than $5,000—in their 
median household income. Driving this regional 
trend were metro areas like Detroit, grand rapids, 
Toledo, and youngstown (Table 2). each of these 
metro areas saw their median incomes decline by 10 
percent or more, likely reflecting the economic toll of 
job losses in the region’s auto manufacturing sector 
during the 2000s.
Southern metro areas, however, have the low-
est median household income among all regions 
($54,724), while northeastern metro areas have the 
highest ($61,598). Among other factors, the consid-
erable income gap between these two regions likely 
reflects differences in costs of living and average 
wage levels. That gap widened in the 2000s, as 
incomes fell more steeply in Southern metro areas 
than in the northeast.
The income gap across individual metro areas 
also widened over the decade, increasing the “dis-
tance” between metro areas at the top and bot-
tom of the list for median household income. for 
Table 1. As Metropolitan Median Incomes Fell Overall, the Gap Between City and Suburban Incomes Narrowed Slightly
Change in Median Income by Primary Cities and Suburbs and Region, 95 Metro Areas*, 1999 to 2008
    
 1999 2008 % Change, 1999 to 2008 
Region Metro Total Primary Cities Suburbs Metro Total Primary Cities Suburbs Metro Total Primary Cities Suburbs
Midwest	 	61,181		 46,604	 68,524	 	56,135		 41,593	 	62,303		 -8.2%	 -10.8%	 -9.1%
northeast 	61,839		 45,833	 69,863	 	61,598		 46,229	 	68,875		 -0.4%	 0.9%	 -1.4%
South 	56,823		 48,009	 62,054	 	54,724		 45,398	 	59,497		 -3.7%	 -5.4%	 -4.1%
West 	62,126		 55,373	 66,797	 	61,143		 54,441	 	65,436		 -1.6%	 -1.7%	 -2.0%
  
95 Metro Area Total 	60,080		 49,317	 66,345	 	57,970		 47,317	 	63,525		 -3.5%	 -4.1%	 -4.3%
All income figures are reported in 2008 dollars      
All changes significant at the 90 percent confidence level      
*Primary city and suburb data are reported for 95 of the largest 100 metropolitan areas for which data are available      
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data     
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instance, the difference between median household 
income in the 10th ranked metro area and the 90th 
ranked metro area increased from roughly $19,500 
in 1999 to $22,000 in 2008.2
Wide disparities in income also exist within metro 
areas, though the income gap between city and sub-
urban households varies by region (Table 1). in 2008, 
the median income in large metropolitan suburbs 
was $63,525—roughly $16,000 more than median 
income in primary cities ($47,317). This disparity, 
however, is somewhat less stark in Southern metro 
areas, and even more muted in the West. in contrast, 
median incomes in northeastern and Midwestern 
suburbs outstripped those in their primary cities by 
over $20,000. The gap reached almost $30,000 in 
metro areas like Milwaukee, cleveland, and Detroit, 
and as much as $40,000 in bridgeport and hartford. 
in part, the magnitude of these disparities reflects 
long-standing racial and ethnic divisions between 
cities and suburbs in these regions.
While these differences are striking, between 
1999 and 2008 the gap between suburban and city 
median incomes did narrow slightly—overall and 
in three of the four regions—reversing the widen-
ing seen during the 1990s. With the exception of 
northeastern metro areas, this narrowing has not 
occurred because of gains in primary cities, but 
because of declining median incomes in the suburbs. 
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Income
Similar to national figures, black and latino house-
holds in the 100 largest metro areas lagged behind 
the median income for all households in 2008, 
while white and Asian households exceeded it. The 
bridgeport metro area showed the greatest level of 
income inequality across races in 2008; the median 
income for black households there was $42,000 less 
than the median for all households, while the gap 
was more than $37,000 for latino households. in 
general, metro areas in the northeast and Midwest, 
Table 2. Changes in Median Household Income Varied Widely Across Metro Areas
Metro Areas Ranked by Percent Change in Median Household Income, 1999 to 2008
    
 largest Increases largest Declines   
 Rank Metro Area Change, 1999-2008 (%) Rank Metro Area Change, 1999-2008 (%) 
	 1 Worcester, MA 8.2	 81 Akron, oh -10.1
 2 new orleans, lA 5.9	 82 little rock, Ar -10.2
	 3 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV 5.1	 83 cleveland, oh -10.8
 4 San Diego, cA 4.7	 84 greenville, Sc -11.2
	 5	 honolulu, hi 4.6	 85 Dayton, oh -11.2
 6 Virginia beach-norfolk-newport news, VA-nc 3.9	 86 youngstown, oh-pA -13.6
	 7 Stockton, cA 3.5	 87 greensboro-high point, nc -13.9
 8 poughkeepsie, ny 3.5	 88 Toledo, oh -14.3
	 9 Albany, ny 3.1	 89 grand rapids, Mi -14.6
	 10 riverside-San bernardino-ontario, cA 2.9	 90 Detroit-Warren, Mi -17.1
Changes were statistically insignificant at the 90 percent confidence level in 10 metro areas, thus 90 metro areas are ranked
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
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and along the coasts, exhibited considerably larger 
racial and ethnic income disparities than metro areas 
in the South and interior West. Disparities between 
black households and all households topped $30,000 
in Minneapolis-St. paul, San francisco, Des Moines, 
Madison, and San Jose. Metro areas where latino 
households faced income gaps of that magnitude 
included boston, hartford, and Worcester. in con-
trast, metro areas like Albuquerque, greensboro, las 
Vegas, and oklahoma city all exhibited below-aver-
age racial and ethnic income disparities. 
Size and Characteristics of the  
Middle Class
in addition to declining median incomes, this decade 
has also seen the metropolitan middle class lose 
ground. of the top 100 metro areas, 52 experienced 
a significant change in the size of their middle class. 
fully 42 of these metro areas saw the share of 
their households with middle incomes decline, with 
10—including ogden, Wichita, Virginia beach, and 
Madison—experiencing a drop of at least 5 percent-
age points. for the metro areas that saw an increase 
in their middle-income household share—including 
knoxville, new york, and McAllen—that growth 
coincided with a drop in the share of upper-income 
households, rather than a relative decline in lower-
income households.
Suburbs accounted for a majority of this middle-
class decline in metropolitan areas in the 2000s. 
led by metro areas like Denver, Minneapolis-St. paul, 
chicago, and Dallas, suburbs saw their middle-class 
share of households drop by 1.8 percentage points 
between 1999 and 2008, compared to a decline of 
1.5 percentage points in primary cities. however, 
suburbs experienced somewhat greater growth than 
primary cities in their upper-income household share 
(1.2 percentage points versus 0.9 percentage points) 
and, in turn, less growth in their lower-income house-
hold share. even with these changes, the middle 
class makes up a larger share of households in sub-
urbs than in primary cities (30.2 percent versus  
26.5 percent), though they are increasingly rare in 
both types of places.
interesting differences emerge between the 
characteristics of middle-income households in cities 
and suburbs (Table 3). White households make up 
nearly three-fourths of the suburban middle class, 
while black and latino households account for a 
greater share of the middle class in primary cit-
ies. Middle-class households in primary cities are 
Table 3. Middle-Class Households in Cities Are More Diverse 
and More Highly Educated than Those in Suburbs
Characteristics of City and Suburban Middle-Class Householders,  
100 Metro Areas, 2008
    
Householder Characteristic Primary Cities Suburbs
Race/Ethnicity (%)  
White 55.3	 73.6
black 18.3	 9.0
latino 17.7	 11.2
other 8.7	 6.1
  
Gender (%)  
Male 55.0	 58.7
female 45.0	 41.3
  
Educational Attainment (%)  
no diploma 10.2	 7.8
high school only 20.3	 24.9
Some college 23.0	 24.9
Associates degree 8.1	 9.3
bachelor's degree 23.9	 21.5
graduate degree 14.5	 11.5
Source: Brookings analysis of internal 2008 American Community Survey data 
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somewhat more likely to be headed by a female than 
such households in suburbs. And while middle-class 
householders in cities are slightly more likely to have 
not completed high school, they also have higher 
shares of bachelor’s and advanced degree holders 
than their suburban counterparts.
Poverty Trends
As metropolitan incomes declined and the middle 
class shrank, the country’s 100 largest metro areas 
also saw their collective poverty rate increase 
significantly between 1999 and 2008, from 11.6 
percent to 12.2 percent. however, these increases 
were not shared evenly across all 100 metro areas 
(Map 1). As with the steepest declines in income, 
many of the greatest increases in poverty were 
concentrated in Midwestern metro areas like grand 
rapids and youngstown, and Southern metro areas 
like greenville, greensboro, and little rock. in con-
trast, some regions showed significant decreases in 
poverty between 1999 and 2008, like los Angeles, 
Modesto, and riverside, though as the recession 
deepened and spread in 2009, this progress likely 
stalled and probably reversed.
These poverty trends across metropolitan 
areas occurred amid an important shift in poverty 
within metro areas. in 1999, 400,000 more people 
below the poverty line lived in primary cities of the 
country’s largest metro areas than in their suburbs. 
between 1999 and 2008, however, the number of 
Map 1. Most of the Largest Increases in Metropolitan Poverty Occurred in Midwestern Metro Areas
Change in Poverty Rates, 100 Metro Areas, 1999 to 2008
All estimates of change are significant at the 90 pcerent level
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and American Community Survey 2008 data
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suburban poor increased by 25 percent—10 points 
above the national average and almost five times 
the growth in primary city poor (figure 4). overall, 
suburbs gained more than 2.5 million poor individu-
als, and by 2008 they were home to almost one-third 
of the country’s poor population. between 1999 and 
2008, the balance of metropolitan poverty had effec-
tively “tipped” so that by 2008 suburbs were home 
to 1.5 million more poor than their primary cities. 
Metro areas including cleveland, baltimore, Detroit, 
rochester, Minneapolis-St. paul, Jackson, and San 
Diego exemplify the shift in poverty from majority 
urban to majority suburban, as they saw the share of 
poor living in the suburbs pass the 50 percent mark 
this decade.
As the suburban poor population grew, the gap 
between city and suburban poverty rates narrowed 
slightly. Suburbs saw a greater increase in their 
poverty rate than cities from 1999 to 2008—0.9 per-
centage points versus 0.3. Despite this narrowing, by 
2008 primary-city residents were still almost twice 
as likely as suburban residents to live in poverty (18.2 
percent versus 9.5 percent, respectively). 
Characteristics of the City and  
Suburban Poor
by and large, poor residents of cities and suburbs 
resemble one another on key social and demo-
graphic characteristics (Table 4). city residents are 
just slightly more likely to live in “deep” poverty, with 
incomes less than half of the poverty line (44 versus 
42 percent), whereas a somewhat higher share of 
suburban residents have incomes just below the pov-
erty line (32 versus 30 percent). comparable shares 
obtained a college degree, though the city poor are 
less likely to have completed high school (38 versus 
32 percent). And immigrants make up only a slightly 
larger share of the city poor than the suburban poor 
Figure 4. The Number of Poor, and the Poverty 
Rate, Increased Significantly Over the Decade in 
Metro Areas, Cities, and Suburbs
Individuals in Poverty by Location, 1999 and 2008
Poverty Rates, 1999 and 2008
*Includes 95 of the largest 100 metropolitan areas for which data are available
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and internal 2008 American  
Community Survey data
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(22 percent versus 19 percent). larger differences 
arise when it comes to family structure: Married-
couple families make up more than 20 percent of 
poor suburban households, compared to less than  
16 percent of poor city households. And though more 
poor now live in the suburbs, food stamp receipt in 
cities continues to outpace suburban uptake; only  
32 percent of poor suburban households received 
food stamps in 2008, compared to 39 percent of 
poor city households. 
by far the greatest differences between the city 
and suburban poor are found in their racial and eth-
nic makeup. in primary cities, 25 percent of the poor 
population was white in 2008 versus 46 percent in 
the suburbs, while 32 percent of poor city residents 
were black, compared to 17 percent in the suburbs. 
Some of the differences in the makeup of the city 
and suburban poor can be explained by differences 
in the racial and ethnic composition of their total 
populations. however, even accounting for these 
differences, African Americans and latinos make up 
a disproportionate share of the poor in both cities 
and suburbs. only in outer suburbs and exurbs do 
whites account for a majority of the poor, and, even 
there, minorities make up a disproportionate share 
of the poor (figure 5). in both cities and low-density 
exurban communities, African Americans account 
for an outsized share of the poor, whereas in older 
and denser suburbs, the poor are disproportionately 
hispanic. 
LOOKING AHEAD:  
INCOME, POVERTy, AND  
THE GREAT RECESSION
Whether in large cities, suburbs, or the nation as a 
whole, income and poverty trends are inextricably 
Table 4. Poor Residents of Cities and Suburbs Have Many 
Similar Characteristics
Characteristics of the Poor in Cities and Suburbs,  
Large Metro Areas, 2008
    
 Primary Cities Suburbs
Share of individuals in poverty	 18.2	 9.5
Share of households in poverty 16.6	 9.0
Share of poor individuals:  
With incomes:  
below 50% of the poverty threshold  44.0	 42.3
50 to 74% of of the poverty threshold  26.2	 25.4
75% to 99% of the poverty threshold  29.8	 32.4
Between 16 and 64 who:  
Work full-time, year-round 11.4	 12.0
Work part-time or part-year 36.6	 38.8
Did not work 52.0	 49.2
25 and over who have completed*:  
less than high school 38.1	 31.8
high school only 28.7	 31.9
Some college or associates degree 21.3	 23.6
bachelor's degree or higher 12.0	 12.7
Who are:  
White 24.8	 46.4
black 32.4	 17.0
latino 34.3	 29.1
other 8.6 7.4
Who are foreign born 22.3	 18.9
Share of poor households:  
That are:  
Married couples 15.5	 20.3
female-headed families 29.2	 27.5
Male-headed families 4.8	 5.1
female-headed non-families 29.3	 29.2
Male-headed non-families 21.2	 17.8
That received Food Stamps* 39.2	 32.0
* Includes 95 of the 100 largest metro areas for which data are available 
Source: Brookings Institution analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data  
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linked to the performance of the economy. Declining 
median incomes, a shrinking middle class, and rising 
poverty this decade reflect in part the economic 
challenges the nation faced in the early 2000s, as 
well as the onset of the deepest and longest reces-
sion of the post-World War ii era. but these trends 
also reflect several years of aggregate economic 
growth that failed to produce real gains for the typi-
cal American household.
undoubtedly, we have yet to see the full extent 
of the great recession’s impact on these trends, 
but early indications reveal that the nation was 
already feeling the negative effects of the down-
turn by the end of 2008. nationally, median income 
declined over the first year of the recession, falling 
1.3 percent, or $659, between 2007 and 2008. At 
the same time, the country saw the middle class 
contract 0.4 percentage points, with an accompany-
ing slight, but significant, uptick of 0.2 percentage 
points in the share of lower-income households.3 The 
nation’s poor population grew by more than 1 million, 
a roughly 3 percent increase over the course of one 
year, leading to an increase of 0.2 percentage points 
in the u.S. poverty rate. 
The 100 largest metro areas also experienced 
declines in real median income between 2007 and 
2008, with the suburbs bearing the brunt of the 
decreases overall: the typical suburban household 
saw income drop $388 while primary city median 
income remained statistically unchanged on the 
whole. Suburban decreases were driven by declines 
in Sun belt metro areas, like Modesto, bakersfield, 
fresno, palm bay, and Tampa. This likely reflects the 
early timing of the housing market collapse, which 
Figure 5. Minorities Make Up More than Half the Poor in Cities and Most Types of Suburbs
Race and Ethnicity of the Poor by Metropolitan Community Type, 100 Metro Areas 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of internal 2008 American Community Survey data
Though more 
poor now live in 
the suburbs, food 
stamp receipt in 
cities continues 
to outpace sub-
urban uptake.
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hit many Sun belt metro areas—with concentrations 
in the construction and real estate industries— 
particularly hard. At the same time, a number of 
metro areas managed to buck this trend—many of 
them in the northeast (e.g., Worcester, poughkeepsie, 
and buffalo)—and experienced real increases in their 
median incomes in the first year of the recession. 
changes in metropolitan poverty over this time 
period largely mirror the income dynamics in these 
regions. Much of the nation’s increase in poverty 
was concentrated in the largest metro areas, and 
particularly in the suburbs, which accounted for 
more than half the nation’s increase in the number 
of poor. contrary to the longer-run trend from 1999 
to 2008, Western metro areas led among regions for 
increases in both city and suburban poverty between 
2007 and 2008, again likely reflecting the early 
onset of the recession in the Sun belt (Table 5). At 
the same time, primary cities in the northeast actu-
ally saw their central-city poor population decline 
overall, even as the poor population in the surround-
ing suburbs increased almost 5 percent. 
While it is notable that some areas saw house-
hold income growth and falling poverty during the 
first year of the recession, research indicates that 
2009 is likely to bring higher poverty rates across all 
major metropolitan areas.4 based on the increases 
in unemployment seen over the course of 2009 as 
the recession deepened and spread, the 100 largest 
metro areas may see a 2.2 percentage-point increase 
in their collective poverty rate, with increases of  
3.5 percentage points or more in Sun belt metro 
areas like cape coral, Stockton, and Modesto; and 
manufacturing centers like Detroit and youngstown. 
in general, these trends are driven by high unem-
ployment increases in both cities (e.g., Stockton, cA) 
and suburbs (e.g., Modesto, cA) between 2008 and 
2009.5 Altogether, more than half of metropolitan 
areas may see a rise of 2 percentage points or more 
in their poverty rates in 2009. 
in the wake of the recession at the start of the 
decade, the nation lost ground on incomes for typi-
cal households and reducing poverty. now, as the 
country works to emerge from a much deeper and 
more protracted recession, the trends explored in 
this chapter are likely to get worse before they get 
better, especially in communities hit hardest by 
recent job losses and rising unemployment. but the 
Table 5. Western Metro Areas Saw the Greatest Growth in Both City and Suburban Poor Populations  
in the First year of the Great Recession
Change in City and Suburban Poor Population by Region, 95 Metro Areas*, 2007 to 2008
    
 Primary Cities Suburbs
 2007 2008 Change (%) 2007 2008 Change (%)
Metro Total 	10,748,398	 10,969,243	 2.1%	 11,941,943	 12,491,486	 4.6%
Midwest 	2,127,005		 	2,143,793		 0.8%	 	2,138,486		 	2,198,817		 2.8%
northeast  	2,520,359		 	2,516,153		 -0.2%	 	2,184,478		 	2,289,853		 4.8%
South 	3,320,929		 	3,356,181		 1.1%	 	4,419,690		 	4,612,951		 4.4%
West  	2,780,105		 	2,953,116		 6.2%	 	3,199,289		 	3,389,865		 6.0%
All changes significant at the 90 percent confidence level
*Includes 95 of the largest 100 metropolitan areas for which data are available
Source: Brookings Institution analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
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future trajectory of these trends will depend on how 
the economy recovers: Will this recovery be a repeat 
of the one we saw earlier this decade, which brought 
increased productivity but stagnating income and 
growing poverty? if so, what will that mean for metro 
areas that have already fallen behind as metropoli-
tan income disparities widened over the decade? or 
will this recovery bring the kind of shared prosper-
ity the country experienced in the 1990s—one that 
increased incomes for the average family, reduced 
poverty in cities and suburbs, and brought economic 
gains to metropolitan areas now in danger of suffer-
ing permanent losses?6 n
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IX. coMMuTing
B y  T H E  N U M B E R S
76% / 5%
Share of workers  
commuting by driving alone 
/ public transit,  
United States, 2008
-0.2% / -1.6% 
 / 0.5%
Change in share of workers 
commuting by driving alone/
carpool/transit, 100 largest 
metro areas, 2000 to 2008
2
Metro areas (out of 100)  
in which fewer than 75% of 
workers commute by car, 
2008 (New york and  
San Francisco)
14% / 27%
Share of transit commut-
ers with incomes $75,000 
and over, primary cities / 
suburbs, 2008
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OVERVIEW
n  Reversing a pair of 40-year trends, the share of Americans that commute by transit increased from 
2000 to 2008, while the share of those that drive alone to work fell slightly. however, driving alone 
remains the method by which fully three-quarters of Americans get to work. Transit usage increased among 
whites and Asians, while carpooling dropped significantly among blacks and hispanics.
 
n  Regional differences distinguish metropolitan commuting modes. commuters drive alone to work in 
high proportions in mid-sized Midwestern and Southern metro areas like youngstown and baton rouge. 
carpooling is most popular in Southern and Western metro areas, including many with large hispanic popu-
lations like bakersfield and McAllen. public transit commuting is concentrated in the nine large metro areas 
that have rates above the metropolitan average (7 percent), including new york, San francisco, Washington, 
and boston. 
n  Metropolitan areas with large transit systems were not alone in seeing increased transit usage during 
the 2000s. While metropolitan areas such as new york and Washington with extensive rail networks saw 
the largest increases in the share of commuters using transit, metro areas that opened light rail lines this 
decade such as charlotte and phoenix saw upticks as well. others that rely almost exclusively on buses for 
transit commuting (colorado Springs, Albuquerque, and Seattle) also experienced notable increases. 
n  In only 19 of the 100 largest metro areas did more than a quarter of the workforce in 2008 commute 
by a mode other than driving alone. in only two of those metropolitan areas (new york and San francisco) 
did more than a quarter of workers commute other than by car. carpooling is an important alternative to 
driving alone in both mid-sized (honolulu, Stockton) and large (los Angeles, Seattle) metro areas.
n  Residents of cities and older, high-density suburbs are more likely to use transit than commuters 
elsewhere in metro areas. Suburban transit users have higher incomes than both city transit users and 
suburbanites overall. rates of working at home are roughly the same across cities and all types of suburbs, 
though more common among higher educated workers.
Commuting flows 
are the 'blood' of 
regional econo-
mies, showing 
the connections 
among busi-
nesses and the 
labor market. 
NATIONAL TRENDS
Travel to work is essential in defining our metro-
politan areas.1 commuting flows are the “blood” 
of regional economies, showing the connections 
among businesses and the labor market. They also 
tie together urban cores and adjacent places and, in 
fact, are the key criteria used to statistically define 
u.S. metropolitan areas.2
commuting—that is, the journey to and from 
work—is only a small fraction of daily travel in the 
united States, about 15 percent of trips in 2009.3 
The significance of commuting results not from the 
amount of it but from the requirements it imposes 
on the transportation system. in comparison with 
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other trips, commuting is regular in its frequency, 
time of departure and destination. because of its 
volume and regularity, commuting significantly 
determines peak travel demand patterns.4 
from the view of transportation policymakers, 
how people get to work—by car, public transporta-
tion, walking, or another “mode”—is among the 
most important aspects of commuting.5 it shows 
commuters’ demand for the use of the transporta-
tion system, such as highways, transit, or streets. 
This information feeds directly into the planning 
of transportation services and capacity. Therefore, 
this chapter focuses almost exclusively on com-
muting mode patterns in metropolitan America, 
leaving aside other issues covered in the American 
community Survey such as travel time, departure 
time, or workplace geography.
in this regard, several small but important 
changes in the national modal patterns of com-
muting occurred in the 2000s (figure 1).6 one is 
that transit increased significantly its share of all 
Transit increased 
significantly its 
share of all com-
mutes for the 
first time in 
40 years. 
commutes for the first time in 40 years. five percent 
of American workers took transit to work in 2008, 
compared to 4.6 percent in 2000.7 commuters in the 
northeast and Midwest helped drive this increase, as 
did bus commuters, who accounted for over half of 
transit growth from 2000 to 2008. While even this 
slight increase is historic, it still leaves transit short 
of its 1990 share of all commutes (5.1 percent).
Another shift regards the role of the car in com-
muting. The share of Americans driving alone to 
work stayed relatively stable between 2000 and 
2008 at 76 percent, though this disguised a small 
but statistically significant drop during the first year 
of the recession (0.6 percentage points). even so, 
Americans continue to drive alone to work in vastly 
greater numbers than all other modes combined. 
carpooling, however, experienced the largest decline 
in its share of commutes during the 2000s, led by 
decreases in the South and West. The share of work-
ers who commuted via carpool in 2008 (11 percent) 
was even below its level in 1970 (12 percent). 
other commuting modes displayed both increas-
ing and decreasing popularity. commutes via two 
wheels (mostly bicycles and motorcycles) increased 
slightly to 1.7 percent of all commutes from 2000 to 
2008. however, the share of Americans that walk 
to work continued to decline and now stands at 2.8 
percent, down from 7.4 percent in 1970, reflecting 
the steady dispersal of people and jobs throughout 
u.S. metro areas. And while this chapter focuses 
on Americans’ work trips, there is a growing trend 
of people not commuting at all: those who work at 
home. That share reached 4.1 percent in 2008, a 
number closer to the transit commuting share and 
much higher than walking or biking, with the South 
leading the way.
These different commuting modes do not distrib-
ute equally across all types of places. in particular, 
Figure 1. The Share of Workers Commuting Via Public Transit Increased 
in the 2000s, Though Driving Alone Remains the Dominant Mode
Share of Commuters by Mode, United States, 1970 to 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of decennial census and 2008 American Community Survey data
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commuting via public transportation is primarily 
a large-metro phenomenon; the 100 largest metro 
areas accounted for 93 percent of such commutes in 
2008, compared to two-thirds for other modes. These 
metropolitan areas drove the slight increase in public 
transit usage seen nationwide during the 2000s.
As further evidence of the diverse distribution of 
modes across the country, racial and ethnic groups 
in large metro areas diverged in their commuting 
mode patterns in the 2000s (figure 2).8 Whites and 
Asians commuted more by public transportation 
in 2008 than in 2000, essentially driving the small 
increase in transit usage in the 2000s. but hispanics 
and blacks drove alone more, and carpooled much 
less, perhaps reflecting their increased suburbaniza-
tion (see the Race and Ethnicity chapter). All groups 
saw small upticks in working at home. in the end, 
however, a majority of every major racial/ethnic 
group drove alone to work in 2008, as was the case 
in 2000. Whites did so at a far greater rate than 
other groups, but were also the only group who used 
this mode less in 2008 than in 2000. 
METROPOLITAN TRENDS
commuting patterns by mode at the national level 
conceal starkly different trends among the top 100 
metropolitan areas.9
Workers in Midwestern and Southern metro areas 
tend to drive alone to work more often than those 
elsewhere. youngstown is the nation’s commuting 
capital for solo drivers, with over 85 percent of its 
metropolitan workers choosing that mode in 2008 
(Table 1). conversely, northeastern and Western met-
ropolitan areas tend to rank lower on this measure. 
new york is a significant outlier, with only about half 
of its commuters driving alone to work.
Figure 2. Minority Groups Commute Via Public Transit More Often than Whites, 
but Whites Drove Increases in Transit Usage in the 2000s
Commuting Mode by Race/Ethnicity, 100 Largest Metro Areas, 2008
Change in Commuting Mode by Race/Ethnicity, 100 Largest Metro Areas,  
2000 to 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
Though the rate remained relatively stable nation-
ally, about one-fourth of the 100 largest metro areas 
saw the share of commuters driving alone to work 
increase significantly from 2000 to 2008 (Map 1). 
This trend reinforced current patterns in the South 
(e.g., el paso and charleston) and in the interior  
West (e.g., las Vegas, california’s central Valley,  
and Tucson). Metropolitan new orleans witnessed  
the largest increases in driving alone to work  
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(5.3 percent), likely due to the aftermath of 
hurricane katrina.10 interestingly, no northeastern 
metropolitan area experienced a significant increase 
in commuting by solo driving during the 2000s. 
carpooling rates tell a similarly diverse regional 
story. Southern and Western metro areas, particu-
larly those with large hispanic populations, dominate 
the top ranks, while northeastern and Midwestern 
metropolitan areas rank near the bottom (Table 
2). in bakersfield, 17 percent of workers drove with 
others to work in 2008, nearly double the national 
rate. indeed, only two Western metropolitan areas 
(Modesto and San Jose) exhibited carpooling rates 
below the metropolitan average of 10.3 percent. At 
the same time, only three northeastern metropolitan 
areas (Scranton, harrisburg, and portland) cracked 
the top 50. And as carpooling declined nationally in 
the 2000s, only Dayton among the 100 largest metro 
areas saw its carpooling rate increase. conversely, 
rates declined in a number of Sunbelt metro areas 
where driving alone increased over the decade. 
not surprisingly, the metropolitan areas with 
the largest shares of transit commuters are older, 
larger areas with relatively extensive systems: 
new york, San francisco, Washington, boston, and 
chicago (Table 3). Transit commuters in new york 
and Washington commute primarily by subway, while 
those in chicago and San francisco mostly ride the 
bus to work. bridgeport, just outside of new york, 
leads in the share of its workers commuting by 
railroad/commuter rail. These large places clearly 
dominate, as only nine of the top 100 metropolitan 
areas have transit commuting rates exceeding the 
large metro area average (7.0 percent). 
Table 1. Commuters in Midwestern and Southern Areas Exhibit Higher Rates of Driving Alone to Work
Metro Areas Ranked by Share Commuting By Driving Alone to Work, 2008, and Change in Share, 2000-2008
     Change in Share Driving Alone to Work,  
  Share Driving Alone to Work, 2008 (%)   2000-2008 (% pts)
 Rank Metro Area  Rank Metro Area 
 1	 youngstown, oh-pA  85.1	 1 new orleans, lA  5.3
 2 Wichita, kS  84.6	 2 Modesto, cA  3.3
 3 Akron, oh  84.4	 3 el paso, Tx  3.2
 4 baton rouge, lA  84.1	 4 las Vegas, nV  3.0
	 5 knoxville, Tn  84.0	 5 oxnard-Thousand oaks-Ventura, cA 	 3.0
      
	 96 Seattle-Tacoma-bellevue, WA  69.0	 96 bridgeport, cT  -2.7
	 97 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV  66.3	 97 poughkeepsie, ny  -2.9
	 98 honolulu, hi  64.2	 98 portland, Me  -3.2
	 99 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA  62.4	 99 Dayton, oh  -3.3
	 100 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA  50.3	 100 Austin, Tx  -3.6
 
  All metro areas 74.0  All metro areas -0.2
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data 
Note: All changes statistically significant at 90 percent confidence interval
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About one- 
fourth of the  
100 largest 
metro areas  
saw the share  
of commuters 
driving alone to 
work increase 
significantly 
from 2000 to 
2008.
Table 2. Southern and Western Metro Areas Rank High on Carpooling, But Saw Rates Slip in the 2000s
Metro Areas Ranked by Share Commuting by Carpool, 2008, and Change in Share, 2000-2008
  Share Carpooling, 2008 (%)    Change in Share Carpooling, 2000-2008 (% pts)
 Rank Metro Area  Rank Metro Area 
	 1 bakersfield, cA  17.1	 1	 Dayton, oh* 2.0
	 2 honolulu, hi  15.9	 2 Madison, Wi  0.9
	 3 Stockton, cA  15.1	 3 Scranton, pA  0.9
	 4 cape coral, fl  14.4	 4	 cape coral, fl  0.7
	 5	 McAllen, Tx  14.2	 5	 portland, Me  0.5
      
	 96 cleveland, oh  8.1	 96	 lakeland, fl* -3.7
	 97 Springfield, MA  8.0	 97	 Jackson, MS* -4.1
	 98 youngstown, oh-pA  7.8	 98	 McAllen, Tx* -4.9
	 99 Akron, oh  7.5	 99 el paso, Tx* -5.2
	 100 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA 	 7.3	 100 Modesto, cA* -5.2
  All metro areas 10.3	  All metro areas* -1.6
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
* Changes statistically significant at 90 percent confidence interval
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data
Map 1. More Commuters Drove Alone to Work in Southern and California Metro Areas, 
While Fewer Did in the Northeast and Midwest
Change in Share of Commuters Driving Alone to Work, 100 Largest Metro Areas, 2000 –2008
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As described above, transit usage increased for 
the first time in decades during the 2000s, though 
by a small degree. The increase was most apparent 
in metropolitan areas with large transit systems, 
such as new york and Washington, where the share 
of commuters choosing the mode rose by at least 2 
percent from 2000 to 2008. but increases were also 
seen in metropolitan areas that opened new transit 
lines and expanded transit service in the last eight 
years. charlotte opened a light rail line in november 
2007 and colorado Springs opened an intercity com-
muter bus line in 2004, and both managed to place 
among the top 10 metropolitan areas for increases in 
commuter transit ridership, and rate of commuting 
by transit.11 
While one-third of metropolitan areas saw signifi-
cant increases in their transit commuting rate during 
the 2000s, most of these increases were very small. 
only five metro areas posted increases of more than 
one percentage point. At the same time, the only 
decrease larger than one percentage point occurred 
in new orleans, as a result of hurricane-inflicted dam-
ages to its public transit infrastructure. The first year 
of the great recession, which coincided with a spike 
in gasoline prices, contributed to the move toward 
greater transit usage. between 2007 and 2008, 
rates of driving alone to work dropped in 38 of the 
largest 100 metro areas. in return, about 30 metro 
areas saw increases in carpooling and commuting by 
transit during the same period.
for most metropolitan areas, driving alone to 
work remains the commuting mode for the over-
whelming majority of workers, and other options 
concentrate in a relatively small number of places. 
indeed, only 14 metro areas have transit commuting 
rates higher than the national rate of 5 percent. in 
Table 3. Northeastern and Western Metro Areas Continue to Dominate Public Transit Commuting
Metro Areas Ranked by Share Commuting by Public Transit, 2008, and Change in Share, 2000–2008
  Share Using Public Transit, 2008 (%)   Change in Share Using Public Transit, 2000-2008 (% pts)
 Rank Metro Area  Rank Metro Area 
	 1 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA  30.4	 1	 new york-newark, ny-nJ-pA* 2.9
	 2 San francisco-oakland-fremont, cA  14.4	 2 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV*	 2.3
	 3 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Dc-VA-MD-WV 	 13.4	 3	 bridgeport, cT* 1.3
	 4 boston-cambridge, MA-nh  11.7	 4 poughkeepsie, ny* 1.2
	 5 chicago-naperville-Joliet, il-in-Wi  11.3	 5	 Seattle-Tacoma-bellevue, WA* 1.0
     
	 96 greenville, Sc  0.4	 96 houston, Tx* -0.5
	 97 McAllen, Tx  0.4	 97 Milwaukee, Wi* -0.5
	 98 lakeland, fl  0.4	 98	 las Vegas, nV* -0.6
	 99 Tulsa, ok  0.4	 99 honolulu, hi  -0.7
	 100 palm bay, fl  0.3	 100 new orleans, lA* -2.7
	
  All metro areas 7.0	  All metro areas* 0.5
Source: Brookings analysis of Census 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey data  
* Changes statistically significant at 90 percent confidence interval      
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fully half of the 100 largest metro areas, transit com-
muting rates lie below 2 percent. only 19 had more 
than one-quarter of their workforce in 2008 com-
muting by a mode other than driving alone (figure 
3). When taking into account any other means of 
transportation besides cars, only new york and San 
francisco have more than 25 percent of their labor 
force not driving to work. carpooling looms as a 
more important mode in smaller metro areas like 
honolulu and Stockton, and larger ones like Seattle, 
los Angeles, and Denver. 
City and Suburban Trends12
Americans commute differently based on where 
they live within metropolitan areas. Across the 100 
largest metro areas, a majority of commuters in both 
primary cities and suburbs drove alone to work in 
2008, but city residents did so at a lower rate (64 
Figure 3. In Only 19 Metro Areas Do More than 25 Percent of Commuters Travel to Work By a Mode 
Other Than Driving Alone
Share of Commuters by Mode Other Than Driving Alone, Selected Metro Areas, 2008
Figure 4. City and Inner Suburban Residents Are Less Likely  
to Drive, and More Likely to Use Transit,  
than Commuters Elsewhere in Metro Areas
Share of Commuters by Mode and Metropolitan Community Type, 2008
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
* Includes taxicab, motorcycle, and miscellaneous means of transportation
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data
* Includes taxicab, motorcycle, and miscellaneous means of transportation
S
TA
T
e
 o
f
 M
e
T
r
o
p
o
l
iT
A
n
 A
M
e
r
ic
A
 |
 C
O
M
M
U
T
IN
G
152
percent) than suburbanites (78 percent) (figure 4). 
city workers commute more by transit, walking, and 
biking than those in suburbs, while rates of carpool-
ing are similar in both types of places. 
All suburbs are not created equal in their commut-
ing patterns, of course. in 2008, commuters in the 
high-density suburbs that often surround primary 
cities took transit more often, and drove alone less 
often, than other suburban commuters. by contrast, 
less than 1 percent of exurban commuters took tran-
sit, but more than 12 percent carpooled to cover the 
often long distances between home and work. rates 
of working at home, somewhat surprisingly, differed 
little among metropolitan community types.
The overall increase in the 2000s of transit usage 
owes primarily to increased transit commuting in 
cities. in 2000, commuters in primary cities used 
transit at a rate 10.3 percentage points higher than 
suburban commuters, and the gap had narrowed in 
the 1990s due to decreased ridership in cities. This 
trend reversed over the past decade, as transit usage 
increased faster in primary cities than in suburbs, so 
that the gap reached 11.2 percentage points in 2008. 
carpooling, on the other hand, declined among both 
primary city and suburban commuters in the 2000s, 
though the decline was faster in cities, erasing any 
difference in the rate of carpooling across city and 
suburban lines by 2008.
interesting differences emerge in probing the 
socioeconomic profile of transit commuters in cit-
ies and suburbs (Table 4).13 Those residing in the 
suburbs tend to be older than those in cities, in line 
with the overall population age differences between 
cities and suburbs. not surprisingly, suburban transit 
commuters are more likely to have higher incomes, 
but they are actually higher income than suburban 
Table 4. Transit Commuters in Cities and Suburbs Have Different Socio-Economic Characteristics
Selected Characteristics, Primary City versus Suburban Transit Commuters, 79 Large Metro Areas, 2008
 
Characteristic Primary Cities Suburbs
	 Share of all workers 15.5	 3.8
 With incomes:  
  $15,000 to $24,999 18.2	 13.9
  $75,000 and over 13.7	 26.5
  
 in the Age group:  
  25 to 44 50.6	 45.6
  45 to 54 19.3	 23.8
  
 Who are:  
  below the poverty line 11.3	 6.9
  foreign-born 38.1	 29.8
  renters 67.6	 41.0
Source: Brookings analysis of 2008 American Community Survey data  
Note: Analysis limited to 106 primary cities and 79 metro areas due to data availability.     
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residents overall, perhaps reflecting their greater 
likelihood of residing in close-in, transit-accessible 
suburbs that may be more expensive than outer 
suburbs. And while immigrants make up a larger 
share of city transit commuters, they still account 
for an outsized share of suburban transit commuters 
(30 percent). primary city workers who commute by 
transit are more likely to rent, and more likely to be 
poor. These differences signal that while transit may 
be evolving into a mode of choice for certain types of 
suburban residents, it remains a mode of necessity 
for many city residents. 
finally, mode choices differ among workers at 
different educational levels, but the patterns are 
not necessarily consistent across cities and sub-
urbs. in all types of communities, workers who have 
completed some college exhibit the highest rates of 
driving alone to work (from 69 percent in primary 
cities to 82 percent in outer suburbs), and the lowest 
rates of transit usage, while those without a high 
school diploma carpool much more often than others 
(20 percent). in suburbs, the least educated workers 
are more likely than other groups to walk to work, 
but in cities, all groups walk at roughly the same rate 
(4 to 5 percent). Workers with a bachelor’s degree 
are slightly more likely than others to bike to work in 
cities (1.2 percent), but slightly less likely to bike in 
suburbs. And across all community types, the highest 
educated workers are most likely to work from home 
(5 to 6 percent), reflecting the more flexible nature 
of their jobs and access to technology.
CONCLUSION
between 2000 and 2008, transit commuting 
increased as a share of all commuting for the first 
time in 40 years. it grew across the entire united 
States, in primary cities and suburbs, in metropolitan 
areas with large transit systems in the northeast and 
West, and in metropolitan areas in the South and 
West with growing systems. While significant, the 
increase was rather small, at the national and metro-
politan levels. less than 2 percent of the workforce 
in half of the 100 largest metro areas commuted by 
transit in 2008.
Driving remains, by a long shot, the primary 
commuting mode in America. While driving alone 
to work had underwent a small loss in commuting 
share during the last decade, carpooling use declined 
significantly. An increasing share of hispanics and 
blacks traded carpooling for driving alone to work 
between 2000 and 2008, although more Americans 
preferred carpooling to driving alone during the first 
year of recession. 
While it is uncertain whether these trends will 
continue, it does suggest that very few of the largest 
metro areas are seeing dramatic changes toward a 
“greener,” lower-carbon commuting future. only 19 
of the 100 largest have more than a quarter of the 
workforce commuting by other means than driving 
alone to work. The number is reduced to only two 
(new york and San francisco) when considering only 
non-driving commuting means.
part of the challenge is that workers in many met-
ropolitan areas simply do not have any alternatives 
to driving to work. fifty-four (54) of the 100 largest 
metro areas do not have any rail transit service and 
also have relatively weak bus systems. half of them 
are found in the South.14 Some metro areas, such as 
charlotte, are opening new transit lines, but such 
efforts remain limited. even as metro areas in the 
northeast and portions of the West were able to 
reduce their driving-alone-to-work footprint in the 
2000s, several in the Southeast and Southwest saw 
those rates increase over the decade.
Very few of the 
largest metro 
areas are see-
ing dramatic 
changes toward a 
'greener,' lower-
carbon commut-
ing future. 
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others still have to make do with a road and 
transit network that fits commuting patterns of the 
1950s, when cities still functioned as regional hubs. 
Today only 21 percent of jobs in large metro areas 
locate within three miles of downtown, while over 
twice that share (45 percent) are more than 10 miles 
away from the city center. Moreover, job decentral-
ization accelerated through at least the first half of 
the 2000s.15 
given these overall trends, the incremental 
changes in commuting patterns evident in the 2000s 
are not sufficient to reach any meaningful reductions 
in carbon emissions. in order for the u.S. to truly 
commit to a low carbon future, significant invest-
ments in cleaner vehicles and alternative transporta-
tion modes will be necessary.16 but given the contin-
ued decentralization of metropolitan area jobs and 
residences, serious attention to more sustainable 
growth patterns will also be necessary.
As the experience of other countries shows, this 
will not be a rapid change.17 yet policy initiatives 
abound on all levels of government to help remake 
the sprawling American landscape, by developing 
integrated regional plans that link housing, trans-
port, jobs and land use and create more compact and 
transit rich communities. Doing so will bring particu-
lar advantages, in compact development patterns 
that preserve rural lands and valuable ecosystems, 
and in a wider array of transportation options in 
more of our metropolitan areas that lead to fewer 
miles driven and lower greenhouse gas emissions. n
ENDNOTES
1.  This chapter employs the u.S. census notion of “journey-
to-work” as the travel from home to work of American 
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otherwise.
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6.  All the changes in this chapter are statistically signifi-
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baton rouge, birmingham, chattanooga, harrisburg, 
Jackson, knoxville, little rock, youngstown. note: The 
changes in share of commuting mode add up to one by 
race. change in transit share for African Americans and 
driving alone share for Asians for the largest 100 metro 
areas are not statistically significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level.
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14.  robert puentes, “A bridge to Somewhere: rethinking 
American Transportation for the 21st century” 
(Washington: brookings institution, 2008).
15.  elizabeth kneebone, “Job Sprawl revisited: The 
changing geography of Metropolitan employment,” 
(Washington: brookings, 2009).
16.  electric vehicles will only partially solve this problem if 
the sources of electric generation themselves remain as 
carbon-intensive as they are today.
17.  ralph buehler, John pucher, uwe kunert, “Making 
Transportation Sustainable: insights from germany” 
(Washington: brookings institution, 2009).
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S
ome commentators have begun to refer to the 2000s as “the lost decade,” largely on the basis 
of the lack of job and economic growth nationally over the decade.1 president obama himself 
referred to the decade as such in his January 2010 State of the union address. 
but the decade was lost in another sense, too; the 
nation lost time and opportunity to respond to the 
challenges and prospects that its new demographic 
realities portend. 
We now stand on the precipice of a “decade of 
reckoning.” The economic rollercoaster of the past 10 
years has distracted the united States and its major 
metropolitan areas from grappling with the urgent 
implications of the longer-run shifts afoot in our 
society. issues such as how to support communities 
with rapidly aging populations, how to meet family 
and labor market needs through immigration, how to 
build workforce skills to maintain American economic 
leadership, and how to help lower-paid workers sup-
port themselves and their families simply cannot 
go unaddressed for another decade without risking 
serious degradation to our collective standard of 
living, not to mention the quality of our democracy. 
Tackling these and other challenges will require 
coherent, purposeful leadership at the national scale 
in the coming years.
This reckoning must occur at the metropolitan 
level, too. national policy will be necessary, but 
not sufficient, for addressing the wide range of 
challenges facing metropolitan areas. indeed, the 
increasingly distinct profiles of major metro areas 
along the key dimensions outlined in this report 
demand that their own agendas—at the state, 
regional, and local levels—confront the issues most 
pressing to their own futures. for all metropolitan 
areas, that includes embracing governance adap-
tations that recognize and take advantage of the 
increasingly common demographic, social, and eco-
nomic trajectories of their cities and suburbs.
THE MACRO—SECURING  
THE PLATFORM FOR  
METROPOLITAN PROSPERITy
The issues that the five new realities documented 
here raise are by no means completely off the 
national radar. government fiscal analysts, financial 
planners, and hospital administrators, for instance, 
are only too aware of the challenges and oppor-
tunities raised by the impending retirement and 
ongoing aging of the boomers. likewise, the future 
of America’s immigration policies remains in flux 
amid contentious debate over how they should treat 
undocumented workers. 
yet in these areas and others, national conver-
sations tend to overlook the fact that these new 
realities affect not only “macro” conditions such as 
the federal budget and the u.S. labor market. They 
are also experienced in places—mostly in our nation’s 
largest metropolitan areas. Actors at the metropoli-
tan level cannot, on their own, tackle the enormous 
challenges emerging from these social, demographic, 
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and economic shifts. only national policy makers 
have the fiscal and jurisdictional reach, and authority 
to make the truly market-shaping decisions needed 
to address these new realities. however, this requires 
an agenda that goes beyond the conventional ways 
in which these issues are framed at the national 
level, to confront aspects of particular concern for 
the metropolitan communities on the front lines of 
these trends.
Accommodating More Efficient Growth
America’s growth, as described earlier, confers both 
blessings and challenges. The economic and fiscal 
future of our nation would be in much greater doubt 
if we were not managing to continuously replenish 
our younger population through natural increase and 
immigration. At the same time, the volumes of peo-
ple that we expect to add in the coming decades—a 
projected 90 million between now and 2050—are 
without equal in the industrialized world. Moreover, 
that growth will coincide with urgent new challenges 
for energy consumption and global climate change. 
Quite naturally, the debate at the national level 
around growth and the future of our environment 
has focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
by raising the relative market price of the energy 
sources that produce them, through a carbon tax, 
“cap and trade,” and investment in cleaner energy 
technologies. 
in addition to these strategies, however, national 
leaders makers must address flaws in federal policy 
that have enabled the sort of energy-intensive, 
distended growth patterns familiar to most metro-
politan areas:
• because transportation is the single largest 
contributor to the nation’s carbon footprint, federal 
transportation policy must also play a role in reduc-
ing wasteful growth patterns. The reauthorization 
of the federal transportation law should reward 
and direct greater alignment between housing and 
transportation planning at the state and local levels; 
condition federal affordable housing and transit 
funds on the coordinated use of both; and issue 
“sustainability challenge contracts” to states and 
metropolitan areas that allow them to pursue coordi-
nated growth strategies that collectively reduce their 
carbon footprints2
• reducing the deductibility of mortgage inter-
est could help discourage the over-consumption of 
housing, which not only contributes to sprawling 
development patterns within metro areas, but also 
fueled the economic crisis of the late 2000s and 
over-supply in many Western and Southeastern 
growth centers. proposals to lower the rate at which 
higher-income taxpayers can itemize deductions, 
convert the mortgage interest deduction to a credit, 
or phase out the deduction for larger, more expen-
sive, or second homes could all preserve society’s 
implicit preference for homeownership, while 
encouraging more environmentally prudent housing 
patterns3
Integrating and Incorporating  
Diverse Populations
The notion of America as a great “melting pot,” 
popularized during the last great wave of immigra-
tion at the dawn of the 20th century, implied that 
new arrivals to this country would absorb the ways 
of their new society, preserving a more homoge-
neous “American culture.” That notion was always a 
bit of a myth, because as immigrants assimilated into 
American society, they expanded the boundaries of 
its culture. That expansion and its accompanying ten-
sions continue today, especially given the dramatic 
regional shift in the sources of u.S. immigration, 
the rising share of population born abroad, and the 
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labor market challenges currently facing the country. 
Moreover, underlying concerns extend beyond the 
foreign born to include other growing non-white 
shares of the u.S. population, such as African 
Americans and the “second generation” children of 
immigrant parents.
As others have persuasively argued, the demo-
graphics of our society require the successful eco-
nomic and social incorporation of diverse younger 
populations.4 As the ratio of seniors to working-age 
residents grows in the coming decades, how these 
populations fare will largely dictate our ability to 
support older populations economically, maintain a 
stable housing market, and supply the human capital 
for the institutions and occupations on which seniors 
will depend. in this sense, comprehensive immigra-
tion reform that protects our borders, meets our 
labor market needs while protecting u.S. workers, 
and provides a fair pathway to legal status for long-
time residents is surely an immediate national policy 
priority. 
While this approach may resolve for now the 
future of u.S. immigration policy, it does not amount 
to a coherent u.S. immigrant policy that assists in 
the incorporation of these new populations and 
others like them. in its absence, metropolitan com-
munities on the receiving end of recent waves of 
immigrants have responded in hundreds of conflict-
ing, often counter-productive ways to these influxes. 
responding in a timely and strategic way to new and 
existing immigrant populations at the regional level 
may require federal support to bolster programs and 
practices—such as literacy training, workforce assis-
tance, civic engagement and citizenship classes—that 
facilitate incorporation but may be destined for 
cuts in the current fiscal environment. one proposal 
would create a national Office of New Americans 
to elevate the largely makeshift, localized efforts 
toward integration to form a strategic nationwide 
network.5 Such a network should focus on metro-
politan approaches, as individual jurisdictions do not 
serve the broader set of communities (e.g., work-
places, schools, places of worship, social networks) 
that form the locus of immigrant integration.
Enhancing Community Affordability and 
Vitality for Seniors
The national conversation around aging has recently 
focused, with good reason, on the fiscal impacts of 
boomer retirements—particularly on public health 
care expenditures. The recently enacted health care 
reform law probably represents only the beginning of 
what will be a long-running debate on the topic. Still 
to be fully reckoned with are decisions to ensure the 
fiscal future of the Social Security system, while pre-
serving and encouraging the labor market contribu-
tions of boomers as they advance beyond age 65. 
We cannot know for sure what the retirement 
of the boomers will mean for the landscape of 
America’s metropolitan areas, especially the suburbs 
in which most are located. The generation’s demo-
graphic, social, and economic diversity suggests that 
communities will both benefit and face new chal-
lenges from the aging in place of the boomers. 
federal policy has an important role to play in 
helping communities accommodate these diverse 
older populations in ways that enhance quality of life 
and community vitality for all residents. on prior-
ity must be to meet increased demand for afford-
able housing for seniors, such as units subsidized 
through the u.S. Department of housing and urban 
Development’s (huD’s) Section 202 program, and 
coordinate supportive services for those popula-
tions (funded by the u.S. Department of health and 
human Services). for the home-owning majority of 
boomers, huD should also exact greater oversight of 
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counseling around home equity conversion mort-
gages (HECMs). These products allow seniors to 
convert their home equity into cash advances while 
still living in their homes, but which are too often 
marketed and sold in misleading ways.6 To preserve 
and enhance senior mobility, federal transportation 
planning requirements could obligate grantees to 
take into account the specific highway and transit 
needs of older populations, and funding could be 
conditioned on their success in meeting accessibil-
ity targets.7 likewise, greater coordination of federal 
affordable housing and transit programs could be a 
further lever to improve seniors’ access to walkable 
communities with a range of transportation options.8
Accelerating Higher Educational  
Attainment
improving the quality of education is no less than a 
public policy obsession for many public- and private-
sector leaders, at all levels of the system. And with 
good reason—the rising human capital levels of our 
population explained much of America’s economic 
success in the 20th century, and will probably be an 
even more important contributor to our standards of 
living into the future.9 
in that regard, it is difficult to see how much 
longer the united States can abide widely divergent 
educational outcomes by race and ethnicity, given 
our changing population characteristics. by 2050, 
non-hispanic whites will represent less than half of 
the nation’s prime working-age (25 to 64) popula-
tion. over the next 40 years, blacks and hispanics 
are projected to account for roughly 90 percent of 
total growth in that age range.10 but post-secondary 
educational attainment rates for those groups track 
below 20 percent, roughly half those for whites and 
Asians. Although racial and ethnic gaps in edu-
cational achievement and access to college have 
narrowed over time, they have persisted in college 
completion. increasing diversity in the younger 
college-going population may go some way toward 
explaining the lower rate of college degree attain-
ment among 25 to 34 year-olds than the previous 
cohort.
Thus, federal policies that promote access to 
higher education, such as the recently enacted 
increase in the pell grant program, are important 
but not sufficient for significantly raising attainment. 
first, strategies to reduce inequities in prepared-
ness for higher education are crucial. The u.S. 
Department of education should continue to focus, 
through multiple programs such as Race to the 
Top, Investing in Innovation Fund, and Title I, on 
enhancing teacher quality for students in need and 
promoting effective interventions for low-performing 
schools, which locate disproportionately in large 
metropolitan centers, both inner-city and suburban. 
Second, research indicates that rewarding institu-
tions and students not just for enrollment, but also 
for persistence and completion, in higher education 
can result in improved rates of attainment.11 The pro-
posed College Access and Completion Innovation 
Fund and American Graduation Initiative would 
focus more federal resources, and leverage state and 
local resources, to promote pathways to degrees. 
Their biggest targets would be the community 
colleges that are present in multiple parts of all 
metropolitan areas, and which serve a large and 
growing share of their racial and ethnic minority 
students. both programs were dropped from recent 
legislation enacting the pell grant increase, but their 
ideas deserve continued support from federal policy 
makers concerned with reducing racial and ethnic 
disparities in higher education.
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Reducing Income Inequality
Throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, middle-
income households and middle-wage workers 
derived limited benefit from economic growth in 
the form of rising earnings. higher-income families 
and workers began to pull away from the pack, and 
income inequality increased. but the 2000s put an 
exclamation point on this pattern, resulting in real 
income and wage losses at the middle and bottom 
of the distribution, even as those at the higher end 
posted gains. The combination of the types of jobs 
lost during the recession, and those sustained and 
now growing in its wake, could in fact contribute to 
a labor market with even greater wage and income 
inequality than what preceded the downturn.12
At the moment, lessening income inequality has 
taken a back seat to resolving the plight of unem-
ployed workers and creating jobs among federal 
economic policy priorities, with good reason. As 
the federal government considers strategies and 
investments to reduce unemployment, it should 
seek to create and sustain jobs that not only fill 
critical functions in the economy, but also provide 
employment opportunities and decent wages for 
low- to middle-skilled workers. Along these lines, 
investments that restore and grow the productive 
capacity of the nation’s auto communities would 
help keep the nation on the front lines of innovation 
and the move to a low-carbon economy, rebalance 
u.S. trade, and bolster a sector that has tradition-
ally generated good middle-class jobs.13 given the 
suffering these communities endured at the hands of 
the economic crisis, investments to modernize their 
infrastructure and land use, support their leadership 
in clean energy production, and keep and grow their 
advanced manufacturing industries now lie clearly 
and uniquely within the purview of federal policy.
over the longer run, educational policies that 
prepare a larger segment of the workforce to serve 
in higher-paying industries and occupations are 
another wise investment. but for the foreseeable 
future, there will remain jobs that pay wages insuf-
ficient to help workers meet basic costs of living 
for themselves and their families. This is especially 
the case now that unemployment rates will likely 
remain high for an extended period of time. federal 
policy must thus continue to supplement the wages 
and incomes of low- and moderate-income families. 
Subsidizing their purchase of health insurance, as 
the recently enacted health care reform law will, 
is an important step in this direction. Stepped-up 
labor standards enforcement, which the obama 
administration has begun to undertake, could help 
improve wages for vulnerable workers and communi-
ties toward the bottom of the income distribution.14 
equally critical are tax credits that support lower-
income working families—a majority of whom live in 
suburbs—such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and 
the Child Tax Credit.15 federal policy makers should 
renew provisions of these credits in the coming years 
that are scheduled to expire, as well as consider 
strategies to combine and expand these and related 
credits as part of a more fundamental re-writing of 
the federal tax code.
THE METRO—UNDERSTANDING 
AND TAILORING RESPONSES  
TO REGIONAL REALITIES
national policy makers have the unique obligation to 
address aspects of the five new realities that affect 
all metropolitan areas, or are simply beyond metro-
politan areas’ own capacity to tackle. As this report 
demonstrates, however, different challenges assume 
varying levels of prominence in different types of 
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metropolitan areas. The future of second generation 
Americans, for instance, is a much more pressing 
issue in Diverse giant and border growth metro 
areas than in industrial core areas. national policy 
responses must recognize the diverse starting points 
of metropolitan areas and, where necessary, ensure 
that interventions are tailored to those differing on-
the-ground realities.
The 2010s will be metropolitan areas’ decade of 
reckoning, too. because these places pulled even far-
ther apart from one another on several dimensions 
of the new realities in the 2000s, federal policy alone 
cannot provide a solution tailored to each metropoli-
tan area’s individual situation. Therefore, leaders at 
the state, regional, and local levels must now more 
than ever understand and respond purposefully to 
the demographic, social, and economic changes 
most affecting their places. in doing so, they can look 
to the experience and support of metro areas with 
which they share important characteristics, as no 
metropolitan area is so unique that it stands totally 
alone in the face of these dynamics.
Border Growth and Mid-Sized Magnets
in the once booming, now sputtering growth centers 
of the Southwest and Southeast, the 2000s were an 
ephemeral decade in which housing and in-migration 
grew to play too important a role in the metropolitan 
economy. The subprime mortgage crisis originated in 
many of these places, and eventually triggered a full-
blown international economic crisis that shut down 
the engines of their growth. Much of that growth 
was not only economically unsustainable, but also 
environmentally wasteful.
over the next decade, these metropolitan areas 
must seek greater balance. This applies first and 
foremost to their economies, which policies must 
seek to diversify away from housing, toward pro-
ductive industries that can contribute to America’s 
emerging next economy. Smart infrastructure invest-
ments in these metro areas could promote growth 
of alternative energy production and distribution, 
international travel and tourism, and linkages with 
larger nearby centers of global commerce (e.g., los 
Angeles, houston, Miami). This also applies to their 
own growth patterns, which in many cases have 
strained natural resources by concentrating develop-
ment in low-density locations. Their current over-
supply of housing and slowed rates of in-migration 
obligate these places to reconfigure their housing 
and transportation plans, to provide more sensible 
options for homeowners and renters in an aging 
society (especially in the Southeast) and carbon-
constrained economy. 
The other, even more existential challenge facing 
these places is to equip their emerging workforce 
with the education and skills necessary to attract 
and retain productive, competitive industries and 
occupations. With many of these metro areas 
located in states suffering severe fiscal challenges, 
their institutions of higher education—both 2-year 
and 4-year colleges—face severe cuts in their own 
budgets. local and regional leaders in these areas 
must be fierce champions for the continued viability 
of these institutions, which offer the best hope for 
ensuring that their large and growing young, minor-
ity populations can contribute meaningfully to future 
economic growth, and provide an even better life for 
their families than their parents could.
Diverse Giant/Next Frontier
The large coastal and growing Western metro areas 
that make up the Diverse giant and next frontier 
categories will retain an economic advantage in 
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the next decade from their built-in stocks of human 
capital, innovative firms and research institutions, 
and denser urban cores that attract and retain highly 
educated workers. While their increasingly diverse 
demography confers numerous strengths, it also 
raises challenges in the form of high and rising edu-
cational and income inequality.
The 18 metropolitan areas in these categories 
contain 56 percent of the nation’s foreign-born 
population, and a majority of its “second generation” 
children, too. These populations are highly diverse 
in their national origin, educational background, and 
recentness of entry to the united States. Moreover, 
57 percent of their foreign born are located in 
suburban communities, many of which are quite new 
to the phenomenon of immigration. As changes in 
these populations occur relatively quickly, public, 
private, and non-profit leaders in Diverse giant and 
next frontier metro areas should undertake region-
wide efforts to monitor the size and status of their 
foreign-born populations. They should also adopt the 
most innovative practices for accelerating the civic 
and labor market integration of these populations, 
such as intergenerational and vocational literacy 
training, and programs that help immigrants become 
u.S. citizens.16
The high levels of inequality that mark many of 
these areas also create intense price pressures for 
low-income, and even middle-income, workers and 
families. providing high-quality, affordable com-
munities for these segments of the population is 
important not only to ensure that basic public needs 
are met (e.g., by key workers in health care, educa-
tion, and safety), but also to keep retail prices in 
check more generally, and to provide viable options 
for families as they climb the economic ladder.17 The 
housing price crash has perhaps ameliorated the 
affordability pressures in these markets temporarily, 
but they are sure to grow again in the coming 
decade. More cities and regions in these metro cate-
gories could benefit from the sort of bold, long-term 
thinking that undergirded new york city’s ambitious 
planyc, or the Sacramento region’s blueprint, each 
of which provide a roadmap for addressing future 
local and regional population needs in an environ-
mentally sustainable, fiscally efficient manner.18 in 
addition, strategies to promote greater affordability 
within these regions should take into account the 
costs of not just housing but also household trans-
portation, as the latter can represent an equally 
heavy burden on the budgets and time of moderate-
income working families.19
New Heartland
new heartland metropolitan areas, as indicated by 
their title, represent in some ways the “middle of the 
road” on the new demographic realities transform-
ing America. Their population characteristics—more 
educated, somewhat less diverse, younger, and with 
lower levels of educational and income inequality—
reflect in large part the selective in-migration they 
experienced in the 2000s and earlier decades. As 
the recovery gets underway, the diverse economic 
specializations of these places will likely position 
them well to participate in the next wave of u.S. 
economic growth during the 2010s. however, with 
migration rates likely to remain somewhat lower in 
the near term, an “import strategy” for augmenting 
their human capital may not be as reliable as in the 
recent past.
To that end, these metropolitan areas would do 
well to focus on growing a more educated pipeline 
of workers, both present and future, from within 
their own borders. Some are home to challenged 
urban and inner-suburban school systems with high 
proportions of lower-income minority students (e.g., 
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Atlanta, indianapolis, Minneapolis), that may now 
have an opportunity to attract new, young, middle-
class families who are choosing to live in the urban 
core. This could mean improved learning prospects 
for disadvantaged kids as well as a wider constitu-
ency for continued investment in and improvement 
of these systems.20 in addition, most of these metro-
politan areas are home to major public universities 
that educate many of their own residents, or those 
elsewhere in the state. closer partnership between 
regional economic development and university 
officials could be geared toward convincing more of 
their students to begin their careers—and build the 
next middle class—in their alma mater’s region.
Skilled Anchor and Industrial Core
economically, the Skilled Anchor and industrial core 
metro areas are quite distinct. The former have 
lower shares of their populations in manufacturing 
industries, and higher shares in services industries 
such as health and education. This difference has 
insulated them from the recent, deep economic suf-
fering visited on the industrial core areas. indeed, 
some of the larger cities among the Skilled Anchors 
(e.g., baltimore, boston, philadelphia, pittsburgh, 
St. louis) showed renewed signs of residential 
strength in the 2000s that were less apparent in the 
industrial cores.
yet on most of the five new demographic realities 
transforming metropolitan areas, Skilled Anchor and 
industrial core areas are more similar than distinct. 
They experienced rapid decentralization amidst only 
modest growth in the 2000s, and an above-average 
share of their commuting occurs by car (the highest 
rate in industrial cores). immigration to these metro 
areas—with a couple of notable exceptions—is quite 
low, though most retain significant African American 
populations as a consequence of their former 
manufacturing might. They have among the oldest 
age profiles of the metropolitan types, the result 
of low in-migration and a significant aging-in-place 
boomer and senior population.
While both types of areas have similar challenges 
to tackle, then, their different economic positions 
may dictate different approaches. Slowing the tide 
of decentralization should be a priority for all of 
these metropolitan areas. Skilled Anchors have, as 
their name implies, significant anchor institutions 
in the form of universities and hospitals that can be 
effective partners in both economic and residential 
development.21 Many such institutions are present in 
the industrial cores, too, but in light of their vast but 
now unutilized industrial and population footprints, 
those regions likely need more radical land-use inter-
ventions to revive residential and economic vitality.
These strategies should also take account of the 
particular opportunities and challenges accompany-
ing the rapid aging of their populations. Many expe-
rienced a “brain drain” of younger workers in recent 
decades, even the Skilled Anchors where educational 
attainment remains above average. for that reason, 
efforts to keep the boomers connected to the labor 
market, even as they reach retirement age, could 
benefit these regions both socially and economical-
ly.22 integrating housing and social services for their 
larger-than-average senior populations, in both 
urban and suburban settings, as well as supporting 
the use of home and community-based services (ver-
sus institutional care) to care for the elderly should 
be additional priorities.
finally, the out-migration these regions have 
experienced reflects not only a decline in their 
economic functions, but also the perception among 
departing younger workers and married-couple 
families that areas like the new heartland and 
the next frontier may offer themselves and their 
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children better educational opportunities, or a more 
diverse and vibrant cultural environment. Thus, 
priorities that apply to other metropolitan categories 
around welcoming and incorporating new (if still 
small) immigrant populations, and improving (if not 
completely overhauling) the human capital pipeline, 
apply at least equally to the Skilled Anchors and 
industrial cores.23
Enabling Metropolitan Action
finally, new demographic realities must be met with 
new governance arrangements. More than ever, 
the lines between cities and suburbs—and the long, 
fruitless history of battles and mistrust between 
them—must be transcended. cities and suburbs 
increasingly share challenges like poverty, growing 
elderly populations, and influxes of new Americans. 
At the same time, the fiscal crisis has dramatically 
undermined the capacity of individual jurisdictions 
to address familiar existing needs, and has compro-
mised their ability to react to new realities. States 
are facing their own intense fiscal stresses, which will 
get worse before they get better, and thus they can-
not be counted on to support the local government 
status quo.
The demographic and fiscal outlook demands 
three kinds of changes from local leaders. first, 
they must create regional solutions to new, shared 
regional challenges. changes in suburban demo-
graphics and the challenges they raise will not 
abate in the 2010s. local leaders need to recognize 
that these trends are playing out to a greater or 
lesser extent across most of the jurisdictions in 
their metropolitan area, and work toward regional 
solutions to regional issues. older, larger jurisdic-
tions, with greater experience in dealing with 
poverty, or the needs of second-generation children, 
have valuable insights that can structure regional 
responses and keep other places from reinventing 
the wheel. Sometimes, new institutions are needed. 
for instance, in a growing number of metro areas, 
regional workforce intermediaries serve as critical 
links between the supply and demand sides of the 
labor market, working with employers, educational 
institutions, workforce training providers, and work-
ers at the regional scale.24 
Second, metropolitan areas need to overcome 
their legacy of fragmented “little box” govern-
ments, either through greater collaboration between 
jurisdictions, or outright consolidation of outdated, 
inefficient local government units. The pittsburgh 
metropolitan area, for example, which declined in 
population in the 2000s, still contains 775 separate 
local governments that include municipalities, town-
ships, counties, and special districts. fragmentation 
such as this keeps governments weak: the vast 
majority of municipalities have limited tax bases and 
struggle to provide even the most basic services. 
fragmentation also increases the cost of govern-
ment, often leading competing jurisdictions to dupli-
cate infrastructure, staffing and services that could 
otherwise be provided more cost effectively. finally, 
fragmentation exerts weakens long-term regional 
economic performance: parochial jurisdictions 
compete against each other rather than working 
together to resolve shared challenges and compete 
in the world economy. consolidation, particularly of 
school districts, has yielded savings, better services, 
or both. Maine has saved $36 million by reducing 
the number of school districts from 290 to 215, 
and hopes to make additional reductions. School 
district consolidation has also been proposed in 
pennsylvania (from 500 districts to 100) and indiana. 
Third, metropolitan areas have to act like metro-
politan areas, especially in their dealings with states. 
in 29 states, large metropolitan areas contain a 
More than 
ever, the lines 
between cities 
and suburbs—
and the long, 
fruitless history 
of battles and 
mistrust between 
them—must be 
transcended. 
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majority of the population; in some of those states, 
just one or two metropolitan areas alone make up 
a majority of the population. yet state legislators 
from these large centers, together with their smaller 
metropolitan counterparts, do not reliably unite to 
exercise their numerical advantage. They are divided 
by party, by race, by class, and by the outdated view 
that cities, suburbs, exurbs, and rural areas (all of 
which are found within metropolitan areas) have 
incompatible interests. As metropolitan areas grow 
and share an increasingly unified demographic pro-
file—and attendant challenges—they should consoli-
date their influence on common issues that concern 
the well-being of their populations. 
These governance ideas are, admittedly, not nec-
essarily new, nor have they been widely practiced to 
date. but the recent pace and scale of demographic 
change in metropolitan areas, and the challenges 
those trends raise amid a bleak fiscal environment, 
mean that the time has come for individual metro-
politan jurisdictions to govern together, in ways befit-
ting their increasingly common destinies.
CONCLUSION
Specific policy responses that truly engage and 
make the most of America’s potential in the face of 
emerging demographic realities must be priorities 
for national, metropolitan, and local actors alike in 
the coming decade. This chapter presents a policy 
framework for approaching these issues from both 
“macro” and “metro” perspectives. 
but a higher-order leadership is just as needed. 
notwithstanding the long-term sweep of many of 
the trends described here, the pace of change and 
complexity of u.S. society only seems to multiply 
with each passing decade. now, as the nation and its 
major metropolitan areas reach a series of critical 
demographic junctures, forging a constructive path 
forward to the “next society” is as much about help-
ing communities manage the velocity of change as it 
is about responding to its specific character. failure 
to maximize shared responses to the inevitable chal-
lenges of change, and to promote common owner-
ship of the solutions, will only serve to sow the seeds 
of intergenerational and inter-racial, inter-ethnic 
conflict. The resulting polarization, already evident 
in our national politics, impedes adaptation and the 
timeless American struggle to form a more perfect 
union. 
understanding—from the ground up—who 
Americans are, and who they are becoming, is a criti-
cal step toward building those bridges before they 
become impassable divides. We hope that the State 
of Metropolitan America proves a useful platform 
from which to build that understanding. n
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